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INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND OVERVIEW

A. Introduction
In 1980, Congress embarked upon an experiment in "curbing excessive
regulation and the unreasonable exercise of Government authority" by directing
that attorney's fees be awarded in favor of private parties who resist unjustifiable
government conduct in litigation.' The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)2
expanded the federal government's liability for awards of attorney's fees beyond
the traditional realms of civil rights laws3 and open government laws,4 and
broadly waived the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to
payment of attorney's fees in any civil action in which the position of the federal
government is found to be without substantial justification.5 While Congress had
previously enacted attorney's fee award statutes to encourage private enforcement
of important statutory policies, the EAJA blazed a new path by adopting feeshifting as an instrument to monitor government regulation and to deter
unjustifiable government policies and enforcement actions. 6

1. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4991 (explaining under this legislation "fee-shifting becomes an instrument for curbing excessive
regulation and the unreasonable exercise of Government authority"); S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1979) (same).
2. The original EAJA was enacted in 1980, Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat.
2325 (1980), as an experimental program with a "sun-set" provision, under which the statute lapsed
on October 1, 1984. Id. § 203, 94 Stat. at 2327. Congress re-enacted the EAJA, with some
clarifying amendments, as a permanent statute in 1985. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
4. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988).
5. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
6. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Attorneys' Fees, the NLRB, andthe EqualAccess to JusticeAct:
From Bad to Worse, 2 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 1, 43 (1984) (arguing the EAJA effects "a complete
upheaval of the historic theoretical justification for fee shifting legislation" because, while "Congress
hafs] previously authorized fee-shifting in order to encourage private enforcement of important
statutory public policies," the EAJA "for the first time will be using fee shifting to deter
governmental enforcement of public policies"); Susan G. Mezey & Susan M. Olson, Fee Shifting and
Public Policy: The Equal Access to Justice Act, 77 Judicature 13, 13 (1993) (stating the EAJA
"represents the intersection of two independent trends that developed during the late 1970s: the
deregulation of business and the use of statutes shifting the costs of litigation to further public
policy").
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Over the decade leading up to the EAJA, the federal government had
gradually lowered the shield of sovereign immunity and made itself increasingly
amenable to awards of attorney's fees to those who succeed in specific types of
litigation against the government.7 This "trend against immunity from fee awards
reached its crescendo with the enactment of the Equal Access to Justice Act,
which puts the government on equal footing with private defendants in terms of
fee-shifting and further makes the government liable in fees whenever its position
is not substantially justified."8 In 1985, Congress "institutionalized" the
experiment 9 by re-enacting the EAJA as a permanent statute.1°
Fifteen years after its original enactment, the EAJA remains a constant focus
of judicial attention, with new appellate decisions interpreting its provisions and
applying its standards appearing in nearly every volume of the Federal Reporter.
Although recent commentators have suggested the EAJA has had only qualified
success in encouraging injured parties to seek redress against government
wrongdoing and in deterring government misconduct," the provision is likely to
remain on the statute books for the foreseeable future. There is a powerful
appeal to the principle that the government should be held responsible for all
litigation costs, including attorney's fees, attributable to its wrongful conduct.
The EAJA has become a bright star fixed in the firmament of fee-shifting
statutes. As evidenced by its ubiquitous presence in the federal case reporters
during the last decade, Section 2412 of Title 28 has become one of the most
heavily and intensely litigated sections of the United States Code.
Several articles have addressed particular aspects of the EAJA, provided a
general overview of the statute, or explored the practical consequences of its feeshifting rules and limitations. This two-part article is a comprehensive and
detailed survey of each significant operative provision of the statute concerning
court awards of attorney's fees based upon unreasonable government conduct.
This article provides a critique and synthesis of the burgeoning body of case law

7. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Priner on Awards ofAttorney's Fees Against the Federal
Government, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 733, 735-36 (1993).
8. Id. at 735. See also Barry S. Rutcofsky, Note, The Award of Attorney's Fees Under the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 307, 307-08 (1982) ("Although many statutes have
previously penetrated the veil of government immunity, none has done so on such a grand scale.").
9. See Claire Elizabeth Winold, hIstitutionalizingan Experiment: The Extension ofthe Equal
Access to Justice Act-Questions Resolved, Questions Remaining, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 925 (1987).
10. See supra note 2. See generally Louise L. Hill, Equal Access to Justice Act-Paving the
Way for Legislative Change, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 50 (1985) (discussing the "tumultuous" threeyear trial period of the original EAJA and the evolution of the legislation to re-enact and clarify the
EAJA in 1985).
11. See Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act-A Qualified
Success, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 458 (1993) (concluding the EAJA has been of modest value in
providing incentive for injured parties to challenge government action and in deterring government
misconduct, and proposing the Act be revised to eliminate the substantial justification standard in
favor of automatic fee-shifting at least in individual benefits cases); Mezey & Olson, supra note 6
(concluding the EAJA has been an ineffective way to encourage small businesses to challenge
unreasonable government regulators and has been used mainly by Social Security disability plaintiffs).
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that has grown up around the statute. In the tradition of the treatise, this article
is designed as both a reference work on an important statute and a prescription

for interpretation of the statute in a manner that comports with the purpose and
language of the Equal Access to Justice Act.
B. Background on the Equal Access to Justice Act
1. Legislative History of the EAJA
The Equal Access to Justice Act was originally enacted as a rider to a small
business assistance bill, reflecting the concern of Congress that small businesses
were being subjected to arbitrary regulation by federal administrators and "that
small business are the target of agency action precisely because they do not have
the resources to fully litigate the issue." 2 However, although the statute imposed
certain eligibility limits based upon net worth and employment size, Congress
extended the benefits of the EAJA to nearly all citizens or entities contesting
unreasonable exercises of government authority.' 3 The EAJA, as originally
enacted, contained a sunset provision allowing a three-year trial period, 4 and the
Aot expired by its own terms on October 1, 1984. Although Congress had
passed various amendments to the Act in October of 1984,'s the bill was vetoed
by President Reagan on November 8, 1984,16 In 1985, Congress passed new
legislation, including changes responsive to the President's objections, that
reinstated the EAJA retroactively to October 1, 1984.' 7 On August 5, 1985,
President Reagan signed the bill.'8 The EAJA, as amended, was re-enacted as
a permanent statute. 9

12. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2dSess. 10(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4988; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
13. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988) (defining "party" for
purposes of EAJA Subsection (d)).
14. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325, 2329 (lapsed).
15,
130 Cong. Rec. H12171-74 (daily ed. Oct. 1. 1984).
16. Memorandum of Disapproval of H.R. 5479, 20 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 1814-15 (Nov. 8,
1984). Although expressing general approval of the EAJA, the President objected to certain specific
provisions of the bill. Id. Section IV of this article, forthcoming, will discuss the meaning of the
"position of the United States," which must be substantially justified under the EAJA, and the
definition of this term in the re-enactment legislation.
17. 131 Cong. Rec. S9991-98 (daily ed. Jly 24, 1985). See also H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess, (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.CA.N. 132. As discussed in section IV of this
article, forthcoming, although Congress' revisions were only partially responsive to the President's
objections, he signed the bill.
18. Extension of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 21 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 966-67 (Aug.
5, 1985).
19. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 504 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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2. Summary of the EAJA
The Equal Access to Justice Act actually contains three fee-shifting
provisions; two provide for awards in court proceedings and one applies to
certain administrative proceedings.
The first fee-shifting provision in the statute, Subsection 2412(b), subjects
the United States to liability for attorney's fees "to the same extent that any other
party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute
which specifically provides for such an award."' Under the "American Rule"
on attorney's fees, each party in litigation must bear its own legal expenses
unless there is an express statutory authorization for shifting fees or one of the
narrow common-law exceptions to the rule applies.2 Subsection (b) makes the
federal government liable for attorney's fees under common-law and statutory
fee-shifting exceptions to the American Rule on the same basis as any other
party. In effect, the statute places the government on "equal footing" with
private parties in terms of liability for attorney's fee awards. 22 Subsection (b)
waives the sovereign immunity of the federal government, but "does not create
any new substantive rights to attorney's fee awards."23 To collect a fee, the
litigant must still identify another statute or common-law doctrine that provides
an exception to the general bar on fee-shifting per the American Rule.24
The second fee-shifting provision found in the EAJA, Subsection 2412(d),2"
is the focus of this article. Subsection (d) not only waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States, but also creates a new basis for an award of
attorney's fees beyond other common-law or statutory exceptions to the
American Rule. Subsection (d) is broad in that it applies to most civil actions,
but it is also limited in that it allows an attorney's fee award only when the
government's position is found to be unreasonable.
Under Subsection (d), in addition to court costs,26 the court must award
attorney's fees to any party who meets specified eligibility qualifications

20. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988).
21. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 1616
(1975). See generally Sisk, supra note 7, at 738-39.
22. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4987.
23. Sisk, supra note 7, at 784.
24. See generally id. at 783-88 (discussing EAJA Subsection (b)).
25. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
26. In Subsection 2412(a), the EAJA provides court costs are available to the prevailing party
in an action against the federal government, unless there is a statutory exception. Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In addition to attorney's fees, Subsection
(d) of the EAJA provides for an award of "the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses" and "the
reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test or project which is found by the court
to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case." Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988). Although court
costs are routinely available under Subsection (a), fees and other expenses may be awarded only if
the position of the United States is found to be without substantial justification. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
The focus of this article is upon awards of attorney's fees.
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(generally excluding wealthy individuals and large organizations) 2' and who
prevails 28 in a non-tort civil action against the federal government,29 "unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or
that special circumstances make an award unjust. 30 In Pierce v. Underwood,3 '
the Supreme Court interpreted "substantially justified" to mean "'justified in
substance or in the main'-that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person.0 2 Subsection (d) places a specific cap on the amount of
permissible fee awards, directing that fees "shall not be awarded in excess of $75
per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a
special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the
proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee. 33 An applicant for a fee under
Subsection (d) must file an application for fees "within thirty days of final
judgment in the action. '
Finally, a third fee-shifting provision created by the EAJA, which is
separately codified,35 authorizes a prevailing party in an "adversary adjudication"
before an administrative agency to obtain an award for legal expenses in the
administrative proceedings under the same terms as Subsection (d)-that is, when
the government's position is not substantially justified. 6 The statute defines an
administrative proceeding as "adversarial" if it involves an adjudication under
Section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act in which the United States is
represented by counsel or otherwise.3 7 Although much of the discussion in this
article is pertinent to the interpretation of EAJA Section 504,38 this article is

27. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B). See generally infra section III.B
(discussing the nature of party
eligibility).
28. See generally infra section III.A (discussing the prevailing party requirement for eligibility).
29. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988). See generally infra section
II (discussing the scope of EAJA Subsection (d)).
30. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988). See generally infra section
IV, forthcoming (discussing entitlement to an award, the substantial justification inquiry, and the
special circumstances exception).
31.
487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541 (1988).
32. Id. at 565, 108 S.Ct. at 2550.
33. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988). See generally infra section
V,forthcoming (discussing measurement of the fee award under EAJA Subsection (d), including costof-living increases and special factor enhancements).
34. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(B) (1988). See generally infra section
VI, forthcoming (discussing the procedures to petition for a fee award under EAJA Subsection (d)).
35. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 504(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993) (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1988)). See generally
Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 112 S.Ct. 515, 519-21 (1991)
(holding administrative deportation proceedings are not "adversary adjudications" for which fees may
be awarded under EAJA Section 504 because such proceedings are not subject to or governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act). See also infra section II.A.2 (discussing the general limitation of
EAJA Subsection (d) to judicial proceedings and the limited exception for ancillary administrative
proceedings).
38. Section 504 applies the same standard for awards of attorney's fees at the administrative
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limited in scope to an examination of Subsection (d) of EAJA Section 2412,
which provides for attorney's fees in court proceedings.
3. Purposes of the EAJA
Through the Equal Access to Justice Act, "Congress presumably sought to
achieve three inter-connected goals: to provide an incentive for private parties
to contest government overreaching, to deter subsequent government wrongdoing,
and to provide more complete compensation for citizens injured by government
action."39'
First, Congress intended to "reduce[] the disparity in resources between
individuals, small businesses, and other organizations with limited resources and
'the federal government,"4 thereby "encourag[ing] relatively impecunious private
parties to challenge unreasonable or oppressive government behavior by relieving
such parties of the fear of incurring large litigation expenses."4 The preamble
to the EAJA expresses this purpose "to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking
review of, or defending against, governmental action."42 As one court colorfully
put it, by "discourag[ing] the federal government from using its superior
litigating resources unreasonably," the EAJA is "an 'anti-bully' law."43
Second, Congress sought to deter wrongful behavior by federal officials and
regulators, "anticipat[ing] that the prospect of paying sizable awards of attorneys'
fees when they overstepped their authority and were challenged in court would
induce administrators to behave more responsibly in the future."' By encouraging judicial challenges to administrative decisions, Congress also hoped to refine
the administration of federal law and "help assure that administrative decisions
reflect informed deliberation. 45 At the same time, however, Congress did not

level and contains a nearly identical definition of "party."
39. Krent, supra note 11, at 458. See also Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 549-50 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984) (outlining goals of the EAJA).
40. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985), reprintedin 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
133. See also Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163, 110 S. Ct. 2316, 2321 (1990) ("[Tlhe
specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the financial disincentive to
challenge unreasonable governmental actions.").
41. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 549 (citing statute and legislative history). See generally Krent, supra
note 11, at 463-67 (analyzing whether the EAJA has encouraged private parties to challenge
governmental action by equalizing litigation resources); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651, 663-65 (discussing as a general
theory of fee-shifting the prospect that reimbursement of fees will strengthen the position of a weaker
party opposing a party with superior resources).
42. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481. § 202(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2325, 2325 (lapsed).
43. Battles Farm Co. v. Pierce, 806 F.2d 1098, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated, 487 U.S. 1229,
108 S.Ct. 2890 (1988).
44. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 550.
45. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4991. See also Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 165 n.14, 110 S. Ct. 2316, 2322 n.14 (1990)
(quoting favorably from the committee report accompanying the 1980 EAJA legislation and stating
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want the prospect of paying attorney's fees to "chill public officials charged with
enforcing the law from vigorously discharging their responsibilities. 46
Accordingly, rather than prescribing mandatory fee awards against the government whenever it lost a case, the EAJA adopts the "middle ground" approach of
authorizing a fee when the government's position is found to be without
substantial justification.47 The "substantial justification" standard "balances the
constitutional obligation of the executive branch to see that the laws are faithfully
executed against the public interest in encouraging parties to vindicate their
rights. 48
Finally, although the legislative history focuses upon the first two purposes
as primary, Congress also undoubtedly intended to compensate parties who had
been wronged by the government, thus allowing "those injured by the government to receive complete compensation for their injuries, including litigation
expense. 49 Thus, the EAJA serves "a salutary function in creating the
appearance of fairness" by providing more complete compensation to those who
have suffered a breach of the public trust through the arbitrary and unreasonable
use of government power."

these reports "reflect the dual concerns of access for individuals and improvement of Government
policies"). See generally Krent, supra note 11, at 467-76 (discussing the purpose of the EAJA in
encouraging monitoring of administrative decisions and deterring governmental wrongdoing, but
suggesting the EAJA has had little success in promoting this purpose); Rowe, supra note 41, at 66061 (discussing the award of attorney's fees as "punishment for unjustified or undesirable behavior").
46. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
139.
47. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4993. See also Krent, supra note 11, at 507 (stating the EAJA "is the product of an uneasy
compromise" between the desire "to encourage meritorious litigation against the government" and
"deter government wrongdoing" and the wish "to prevent overdeterring vigorous government
policymaking and vigilant enforcement initiatives." a compromise reflected in the statute's
"safeguards ... most notably the substantial justification standard").
48. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96thCong.,2dSess. 10(1980), reprintedin 1980U.S.C.C.A.N. 49844989.
49. Krent, supra note 11, at 477 (criticizing the EAJA as a compensation mechanism because
of its narrow reach). See also 131 Cong. Rec. S9998 (daily ed. July 24, 1985):
And there is not a Member of this body who has not found on his or her doorstep citizens
who have been wronged by their own Government. At worst, a career or a life may be
rined; at best, the individual has been wrongly accused and has had to incur great
expense to clear his name ....
Equal access to justice made the promise of justice to
these people who had gone to great expense to challenge agency wrong, or who had
successfully defended themselves against wrongful agency action.
(statements of Sen. Bumpers). See also Rowe, supra note 41, at 657 ("A party subjected to a
baseless suit, forced to run tip legal fees to overcome a groundless defense, or subjected to unjustified
tactics in litigation, has an appealing claim for recompense of legal fees he should not have had to
spend .... "). See generally Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 Va. L. Rev.
2039, 2069-75 (1993) (discussing the compensation rationale for fee-shifting statutes).
50. Krent, supra note 11, at 478. See also Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir.
1983) ("[lit has been suggested that the EAJA was intended to compensate parties for expenses
incurred in defending against unreasonable government action-a purpose which arguably is distinct
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C. Overview
Although the Supreme Court has wishfully admonished that attorney's fee
requests should "not result in a second major litigation" overshadowing the
merits of the case,5 neither should the courts give "short shrift" to fee calculations given the important legal rights and the substantial financial stakes at issue
in fee-shifting proceedings.52 Especially in the EAJA context, because of the
weighty role Congress envisioned for this statute in encouraging citizen
resistance to unreasonable governmental actions and deterring government
officials from administrative wrongdoing, the courts have a significant responsibility in faithfully applying the provisions of the statute in accordance with those
legislative purposes. Moreover, the complexity of the EAJA, with its limitations
on scope, specific definitions of eligible parties, and special standards for
entitlement to and measurement of a fee award-all designed to implement the
particular legislative purposes behind the statute--demands and requires careful
legal analysis.
Precisely because of the significant policy and financial issues lurking behind
every EAJA dispute, this statute has been the situs of closely fought litigation
battles. The economic lure of a fee award has caused litigants to test every
limitation and exception in the statute, from the statutory rules on eligibility of
parties a to the $75-per-hour cap on attorney rates.'
On the other side, the
government, wishing to avoid a judicial determination that its position was not
substantially justified, has insisted upon a narrow scope for the act and
vigorously opposed nearly every significant EAJA application.5 5 As a consequence, virtually every paragraph and phrase in the statute has been the subject
of litigation and nearly every word has been parsed by the courts in reported
decisions. In this respect, the EAJA and its accompanying case law present a
fascinating model of statutory interpretation in action.

from mitigating the deterrent effect of litigating.").
51. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983).
52. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 57 (1991) ("There is no immediately obvious reason why the courts should give short shrift to fee
calculations as compared with other judicial responsibilities. At issue in the fee calculation are legal
rights no less important than other rights stemming from the disposition of the case on the merits or
from the damages calculation.").
53. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988) (defining "party" as
individuals and entities with limited net worth and employment size).
54. See id. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (providing "attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per
hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the
limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee").
55. See id. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (directing the court to award fees "unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust").
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Although the discussion that follows may serve as background information
for those who wish to conduct a case study of principles of statutory interpretation, most readers are expected to use this article as a comprehensive reference
work on Subsection (d) of the Equal Access to Justice Act. Moreover, while
complexity is inherent in the provisions of the statute and inevitable in its
application to specific fact scenarios, this commentary is dedicated toward
simplifying the process and sharpening the legal debate by identifying patterns
in the case law and suggesting approaches toward issues of continuing
controversy. The primary value of a commentary on an area of statutory law lies
in the sifting of decisions and the synthesis of case law, the suggestion of
systematic approaches to resolve persistent problems, and the constant reminder
to return to first principles found in the text and purpose of the statute. In the
tradition of the treatise style of scholarly writing, this article provides both a
survey of the provisions in the statute and a critique of the case law, lingering
on points of theoretical complexity or litigative intensity and giving special
attention to unsettled areas of dispute or those in which a structured analysis has
not yet emerged from the court decisions.
Part one, presented here, considers the scope of EAJA Subsection (d) in
terms of the kinds of claims to which it applies (section II) and the eligibility
requirements laid down in the statute as prerequisites to seeking a fee award
(section III). Section II examines the scope of Subsection (d), including the
general application of the provision to "any civil action" (and its limitation to
judicial proceedings),56 the types of courts that have authority to consider EAJA
awards, 57 the exclusion of cases sounding in tort'g and tax proceedings, 59 and the
prohibition on superseding or displacing any other fee-shifting statute. 60 Section
III addresses the standards of eligibility for a fee award, including the classic
requirement that a party prevail in the litigation, 61 the definition of "party" in the
statute to include only individuals with a net worth that does not exceed $2
million and other listed entities with a net worth that does not exceed $7 million
and that employ no more than 500 people, 62 and the requirement that a party
incur an obligation for legal expenses to be eligible for a fee award.63
Part two, which will be published in a future issue of this review, will
contain the remaining three sections of the article, together with a conclusion.
Section IV will explain and analyze the entitlement standards for receiving an
EAJA award, including the requirement that the position of the United States be

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra
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found to be without substantial justification.' The section will explore the nature
of the government's position, the meaning of substantial justification, the
relationship between the substantial justification inquiry and the decision on the
merits, appellate review, and factors that weigh positively and negatively in the
determination. 6 In addition, the section will address the provision that attorney's66
fees be withheld when special circumstances would make an award unjust.
Section V will describe the measurement of the fee award, including the $75-perhour cap on attorney's fees, together with a discussion of cost-of-living increases
and a critical evaluation of when special factors justify an enhancement of the
award above the rate ceiling.67 Finally, section VI will outline the procedures for
seeking an EAJA fee award, including the thirty-day time period for filing a
petition after final judgment in the civil action. 68
II.

THE SCOPE OF EAJA SUBSECTION (D)

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award
to a prevailing party other than the United States fees ... incurred by
that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),
including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by
or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that
action, unless the court finds that, the position of the United States was
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust. (EAJA § 2412(d)(l)(A))6 9

A. Application to "Any Civil Action"
1. The Breadth of the "Civil Action" Provision
The Equal Access to Justice Act is unparalleled among fee-shifting statutes
in its breadth of application. Other statutes authorizing the award of attorney's
fees are invariably attached to an underlying statutory cause of action and have
no application beyond cases brought pursuant to that substantive claim.70 For
example, in 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to authorize
awards of attorney's fees against the United States when a party prevailed against
the federal government in a claim of discrimination within the purview of the

64.
65.
66.

See infra section IV, forthcoming.
Id.
Id.

67.

See infra section V, forthcoming.

68. See infra section VI, forthcoming.
69. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
70. Mezey & Olson, supra note 6, at 13 (stating most fee-shifting statutes "are adjuncts to
substantive legislation").
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Civil Rights Act.7 Likewise, when Congress has created statutory causes of
action unique to the federal government, such as the Freedom of Information

Act, it frequently has attached a provision for the award of attorney's fees that
attends the particular cause of action. 7' The Equal Access to Justice Act, by
contrast, "is a freestanding statute; its provision for fee awards is not attached to
a particular statute creating a substantive cause of action. 73
The wide compass of EAJA Subsection (d) is shown by its provision for an
award of attorney's fees "in any civil action" brought by or against the federal
government. 74 Although there are certain limitations in the statute's application,
as discussed below, the general availability of attorney's fees "in any civil
action" confirms the EAJA's wide-ranging coverage. Indeed, the breadth of the
statute implicit in the phrase "any civil action" was further clarified and extended
by Congress when the EAJA was re-enacted in 1985 through the addition of the
phrase "including proceedings for judicial review of agency action." 75 In sum,
the EAJA encompasses nearly every claim or case that is civil, rather than
76
criminal, in nature.

71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Stipp. V 1993). See generally Sisk, supra note 7. at 76970 (discussing awards of attorney's fees against the federal government under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988). See generally Sisk, supra note 7, at 772-75 (discussing
awards of attorney's fees against the federal government under the Freedom of Information Act).
73. Sisk, supra note 7, at 783. See also Mezey & Olson, supra note 6, at 13 ("EAJA ... is
a free-standing statute, not limited to business or deregulatory litigation.").
74. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
75. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(a)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (1985). See
generally National Wildlife Fed'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 870 F.2d 542, 543 (9th
Cir. 1989) (discussing amendment and holding it allows EAJA fee awards in all actions for judicial
review of agency decisions, even if recovery of costs is barred by statute).
76. Although habeas corpus actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) by prisoners
challenging confinement resulting from criminal convictions are characterized as "civil," the subject
matter is primarily criminal in nature and such cases are certainly related to the prior criminal
proceeding. The courts have declined to extend the EAJA to habeas corpus proceedings challenging
criminal confinement. Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 968-71 (10th Cir. 1987); Boudin v. Thomas,
732 F.2d 1107, 1112-15 (2d Cir. 1984). But see In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding habeas corpus petition by alien challenging exclusion from the country did not involve a
criminal matter and thus constituted a civil action under the EAJA). See generally I Mary F. Derfiner
& Arthur D. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees 1 7.04[4], at 7-69 & n.84 (1994) (citing Hill court's
inclusion of certain type of habeas corpus case under the EAJA as an example of "spotty" adherence
by the courts to the rule that waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed). The courts have
generally excluded from the EAJA other cases that raised matters directly related to criminal
proceedings. See it re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 775 F.2d 499, 502-04 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988 & Stipp. V 1993), which provides for an award of costs "in any
civil action" brought by or against the United States, does not apply to case involving collateral
matters arising from criminal trials or grand jury investigations); United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Military Review v. Cheney, 29 M.J. 98, 103-04 (C.M.A. 1989) (holding the EAJA did not
apply to proceeding which was related to possible court-martial and thus was essentially criminal in
nature or had substantial relationship to criminal proceedings). But see Lee v. Johnson, 799 F.2d 31,
36-37 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding by divided court that action to quash a criminal grand jury subpoena
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Moreover, EAJA Subsection (d) does not discriminate on the basis of party
status.77 The statute applies to "civil actions brought by or against the United
States," thus covering suits initiated by the government against citizens and suits
filed by citizens against the government. Therefore, both plaintiffs and
defendants who prevail in litigation with the United States may recover
attorney's fees. As one commentator has explained:
[The one-way fee shifting provision of the EAJA] is not a distinction
between plaintiff and defendant, but between government and-citizen.
The citizen who prevails can recover attorney fees, whether that citizen
is a prevailing plaintiff or a prevailing defendant; the government, in
contrast, can never recover attorney fees.78

2. Limitation to Judicial Proceedings
The statute's reference to "civil action" demarks its most significant
limitation as well. Although the term "civil action" is not defined in the statute,
the ordinary meaning of the term is that of a judicial proceeding. 9 Further
reference in the statute to the forum of the "civil action" as being "in any
court"8 confirms the judicial nature of the proceedings to which the statute
applies. Thus, EAJA Subsection (d) can be invoked only when "formal litigation
with the governmen t is involved."'" Moreover, by reason of this restriction to
judicial proceedings, a party who prevails in a covered civil action may not
recover attorney's fees or expenses incurred in earlier administrative proceedings
or other activities.82 Attorney's fees are allowable only for those "reasonable and
necessary expenses of an attorney incurred or paid in preparation for trial of the
specific case before the court, which expenses are those customarily charged to

was "civil action" under the EAJA because the relief sought was civil and the privacy and other
interests raised were similar to those raised in civil proceedings).
77. Subsection (d) does, however, place an eligibility restriction on the nature of the parties that
may seek fees, imposing limitations based on net worth and employment size. Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988) (defining "party"). See generally infra section Ill.B
(discussing the definition of "party" and the net worth and employment size limitations).
78. Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem,
1986 Duke L.J. 435, 449 (1986). See also 1 Derfner & Wolf, supra note 76, 1 5.03[12][a], at 5-47
(stating the provisions of the EAJA are "sui generis primarily because they zeroed in on a particular
litigant, rather than a particular cause or category of action").
79. LeVernier Constr. v. United States, 947 F.2d 497, 503 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also VibraTech Eng'rs v. United States, 787 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding awards of fees under
EAJA Subsection (d) are limited to matters that are "part of the district court action").
80. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988).
81. John C. Dods & Timothy J. Kennedy, The Equal Access to Justice Act, 50 UMKC L. Rev.
48, 52 (1981).
82. LeVernier Constr., 947 F.2d at 501; Full Gospel Portland Church v. Thomburgh, 927 F.2d
628 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992).
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the client where the case is tried.""3 Thus, expenses for such routine activities
as factual investigation and legal research prior to filing a complaint would be
allowable.
As an illustration, when a contractor presents a claim to an agency for
payment on a government contract, prior to any final decision by an agency
contract officer and the filing of a formal lawsuit under the Contract Disputes
Act,84 no "civil action" has yet been instituted within the meaning of the EAJA
and legal expenses for work at that pre-litigation administrative stage could not
be recovered later in court. 85 However, once a final decision has been made by
an agency contract officer, and the government contractor seeks direct court
review of that decision, the EAJA would allow an award of attorney's fees.
Indeed, another paragraph in EAJA Subsection (d) specifically defines "civil
action brought by or against the United States" to include "an appeal by a party,
other than the United States, from a decision of a contracting officer rendered
pursuant to a disputes clause in a contract with the Government or pursuant to
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.''s6 This provision, which was added in 1985,
further clarifies that once a matter has progressed beyond the administrative level
and formal litigation has ensued, EAJA Subsection (d) authorizes
recovery of
87
those costs attributable to the litigation phase of the matter.
Notwithstanding the limitation of EAJA Subsection (d) to judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court has held a fee claimant under unusual circumstances
may recover attorney's fees under this subsection for administrative proceedings

83. Oliveira v. United States, 827 F.2d 735, 744 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
84. 41 U.S.C. § 609 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
85. LeVernier Constr., 947 F.2d at 500-02; Keyava Constr. v. United States, 15 Ct. Ct. 135,
138 (1988).
86. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(E) (1988). Under the Contract
Disputes Act, a government contractor may seek review of the decision of an agency contracting
officer either through a direct action in the United States Court of Federal Claims, 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), or by an agency board of contract appeals. Id. § 606 (1988). If a contractor
seeks direct review in the Court of Federal Claims, and a decision of the contracting officer is found
to be without substantial justification, Subsection (d)(2)(E) directly applies to authorize a fee award.
See also Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining
"court" for purposes of EAJA Subsection (d) to include the Court of Federal Claims). If a contractor
instead seeks review in the agency board of contract appeals, a separate part of the EAJA applying
to adversarial administrative adjudications expressly provides for an award of fees if the government's
position is found to be without substantial justification. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
504(a)(1) (1988) (providing for award of fees in "adversary adjudication"), and 504(b)(1)(C) (Supp.
V 1993) (defining "adversary adjudication" to include an appeal of a contracting officer's decision
to an agency board of contract appeals under the Contract Disputes Act). See generally Donald J.
Kinlin, Equal Access to Justice Act, 16 Pub. Cont. L.J. 266, 268 (1986) (discussing jurisdiction of
boards of contract appeals and the United States Claims Court over EAJA applications).
87. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., IstSess. 17 (1985), reprintedin 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
146 (stating amendments to the EAJA clarify that "civil action brought by or against the United
States" includes judicial review of agency action and an appeal from a decision of a contracting
officer).
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8
that are "intimately connected" to an ongoing judicial proceeding. In Sullivan
v. Hudson,89 the Court held attorney's fees may be collected for administrative
proceedings in a Social Security benefits case that follows a court remand to the
agency, provided the court has properly retained jurisdiction over the matter and
9
contemplates the entry of a judgment upon completion of all proceedings. 0 In
other words, attorney's fees may be available when post-litigation administrative
proceedings are supplemental to the judicial proceedings and remain subject to
ultimate approval by a court maintaining supervisory powers. However, in the
more recent decision of Shalalav. Schaefer,91 the Court clarified that a court may
retain jurisdiction pending a remand to the agency-and thus may award
attorney's fees under EAJA Subsection (d) for post-litigation administrative
proceedings--only if the judicial review statute permits a remand without the
prior entry of judgment. 92 Thus, the exception allowing recovery of EAJA
Subsection (d) fees for subsequent administrative proceedings applies only in the
context of "statutes regulating in great detail the interaction between the court
and the agency, specifically those statutes which provide for continuing court
jurisdiction over post-remand agency proceedings."93
Although EAJA Subsection (d) is restricted by its terms to judicial
proceedings, this is less a limitation on the availability of an award of attorney's
fees against the federal government than a recognition that a separate but related
statutory provision governs the award of attorney's fees for unreasonable
government conduct at the administrative level. Under a separate section of the
EAJA--codified at Section 504 of Title 594-a prevailing party in an "adversary

88. Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 892, 109 S. Ct. 2248, 2258 (1989).
89. Id.
90. Id.
113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993).
91.
92. Id. at 2628-31. Under the Social Security Act, which was at issue in both Hudson and
Schaefer, the district court may remand a Social Security benefits case to the agency under either
sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2629. Sentence
six, which allows a remand only if the agency requests the remand before answering the complaint
or where new evidence is properly adduced, specifically provides that the new agency decision is to
be filed with the court after proceedings on remand. Id. at 2629 & nn. 1-2. Thus, the statute plainly
contemplates the court will retain jurisdiction pending the remand. However, under sentence four,
which generally authorizes remands for other reasons, the court is directed by statute to enter a
judgment at the time of any remand. Because judgment must be entered immediately upon the
court's grant of a sentence-four remand, the court may not retain jurisdiction and thus may not award
fees in the forthcoming administrative proceedings. Id. at 2628-31. The different effects of sentencefour and sentence-six remands upon the application of the EAJA is discussed in detail infra section
III.A.2.b (discussing prevailing party status in the context of government benefit cases and Social
Security claims).
93. Full Gospel Portland Church v. Thornburgh, 927 F.2d 628, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992) (holding EAJA fees are not available for post-litigation administrative
proceedings when the district court did not retain continuing jurisdiction and did not remand the case
to the agency, even though the agency may have implemented the court's conclusion in its administrative determination).
94. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). As stated earlier,
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adjudication" before an administrative agency may obtain an award for legal
expenses when the government's position is not substantially justified.95 The
statute defines an administrative proceeding as "adversarial" if it involves an
adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act in which the United States
is represented by counsel or otherwise. 96 Moreover, if a party successfully seeks
judicial review of an adversary adjudication by an agency, EAJA Subsection
(d)(3) authorizes awards of attorney's fees by the court for both the judicial and
the prior administrative phases of the proceedings if the government's position
during the adversary adjudication was not substantially justified.97
B. Jurisdictionto Award EAJA Fees
From the date of the original enactment of the EAJA, questions have arisen
regarding whether Subsection (d), by providing for an award by "any court,"
authorizes an award of attorney's fees against the government in courts created by
Congress with judges that do not enjoy the protections of Article III of the United
States Constitution.98 Subsequent amendments to the EAJA have explicitly
extended authority to award attorney's fees under the EAJA to certain non-Article
III tribunals, 99 thus simultaneously reducing the opportunity for controversy about
the scope of the EAJA and indicating that courts not included within that express
authorization are without power to apply the EAJA.'0° Nevertheless, the issue has
persisted and demanded the attention of the courts, most significantly in the context
of bankruptcy courts.' ° ' In the end, however, the controversy may be of limited

although much of the discussion in this article is pertinent to the interpretation of the EAJA Section
504, which applies the same standard for awards of attorney's fees at the administrative level and
contains a nearly identical definition of party, this article is limited in scope to an examination of
EAJA Subsection (d) for awards of attorney's fees in court.
95. Id. § 504(a)(1) (1988).
96. Id. § 504(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
See generally Ardestani v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 112 S. Ct. 515. 519-21 (1991) (holding administrative deportation proceedings
are not "adversary adjudications" for which fees may be awarded under EAJA Section 504 because
such proceedings are not subject to or governed by Section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act).
97. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(3) (1988). See generally Full Gospel
Portland Church, 927 F.2d at 630-31 (holding EAJA Subsection (d)(3) authorizes court awards of
fees for both judicial review and administrative proceedings only if the challenged administrative
action involved an "adversary adjudication" governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, as
required by the EAJA Section 504(b)(1)(C)).
98. Judges of both the Supreme Court and inferior courts are appointed for life tenure, "during
good Behaviour," and may not have their compensation diminished during their term in office. U.S.
Const. art. Il, § 1.
99. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining
"court" to include the United States Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Veterans Appeals).
100. See infra section II.B.2 (discussing the definition of "court" in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F)
and concluding this definition excludes other non-Article III entities).
101. See infra section II.B.l (discussing conflicting court decisions concerning whether
bankruptcy courts have authority to make awards of fees under the EAJA).
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practical significance because there is an alternative method by which EAJA
fees
0 2
may properly be awarded in cases originating in the bankruptcy courts.1
1. The BroadReference in Paragraph(d)(1)(A) to "Any Court" Could
be Understoodto CoverNon-Article III TribunalsIncluding
Bankruptcy Courts
Paragraph (d)(1)(A) of the EAJA authorizes award of attorney's fees in any
civil action brought by or against the United States "in any court having jurisdiction
of that action,"'0 3 which by itself would suggest that any adjudicative body styled
as a court would have authority to consider an award of attorney's fees under this
statute.'I° The word "court" would certainly encompass at least Article III district
courts and courts of appeals with judges appointed for life tenure and would not
appear to exclude other judicial tribunals.'05 The expansive and all-inclusive
modifier, "any," further suggests the reference has broad application. 06
Early EAJA cases raised the question whether such non-Article III courts as
the Tax Court'0 7 and the Claims Court'0 8 had jurisdiction to award attorney's fees
under the EAJA, with courts reaching mixed results. The question with respect to
both of these courts has since been answered by express statutory enactments. In
1982, Congress adopted a new and distinct fee-shifting provision for Internal
Revenue cases that specifically authorized awards by the Tax Court'0 9 and

102. See infra section II.B.3 (concluding bankruptcy courts, as an arm of the district courts, may
recommend the award of the EAJA fees by the district courts).
103. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
104. See O'Connor v. United States Dep't of Energy, 942 F.2d 771, 773 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The
term 'court' is generally defined in its plain, ordinary, and every day meaning as '[a] person or group
of persons whose task is to hear and submit a decision on cases at law."' (quoting Webster's II New
Riverside University Dictionary)).
105. In Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991), the Supreme Court
considered whether the chief judge of the Tax Court may appoint special trial judges consistent with
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of
inferior officers "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S.
Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. The Court interpreted the phrase "Courts of Law" to include legislative
courts and not to be limited to Article III courts. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 888-90, 111 S. Ct. at 2444-46.
106. Cf.Freytag, 501 U.S. at 892, 111 S. Ct. at 2651 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (disagreeing
with the majority that the Tax Court can be the type of court referred to in the Appointments Clause
because the Clause "refers to 'the Courts of Law,"' which narrows the class of courts down to those
Article III courts envisioned by the Constitution, as opposed to meaning "any 'Court of Law"').
107.' Bowen v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding the non-Article III Tax
Court lacked jurisdiction to award EAJA fees). See also McQuiston v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 807,
811 (1982).
108. Essex Electro Eng'rs v. United States, 757 F.2d 247, 250-52 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding the
non-Article III Claims Court had jurisdiction to award EAJA fees). See also Bailey v. United States,
I C1. Ct. 69, 72-74, vacated in part on other grounds, 721 F.2d 357 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
109. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(a), 96 Stat. 324, 572 (1982) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7430
(1988)).
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simultaneously withdraws tax cases from the scope of the EAJA." ° In 1985, a
new definition section was added to the EAJA specifying
that "court" includes the
2
Claims)."
Federal
of
Court
(now
Court"'
Claims
However, the issue has persisted in the context of bankruptcy courts, whose
judges are appointed for a term of fourteen years by the court of appeals for that
circuit." 3 Once again, the courts have reached varying results on the 4question of
whether a non-Article III court has jurisdiction to award EAJA fees."
In In re Davis," 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
following an earlier decision that the non-Article III Tax Court was without
authority to award the EAJA fees," 6 concluded that bankruptcy judges were
excluded from the EAJA because only courts with judges appointed pursuant to7
Article III have proper jurisdiction to award attorney's fees under that statute."
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the term "court" in EAJA Subsection (d) is a shortform of the statutory term "court of the United States,""8 which is defined in 28
U.S.C. § 451 as including the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, the district
courts, the Court of International Trade, and any
court "the judges of which are
' 19
entitled to hold office during good behavior.""
The court reasoned that this cross-reference from the EAJA to the definition
of "court of the United States" in Section 451 was appropriate for two reasons.
First, Paragraph 2412(d)(1)(A) allows a court to award attorney's fees "in addition

110. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(c), 96 Stat. 324, 574 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e)
(1988)). See generally infra section I1.D (discussing exclusion of tax cases from the EAJA).
11.1.
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
112. The Claims Court was re-named the "United States Court of Federal Claims" in 1992.
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506,4516 (1992).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
114. Compare O'Connor v. United States Dep't of Energy, 942 F.2d 771, 772-74 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding bankruptcy court is a "court" tinder EAJA Section 2412(d)(1)(A) with authority to
award fees) with In re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136, 1138-40 (11 th Cir.) (holding non-Article III bankruptcy
court lacks jurisdiction to award EAJA fees), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990). See
generally Anthony M. Sabino, "And Unequal Justice for All"-Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction under
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 22 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 453, 489-90 (1992) (concluding that "[o]n
the whole," a "technical reading" of the statute "seems the better argument, thus, ever so slightly,
establishing a rule against bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the EAJA," but that "Congress can and
should amend section 2412 to provide explicitly that bankruptcy courts may adjudicate EAJA
issues"); Mathew J. Fischer, Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act-Are the Bankruptcy Courts Less
Equal Thai Others, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2248, 2251-52 (1994) (concluding "courts should construe the
EAJA consistently with its language, history, and purpose, and allow the bankruptcy courts to shift
fees and costs against the federal government in appropriate cases"); Charles R. Haywood, Comment,
The Power ofthe Bankruptcy Courts to Shift Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 61 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 985, 986 (1994) (concluding "the best resolution of the question is that the EAJA grants
bankruptcy courts the power to shift fees against the government").
115. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990).
116. Bowen v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1087 (11 th Cir. 1983).
117. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1138-40.
118. Id. at 1139.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988).

19941

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICEACT

to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a)."' 20 Subsection 2412(a), in turn,
allows a judgment against the United States for "costs, as enumerated in section
1920 of this title."' 2 1 Section 1920 details the type of costs that may be taxed by a
judge or clerk of "any court of the United States."' 2' Having found the term "court
of the United States" in Section 1920, the Eleventh Circuit was finally led to
Section 451, with its restrictive definition of "court of the United States" as
meaning only judges appointed with Article III protections. 23 Second; the Davis
court relied 124 on a statement in the legislative history of the EAJA that "[tihe courts
the EAJA] are those defined in Section 451 of
so empowered [to award fees 'under
25
title 28, United States Code."'
The simple response to the Davisdecision is that the EAJA simply does not say
courts must be constitutional Article III courts. Instead, Congress adopted, in
Paragraph (d)(1)(A), the unqualified term "any court," which cannot reasonably be
read as an abridged version of "court of the United States" as found in Section 451.
The statutory term of art, "court of the United States," does not appear in the
EAJA.126 The zig-zag path that the Eleventh Circuit takes to find its way to the
restrictive phrase, "court of the United States," bouncing from one statutory section
to another, pausing only long enough to find a sign-post to the next statute, is a
convoluted approach to statutory interpretation, particularly when it evades the
simple and unadorned language of the statute actually before the court.'27
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in O'Connor
v. UnitedStates Departmentof Energy,2 ' in concluding that non-Article III courts
are encompassed within the EAJA:
The reference in § 2412(d)(1)(A) to § 1920 clearly enumerates only the
types of costs that can be awarded under this provision, not the types of
courts having jurisdiction over EAJA awards. Any attempt to splice the

120. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
121. Id. § 2412(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
122. See id. § 1920 (1988).
123. in re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136, 1138-39 (11th Cir.) (following Bowen v. Commissioner, 706
F.2d 1087 (11 th Cir. 1983), and reasoning bankruptcy courts are without jurisdiction to award EAJA
fees), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990); Bowen v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1087,
1088 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding non-Article III Tax Court was without jurisdiction to award EAJA
fees).
124. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1139.
125. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4996 (discussing EAJA Subsection (b)).
126. Laboratory Supply Corp. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 28, 30 (1984) ("Section 2412 does not
anywhere use the term "court of the United States.").
127. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 888, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2644 (1991) (holding
"[tihe text of the [Appointments] Clause does not limit 'the Courts of Law' to those courts
established under Article III of the Constitution").
128. 942 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1991).
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jurisdictional phraseology of § 1920 onto § 2412(d)(1)(A) violates the
plain and unambiguous meaning of "any court."' 29
Nor may a stray statement in the legislative history countermand the plain language
of the statute. Had Congress intended to restrict the EAJA to constitutional Article
III courts, it well knew how to do so, as its use of the statutory
term of art, "court
30
of the United States," in other contexts demonstrates.
Moreover, restricting EAJA Subsection (d) to Article III courts would be
difficult to reconcile with that other part of the EAJA which applies to an
"adversary adjudication" at the administrative level.' 3 1 If the EAJA extends to
administrative proceedings and authorizes awards by agency tribunals, then it is
difficult to understand why non-Article III adjudicatory bodies structured as
3 2
courts presiding over adversary judicial proceedings would be excluded.
Nevertheless, the analysis cannot end here. The reference to "any court" in
Paragraph (d)(1)(A) is not the only provision in the EAJA that bears on the
meaning of "court." The other provision, which is addressed immediately below,
creates complexity and ambiguity, and by so doing likely circumscribes the waiver
of sovereign immunity in the EAJA to its narrowest construction of application
only by Article III judges.
2. The Definition in Paragraph (d)(2)(F) of "Court" as Including the
Court of Federal Clains and the Court of Veterans Appeals Suggests
These Are the Only Two Non-Article III Courts Within the Scope of
the EAJA
Even if we conclude the ordinary understanding of "any court" in Paragraph
(d)(1)(A) encompasses any adjudicatory body styled or structured as a court,

129. Id. at 773-74.
130. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 373 (1988) (referring to "court of the United States" as defined in
28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988) in discussing retirement and resignation of judges), and 1821 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (referring to "court of the United States" as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988) in discussing
fees for court witnesses). As one commentator aptly states:
It imputes ignorant confusion to Congress to maintain that, after using "court of the
United States" throughout Title 28, it intended its references to "a court" and "any court"
in the EAJA to be synonymous with "court of the United States." If Congress had
intended to limit the EAJA to Article III courts, it could easily have done so by simply
using the phrase "court of the United States."
Haywood, supra note 114, at 1009 (footnote omitted).
131. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally supra
notes 94-96 and accompanying text (outlining Section 504 and the award of fees in agency
"adversary adjudication").
132. O'Connor, 942 F.2d at 774 (stating that given the breadth of the EAJA in applying to
adversary agency adjudications, "[granting bankruptcy courts jurisdiction under the plain language
of § 2412(d)(1)(A) is ... congruous with the statutory scheme and furthers the statutory purpose of
placing the initial determination of whether fees are warranted with the forum most familiar with the
merits of the action") (footnote omitted).
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including courts with judges appointed without the protections of Article III, the
subsequent addition by Congress of Paragraph (d)(2)(F) must "give us some pause
in this regard." 3 When the EAJA was re-enacted in 1985, Congress added a new
paragraph stating "'court' includes the United States Claims Court"'" 4 (now the
Court of Federal Claims). 35 In 1992, this paragraph was expanded3 6by the addition
of the United States Court of Veterans Appeals to the definition.
In UnitedStates Navy-MarineCorpsCourtofMilitaryReview v. Cheney, 37 the
United States Court of Military Appeals concluded this paragraph did not preclude
jurisdiction over EAJA claims by non-Article III courts. The court reasoned that
the definition of "court" to include the Claims Court is merely a clarification and
not a limitation of the term.' 38 As the court stated, the use of "includes" in a
definitional provision demonstrates an intent by the drafter "to provide a nonexhaustive list of examples to clarify the meaning of a term.""139 When Congress
' 40
intends to craft an exclusive definition, it uses the word "means."'
However, to say Paragraph (d)(2)(F) is not a limiting, but is rather an
enlarging, definition does not fully answer the question of its purpose in the EAJA
or the effect it has on interpretation of the term "any court" in the earlier Paragraph
(d)(1)(A). We still must ask why Congress thought it was necessary to specifically
denote these two courts in a definitional provision. Nor is it correct to say that a
definition using the verb "includes" invariably amounts to a mere list of examples
to which we may add similar objects. An "enlarging definition" may also use the
verb "includes" to change the "common meaning" of the defined term by adding
'4
"to the number of particulars to which the term applies."' 1

133. United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review v. Cheney, 29 M.J. 98, 102
(C.M.A. 1989) (holding non-Article I11
Court of Military Appeals had authority to award fees under
the EAJA).
134. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (1985)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
135. The Claims Court was re-named the "United States Court of Federal Claims" in 1992. Pub.
L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (1992).
136. Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 506(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992). 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) now reads: "'[C]ourt' includes the United States Court of Federal Claims
and the United States Court of Veterans Appeals."
137. 29 M.J. 98 (C.M.A. 1989).
138. Id. at 102.
139. Id. (quoting City of Brunswick v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1431, 1444-45 (S.D. Ga.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 849 F.2d 501 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053, 109 S.
Ct. 1313 (1989)).
140. Id. See also Barbara Child, Drafting Legal Documents: Principles and Practices 357 (2d
ed. 1992) (stating a drafter uses the verb "means" to stipulate a full and complete definition of a
term). For example, the definition of "party" in EAJA Subsection (d)(2)(B) uses "means" and thus
is intended as an all-encompassing and exclusive description of the individuals and entities that
qualify as a "party." See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988). See
generally section III.B
(discussing the definition of "party" for EAJA Subsection (d)).
141. Child, supra note 140, at 361.
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Thus, we could conclude the "common meaning" of "any court" in
Paragraph (d)(1)(A) is a narrow one covering only constitutional courts, while
the enlarging definition of Paragraph (d)(2)(F) expands the term to add two
special bodies that would not otherwise be included. Indeed, the logical
conclusion to be drawn from the enlarging definition of "court" is that Congress
understood the original meaning of "court" to be restricted to Article III courts
and determined to add these two particular non-Article III courts to those
tribunals having authority to award attorney's fees under the EAJA. By
application of the interpretive canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius(the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), the enactment of Paragraph
(d)(2)(F) suggests that other entities of a similar nature, that is, other non-Article
III courts, that have not been specifically designated are excluded from the scope
of the EAJA.' 42
There is a plausible contrary explanation, although it has become increasingly less plausible over time. When Paragraph (d)(2)(F) was originally enacted in
1985 with a sole reference to the Claims Court, the Claims Court had recently
been created 4 3 and there had been intervening litigation concerning whether this
new entity had authority to award attorney's fees under the EAJA. This
litigation had ultimately culminated in an appellate ruling upholding the Claims
Court's authority. 4' Thus, considering the historical context of its enactment and
the existing case law, Paragraph (d)(2)(F) may have been added simply to reflect
the new court structure and to confirm the authority of the new adjudicatory
body to award EAJA fees. The legislative history confirms this understanding.
The House Report on the bill re-enacting the EAJA in 1985 notes that the Claims
Court had been created since the original enactment of the EAJA and states that
"[s]ince some question has been raised about the jurisdiction of the U.S. Claims
Court to make [EAJA] awards ...this amendment clarifies the jurisdictional
issue, and codifies existing law."' 43 In light of this context, Paragraph (d)(2)(F)
could be understood as commending the judicial interpretation of the EAJA as
extending to non-Article III courts.

142. Sabino, supra note 114, at 485.
143. The Claims Court (now the Court of Federal Claims) was created by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982), as a non-Article IIItrial court,
with appellate jurisdiction given to the new Article 1II
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
144. Essex Electro Eng'rs v. United States, 757 F.2d 247, 250-52 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
145. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
132, 146. See also Fischer, supra note 114, at 2271-72 (emphasizing that the legislative history
"states that the amendment is merely a clarification, rather than a change, in the existing law," and
thus does not suggest that Congress intended to exclude other non-Article IIIcourts); Haywood,
supra note 114, at 998 (arguing amendment did not implicitly exclude bankruptcy courts because
Congress "did not say that it was adding the Claims Court to the authorized courts; rather, it clarified
that the definition of 'court' included the Claims Court, thus 'codify[ing] existing law').
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Similarly, after the creation of the Court of Veterans Appeals in 1988,146
there was litigation concerning whether this new tribunal had the authority to
award attorney's fees under the EAJA, culminating in a decision by the Court of
Veterans Appeals declaring that it lacked jurisdiction under the EAJA.' 47 Once
again, Congress amended the EAJA to specifically grant authority to this new
court, by adding the Court of Veterans Appeals to the definitional provision in
Paragraph (d)(2)(F).148 And, once again, the legislative reports characterize the
49
change as a clarification.
However, when the same issue arises on a second occasion, and the same
limited response is made, it becomes more difficult to regard the amendment as
merely a clarification of existing law rather than a creation of new law.
Although the new addition to Paragraph (d)(2)(F) did again arise in response to
a transitional situation involving the creation of a new court and doubts reflected
in litigation about the authority of that body to award EAJA fees, Congress chose
not to respond to this repeated situation by clarifying the purportedly expansive
meaning of "any court" under Paragraph (d)(1)(A). Congress instead added a
second particular to the list of included entities in the definition of "court."
Moreover, by 1992, doubts had also arisen concerning the authority of the
bankruptcy courts to award EAJA fees, 5 but Congress did not "clarify" the
matter by adding bankruptcy courts to Paragraph (d)(2)(F). Thus, we see
emerging a pattern of ad hoc, case-by-case congressional action with respect to
the EAJA and non-Article III courts.'
When Congress has seen fit to act by

146. Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301(a), 102 Stat. 4113 (1988).
147. Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 231, 232-35, vacatedsub nora.Jones v. Principi, 985 F.2d
582 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
148. Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 506(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
149. H.R. Rep. No. 1006, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3921,
3934 (stating the provision "amends EAJA and clarifies that it applies to the Court of Veterans
Appeals"); S. Rep. No. 342, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1992) ("It is not the intent of the
committee, by specifying the Court of Veterans Appeals, to exclude any other nonarticle III courts
having jurisdiction of an action from qualifying as a 'court' under EAJA."). See also Fischer, supra
note 114, at 2272 (arguing the amendment was "a response to a particular court opinion" and "merely
a clarification of existing law," and thus "does not support the exclusion of the banknptcy courts
from EAJA jurisdiction"); Haywood, supra note 114, at 1005-06 (arguing that "the legislative history
of this amendment makes clear that Congress considers the EAJA to extend beyond Article Ill
courts" and that the intent to "clarify" demonstrates "that Congress considered the EAJA to have
always included the Court of Veterans Appeals, and thus implicitly other parallel Article I courts as
well").
150. Compare O'Connor v. United States Dep't of Energy, 942 F.2d 771, 772-74 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding bankruptcy court is a "court" under EAJA Subsection (d)(1)(A) with authority to
award fees) with In re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136, 1138-40 (11 th Cir.) (holding bankruptcy court lacks
jurisdiction to award EAJA fees), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990).
151. Jones, 2 Vet. App. at 233 (stating "an examination of the development of the EAJA and
the specific amendments to, and in connection with, the 1980 original enactment, shows that when
Congress has provided for the application of the EAJA to analogous litigation (Claims Court, Tax
Court, Social Security Administration (SSA) decision review in district courts), it has done so by
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adding particulars to a definition, the courts would be intruding152 upon the
legislative province by presuming to expand the particulars further.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial doubts have
53
arisen and the EAJA is at least susceptible to conflicting interpretations.'
Accordingly, the "unequivocal expression" of an intent to extend the waiver of
sovereign immunity is absent,' 54 and the EAJA cannot be held to unambiguously
grant jurisdiction to non-Article III courts, such as the bankruptcy courts, other
than the two specified. Through the enactment and subsequent amendment of
Paragraph (d)(2)(F), Congress has taken direct and specific control over the
meaning of the term "court" and the EAJA must be interpreted in strict
conformity therewith.
3. Bankruptcy Courts May Recommend Award of EAJA Fees by District
Court
Over time, the debate about whether Article I courts have authority to make
awards under the EAJA has narrowed precisely because the statute has been
expanded. As noted, two Article I courts-the Court of Federal Claims and the
Court of Veterans Appeals-have been expressly included among the courts
authorized to make awards under the EAJA.155 The Tax Court has authority to
award attorney's fees under an identical substantial justification standard pursuant
to a separate fee-shifting statute in the Internal Revenue Code. 56 Even in the
context of bankruptcy courts, the question is of declining practical significance.
Whether or not a bankruptcy court has authority in its own right to award EAJA
fees against the government, the EAJA is manifestly available in bankruptcy
cases through the process of a recommendation for an award made by the
bankruptcy court to the district court.
In 1982, the Supreme Court held in Northern Pipeline Construction
Company v. Marathon Pipeline Company 157 that the broad grant of jurisdiction
to non-Article III bankruptcy judges to hear all cases related to bankruptcy
matters violated the separation of powers requirements of the United States
Constitution. In response, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and

specific, affirmative legislation").
152. Sabino, supra note 114, at 486.
153.

See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (1992) (holding when

statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the statute fails
to unambiguously extend the waiver beyond the more limited understanding).
154. Id. at 1016. See also Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 112 S. Ct. 515, 521
(1991) (reaffirming that a waiver of sovereign immunity "must be strictly construed in favor of the
United States").
155. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
156. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(6) (1988) (defining "court proceeding" for purposes of this fee-shifting
statute to include a civil action brought in the Tax Court).
157. 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
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the Federal Judgeship Act of 198415' to re-structure the bankruptcy courts as
units or divisions of the district courts.' 59 As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has explained:
Under this new structure, federal district courts exercise original
jurisdiction over all "matters and proceedings in bankruptcy," 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334, and bankruptcy judges "serve as judicial officers of the United
States district court established under Article III of the Constitution."
28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1). Bankruptcy courts are mere "unit[s] of the
district court," 28 U.S.C. § 151, and derive their jurisdiction only
through 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), which authorizes district courts to refer
bankruptcy matters at their discretion to bankruptcy courts. However,
district courts retain the power to withdraw any reference from the
bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). Thus, "while functionally there
may appear to be a separate bankruptcy court, for jurisdictional
purposes there is only one court, i.e., the district court." In re Northwest Cinema Corp., 49 B.R. [479,] 480 [(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985)].' 6
Thus, since district courts clearly possess the jurisdiction to award attorney's
fees under the EAJA, bankruptcy courts would have the power to recommend an
EAJA award to be imposed by the district court.'61 Since an award of attorney's
fees is not a "core" bankruptcy proceeding over which a bankruptcy court has
authority to make a final disposition (subject to referral of the matter from the
district court),' 62 the bankruptcy court would be obliged "to submit proposed
law to the Article III [district] court, where
factual findings and conclusions of
63
they shall be reviewed de novo."'
The requirement that the district court pass upon the bankruptcy court's
recommendation regarding an EAJA award delays resolution of attorney's fee
matters by adding another step to the process.' 4 Moreover, because of both its
expertise on matters of bankruptcy law and its greater familiarity with the case
litigated before it, the bankruptcy court's recommendation is likely to be given
practical deference, notwithstanding the standard of de novo review by the

158.

Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of I I U.S.C. and

28 U.S.C.).
159.

28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988); in re Grewe, 4 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 1056 (1994); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.01[21[al (15th ed. 1993).
160. Grewe, 4 F.3d at 304 (footnote omitted).
161.

In re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136, 1141 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 510

(1990).
162.

Id. at 1140-41.

163. Sabino, supra note 114, at 487. If the government consents to jurisdiction over a matter
by the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge could render a final judgment on an EAJA matter
subject to ordinary appellate review. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1141-42; Sabino, supra note 114, at 487.
164. See Fischer, supra note 114, at 2283 ("The resulting delay and aggravation to the courts
caused by forwarding proposed findings to the district courts ill serves the purposes of the EAJA and
the bankruptcy system." (footnotes omitted)).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

district court. 5 Nevertheless, it seems appropriate that the final authority on this
matter, which involves both the exaction of funds from the public fisc and a
conviction of unreasonable conduct by the government, should be reserved to the
Article III district judge and not exercised by a tribunal that serves as an adjunct
66
to the court.

165. Id. at 2282 (arguing that the procedures "require[] an adjudication by a court that is one
step removed from the parties and the administration of the case," and that "the de novo review
performed by the district court may amount to little more than a rubber stamp of the bankruptcy
court's proposed findings").
166. Shortly before publication of this article, Congress passed and the President signed the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified in scattered
sections of titles 11 and 28 of the U.S.C.). Section 113 of that act waives the sovereign immunity
of the federal and state governments with respect to bankruptcy proceedings before the bankruptcy
courts. This waiver authorizes the bankruptcy courts to enter monetary awards against the federal
and state governments, including an "order or judgment for costs or fees under this title or the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any governmental unit ... consistent with the
provisions and limitations of section 2412(d)(2)(A) of title 28." Id. § 113, 108 Stat. at 4117 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3)) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding this reference to a paragraph of the
EAJA, it appears plain upon close study that this section of the statute does not answer the question
of the authority of a bankruptcy judge to award fees against the federal government pursuant to the
substantial justification standard of Subsection (d) of the EAJA.
By its own terms, Section 113 must be understood as waiving the sovereign immunity of the
federal and state governments only with respect to awards of attorney's fees pursuant to the
bankruptcy statutes and rules. See id. (authorizing an "order or judgment for costs or fees under this
title or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure" (emphasis added)). Moreover, the reference to
the EAJA is specifically to that discrete subpart, in Paragraph 2412(d)(2)(A), which defines "fees and
other expenses" to include reasonable expenses of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of studies
and analyses, and that limits the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to $75 per hour adjustable for
an increase in the cost of living or a special factor. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988). Neither
Section 113 nor any other provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 refers to the provision
of the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988), that creates a new basis for an award of fees when
the position of the United States lacks substantial justification. A preliminary search of the legislative
history behind the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 finds no mention of the EAJA or any expression
of an intent to extend the authority of the bankruptcy courts to award fees under the EAJA.
Moreover, as discussed in the text above, when Congress previously has acted to expand the list of
adjudicatory bodies authorized to apply the EAJA, it has done so by amending the EAJA itself
through an expansion of the definition of "court" in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988 & Supp. V
1993). Finally, Section 113 waives the sovereign immunity of both the states and the federal
government, whereas the EAJA of course applies only to the United States. See H.R. Rep. No. 835,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (explaining purpose of Section 113 as making the bankruptcy statutes
in Title 11 applicable to the states and the federal government).
In sum, Section 113 is limited in scope, authorizing bankruptcy courts to award attorney's fees
against the federal government only pursuant to other provisions in the bankruptcy statutes or rules,
with the reference to the EAJA's definition of "fees and other expenses" serving only to limit the
amount of such fees that may be awarded against the government. See Price v. United States (h re
Price), No. 93-3133, 1994 WL 696819, at *5-6 (7th Cir. Dec. 14, 1994) (holding Section 113 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 waived the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect
to a provision in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), that authorizes an award of attorney's
fees to a party injured by a wilful violation of the bankruptcy stay rule, and holding that such fees
are subject to the $75 per hour cap stated in Paragraph 2412(d)(2)(A)). Given Section 113's
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4. Subject MatterJurisdictionover the Cause of Action
By the express language of EAJA Subsection (d), which authorizes an award
by "any court having jurisdictionof that action," 1 67 a court may award attorney's
fees under the statute only if it has proper subject matter jurisdiction over the
underlying cause of action.1 68 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has ruled, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of the
underlying action is a 'condition precedent' to an award of fees or costs under
EAJA."1 69 For example, if an action is transferred by a district court to the Court
of Federal Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over contract claims against the
federal government, the absence ofjurisdiction on the substantive cause of action
also deprives the district court of the power to grant an award of attorney's fees
under the EAJA. 7'
However, while many statutory prerequisites to a suit involving the federal
government are deemed jurisdictional in nature, the crucial question under the
EAJA is whether the court in which the lawsuit is filed (as opposed to some other
forum) has subject matter jurisdiction over an action of that type. 17' Thus, for
example, when a government action against a private party has been dismissed for

specification of fees awards pursuant to the bankruptcy title and rules, the section's pointed reference
to a limited definition section of the EAJA (to the exclusion of the substantial justification provision
of the EAJA), the silence of the legislative history as to any intent to expand the scope of the EAJA,
and the failure of Congress to follow its previous pattern of amending the definition of "court" in the
EAJA when it intended to authorize a new entity to make EAJA awards, the new bankruptcy
provision falls far short of a clear and unambiguous expression of congressional intent to allow a
non-Article III court to pronounce EAJA liability upon the United States. Especially in view of the
substantial controversy in the courts surrounding the authority of the bankruptcy courts to award fees
under the EAJA, we would have expected a more definitive statement if the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994 were intended to address this question.
167. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
168. Lundin v. Mecham, 980 F.2d 1450, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Smith v. Brady, 972 F.2d 1095,
1097 (9th Cir. 1992).
169. Clark v. Busey, 959 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding a district court could not award
fees under the EAJA when the plaintiffs wrongly filed suit in district court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) because the court of appeals has
exclusive jurisdiction for judicial review of FAA actions).
170. Francis E. Heydt Co. v. United States, 948 F.2d 672, 674-78 (10th Cir. 1991). See also
Greater Detroit Recovery Auth. v. EPA, 916 F.2d 317, 324 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding because the
district court lacked jurisdiction, the award of EAJA fees was improper); Johns-Manville Corp. v.
United States, 893 F.2d 324, 328 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding court could not award EAJA fees when
plaintiff improperly filed suit in the Claims Court); Lane v. United States, 727 F.2d 18, 20-21 (1st
Cir.) (holding court could not award EAJA fees when plaintiff improperly filed suit in a district
court), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829, 105 S.Ct. 113 (1984).
171. United States v. 87 Skyline Terrace, 26 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining the
difference between a court's "lacking potential jurisdiction" over a type of claim and thus being
without authority to award the EAJA fees, and a court's "having potential, but lacking actual
jurisdiction" and thus able to award EAJA fees notwithstanding a statutory flaw in the initiation of
the suit that deprives the court of jurisdiction to decide the merits).
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction because an agency failed to obtain prior
authorization from an official to bring suit as required by a statute, the court would
retain the authority to consider an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA because
it had proper jurisdiction over an action of that nature, notwithstanding the
invalidity of the particular suit for quasi-jurisdictional reasons.'
C. Exclusion of "Cases Sounding in Tort"
1. The Exclusion ofTort Cases from the EAJA
Although EAJA Subsection (d) applies generally and broadly to any "civil
action," the subsection itself declares one explicit exception to coverage-"cases
sounding in tort."' 73 Congress chose to exclude tort cases from the scope of the
EAJA because itbelieved alternative fee payment methods, such as contingency fee
arrangements, were adequate to ensure that injured persons could obtain legal
representation to seek redress for torts committed by government employees or
entities. 74 Indeed, apparently for the same reason, Congress has not made any
provision for award of attorney's fees in tort cases against the federal government
under other statutes. Ts
Accordingly, if a claim against the government is the substantive equivalent
of a claim to be compensated for tortious wrongdoing, an attorney's fee award
under EAJA Subsection (d) is not available. In McLarty v. United States, 76 an
Assistant United States Attorney obtained copies of a Georgia attorney's federal
income tax returns and submitted them in support of the government's successful

172. Id at 927-29. However, because 87 Skyline Terrace involved the actions of the Internal
Revenue Service in the initiation of forfeiture proceedings to enforce the tax laws, the case likely fell
within the exclusion of the EAJA for internal revenue matters, although the court failed to consider
or discuss this provision. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e) (1988). See generally
infra section II.D (discussing the exclusion of tax cases from the EAJA).
173. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(I)(A) (1988) (providing the EAJA applies
to "any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)"). See also Campbell v. United States, 835
F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating tort actions were expressly excluded from the EAJA).
174. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1434,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980), reprintedin1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5003, 5014; S.Rep. No.253, 96th Cong., IstSess. 20 (1979). The Federal Tort Claims Act
expressly provides for payment of attorney's fees out of the damages award itself, up to a maximum
of 25% of the amount of damages recovered in a tort suit against the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
2678 (1988).
175. For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act provides only that attorney's fees may be paid
out of a damages award recovered in a tort suit against the United States and makes no provision for
any shifting of fees to the government. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1988). See Joe v. United States, 772 F.2d
1535, 1536-37 (11 th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("The FTCA does not contain the express waiver of
sovereign immunity necessary to permit a court to award attorneys' fees against the United States
directly under that act."). However, in an extreme case, the United States could be assessed
attorney's fees in a tort case under the common-law bad faith rule pursuant to EAJA Subsection (b),
which waives the immunity of the United States for attorney's fees to the same extent as a private
person under the common law. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988).
176. 6 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 1994).
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opposition to the attorney's application to be admitted pro hac vice to the federal
court for the District of Minnesota to represent a criminal defendant. 1'In an action
for damages brought by the attorney against the United States, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney, ruling that reasonable
government officials would have known the disclosure of tax returns for this
purpose was in violation of federal law.' After the matter was settled for $3,000
during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal, the attorney sought an award of
attorney's fees under the Internal Revenue Code or the EAJA. 1 79 The court
concluded the wrongful disclosure of tax records was a tort and thus attorney's fees
could not be awarded under EAJA Subsection (d). s° Because the plaintiff sought
monetary compensation for the wrongful disclosure in the nature of damages for
lost income and for anger and humiliation, 8' as contrasted with some equitable
form of relief such as an injunction against further disclosure, the court was correct
in characterizing the claim as one sounding in tort.
2. The Application ofthe Tort Exclusion to the Case as a Whole andNot
to Individual Issues
The statutory exception for "cases sounding in tort" requires an analysis of the
nature of the case as a whole, rather than artificially breaking out individual parts
of a claim into tort and non-tort components. In In re Turner,'82 a federal law
enforcement officer who had been sued for negligence in conducting a high speed
pursuit of a speeding motorcyclist successfully moved to have the United States
substituted as a defendant pursuant to a federal statute that makes the government
the proper defendant in suits alleging tortious conduct by a government employee
who was acting within the scope of employment.1 3 The district court awarded
attorney's fees under the EAJA, ruling that the government's refusal to certify that
the officer was acting within the scope of employment had not been substantially
justified.8 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed, holding the case fell within the statutory exception for "cases sounding

177. Id. at 547.
178. Id.
179. Id. Because the case did not involve "the determination, collection, or refund of any tax,"
26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) (1988), the court concluded fees were not available under the Internal
Revenue fee-shifting statute. McLarry, 6 F.3d at 548. See generally section I1.D (discussing Section
7430 and the exclusion of tax-related cases from the EAJA).
180. McLarty, 6 F.3d at 549. The court noted the government could be liable in tort cases for
attorney's fees under Subsection (b) of the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988), which makes the
government liable to the same extent as a private party, although the court concluded the district
court's finding the government's position was substantially justified implicitly stated the government
had not acted in a manner to be subject to fees under the bad faith rule. McLarty, 6 F.3d at 549.
181.
Id. at 547.
182. 14 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (1988).
184. Turner, 14 F.3d at 639.
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in tort."' 5 The district court had reasoned that the exception did not apply because
the issue litigated was the question of the officer's statutory immunity and the
resolution of that issue did not involve tort law.'" Relying upon the plain language
of the statute, the District of Columbia Circuit held: "The statute itself.., does not
parse 'cases' into tort and non-tort issues but instead provides a blanket exception
for cases that sound in tort."' 7 Since there was no doubt the underlying lawsuit
filed by the original plaintiff was actionable in tort, the application of the exception
was indisputable. 8
Judge Williams, concurring in the Turnercase,cautioned that the court was not
called upon to consider the application of the tort case exception to non-tort claims
that happen to be resolved in the same lawsuit as a tort claim but could have been
brought as separate non-tort actions against the federal government.'8 9 Thus, for
example, if a defendant to a civil action by the government were to raise a
counterclaim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,'9 or the
government were to attempt to collect on an obligation as a permissive counterclaim against a tort plaintiff,'9 ' the citizen defendant or plaintiff would not be
precluded by the tort case exception from seeking attorney's fees under EAJA
Subsection (d) for legal expenses attributable to the discrete non-tort claim. The
statutory exception reasonably applies only to preclude an award of attorney's fees
for legal expenses incurred with respect to a claim seeking relief under principles
of tort law, not for separable claims seeking distinct non-tort relief that are merely
joined to a tort claim in a single lawsuit assigned a single court docket number.
3. ConstitutionalTorts
The House Report on the EAJA in 1980 stated the exclusion of tort cases from
EAJA Subsection (d) did not apply to "constitutional tort" cases.' 92 However, there

185.
186.

Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 640.

187.

Id.

188. Id. at 640-41.
189. Id. at 643 (Williams, J., concurring).
190. For example, in FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1990), the FDIC brought suit
against the directors of a bank for breach of fiduciary duties, and the directors counterclaimed under
the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging an improper determination the bank was insolvent. Id. at 105152.
191. For example, in Livera v. First Nat'l State Bank, 879 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 493
U.S. 937, 110 S. Ct. 332 (1989), the guarantor of the bank loan also guaranteed by the Small
Business Administration (SBA) filed suit, alleging the SBA, acting through the bank, deprived the
guarantor of statutory protections and charged an improper interest rate, and SBA counterclaimed for
alleged default on the guarantor's obligation. Id. at 1188-89. See also John M. Steadman et al.,
Litigation with the Federal Government §18.104, at 549 (3d ed. 1994) ("The Government may
counterclaim without limitation.").
192. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4997. See also Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating in dictum
constitutional torts are within the scope of the EAJA), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 1908
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is nothing in the statutory language that would abridge the blanket exclusion of all
tort claims.' 93 A comment in the legislative history may not prevail over the plain
and unqualified language in the statute, especially in view of the requirement that
waivers of sovereign immunity be unequivocally expressed. 94 When a constitutional claim is the equivalent of a private claim for tortious wrongdoing, as revealed
by a claim for relief in the form of compensatory damages, the claim should be
recognized as tortious in substance, with the constitutional provision at issue
creating the cause of action and establishing the standard for determining whether
government conduct is wrongful in nature.
195
In Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. EastBaton Rouge ParishSchool Board,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that constitutional
torts were not within the tort exception from the EAJA and thus could give rise to
an EAJA Subsection (d) fee award.' However, the court paused only briefly on
the question and reached its conclusion without detailed analysis. Moreover, a
review of the factual background to that case in an earlier decision suggests the
lawsuit may have raised only a claim for equitable relief to enjoin unconstitutional
conduct, and thus may not have involved a true tort claim, constitutional or
otherwise, seeking compensatory damages.'9 Indeed, in dicta in a recent decision,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed that "the
reference to 'constitutional torts' in the House Report is vague," and may have been
intended merely to confirm that the EAJA applies "to injunction actions against
government employees in their official capacity for wrongful or tortious conduct."'" In any event, the constitutional tort question has arisen rather infrequently.
D. Exclusion of InternalRevenue Code Proceedings
In 1982, the EAJA was amended to withdraw federal tax cases,'" which are
now governed by a separate fee-shifting scheme under the Internal Revenue
Code. 2° Under 26 U.S.C. § 7430, attorney's fees may be paid to the prevailing
party in suits "in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any

(1984).
193. See Velez v. United States, No. 83-Civ. 7021, 1989 WL 51842, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
1989) (rejecting the argument that exclusion of tort cases from the EAJA does not include
constitutional torts as "contrary to the plain wording of the statute").
194. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 2701-02 (1981) (holding
waivers of sovereign immunity must be expressed unequivocally).
195. 679 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1982).
196. Id. at 68.
197. See Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 578 F.2d 1122 (5th

Cir. 1978).
198.
199.
(1988)).
200.

Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1994).
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(c), 96 Stat. 324, 574 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e)
Id. § 292(a), 96 Stat. at 572 (1982) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988)).
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tax, interest or penalty."'2' Section 7430 imposes a similar standard for fee awards
to that provided under the EAJA, although it places the burden upon the fee
claimant to "establish[] that the position of the United States in the proceeding was
not substantially justified."2 °2
To avoid any confusion or overlapping coverage between the EAJA and
Section 7430, the 1982 amendment to the EAJA added Subsection (e) which states
in pertinent part: "The provisions of this section shall not apply to any costs, fees,
and other expenses in connection with any proceeding
to which section 7430 of the
23
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 applies ....0
The courts have generally applied this provision strictly to exclude all taxrelated disputes from the scope of the EAJA, whether or not the party cites to or
purports to found the action under the Internal Revenue Code. 204 Whenever a
proceeding has any "connection with the determination, collection or refund of any
tax" that has been imposed pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, 205 the EAJA
must yield to Section 7430.206
E. EAJA Subsection (d) DoesNot Supersede Other Fee-Shifting Statutes
1. EAJA Section 206-The Non-DisplacementProvision
One final qualification of the scope of the EAJA must be addressed-the
unavailability of Subsection (d) when another fee-shifting statute covers the

201. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(a) (1988). See generally Joel P. Bennett, Winning Attorney's Fees From
the U.S. Government at ch. 6 (1984 & Supp. 1993); Debra C. Chini, Recent Development, The 1988
Amendment to 26 U.S.C. Section 7430: Expanding Taxpayers' Rights to Recover Costs in Tax
Controversies, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1711 (1989).
202. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i) (1988). Under the EAJA, the burden is upon the government
to prove its position was substantially justified. See infra section IV, forthcoming (discussing
entitlement to an EAJA award). Section 7430 also does impose certain additional requirements for
a fee award, such as the requirement that the party have exhausted administrative remedies within
the Internal Revenue Service before seeking judicial review. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(b)(1) (1988).
203. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e) (1988).
204. In re Grewe, 4 F.3d 299, 301-03 (4th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Brady, 972 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th
Cir. 1992); United States v. McPeck, 910 F.2d 509, 511-13 (8th Cir. 1990).
205. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(a) (1988). Compare McLarty v. United States, 6 F.3d 545, 548-49 &
n.5 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding Section 7430 does not apply to a claim of wrongful disclosure of tax
returns "thatwas completely unrelated to any civil tax proceeding" and did not occur in the course
of any activities by the Internal Revenue Service to determine or collect taxes) with Huckaby v.
United States Dep't of Treasury, 804 F.2d 297, 298 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding Section 7430 applies
to a wrongful disclosure of tax records because the government came to possess them "for the
purpose of determining tax liability"). See also United States v. Arkinson (In re Cascade Roads,
Inc.), 34 F.3d 756, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that bankruptcy proceeding, in which the
bankruptcy trustee attempted to prevent the United States from exercising a set-off for taxes from a
judgment against the government in favor of the bankrupt debtor, was a proceeding in connection
with the determination and collection of taxes and therefore fell under Section 7430 and not the

EAJA).
206.

Grewe, 4 F.3d at 301-02.
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subject matter. Subsection (d) itself anticipates this qualification in its
introductory phrase, stating that the provision applies "[e]xcept as otherwise
specifically stated. 20 7 Section 206 of the EAJA, which has not been codified,
states more explicitly and emphatically:
Nothing in section 2412(d) ...alters, modifies, repeals, invalidates, or
supersedes any other provision of Federal law which authorizes an
award of such fees and other expenses to any party other than the
United States that prevails in any civil action brought by or against the
United States. 20

2. Using the EAJA to Supplement Other Fee Statutes that Do Not Cover
Certain Types of Cases or Claims
The EAJA may be used to supplement existing fee provisions, but not to
replace or supersede other fee-shifting statutes. The subtle distinction between
supplementing and superseding has been the subject of much litigation with
conflicting results. In general, courts have allowed resort to the EAJA in only
two circumstances: (1) where no other statute provides for fee-shifting for that
type of case, or (2) where another fee-shifting statute applies to similar or related
claims but does not cover the particular type of claim or proceeding. In both
circumstances, the application of the EAJA fills in a gap in the availability of fee
recovery without intruding upon Congress' considered adoption of particular
eligibility or entitlement standards necessary to obtain an award under another
fee-shifting statute.
As an example of the first circumstance, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Guthrie v. Schweiker"09 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Wolverton v. Heckler2 0 both ruled that the
EAJA could be used to supplement Section 406(b)(1) of the Social Security Act,
which allows payment of attorney's fees out of any benefit award made to the
claimant.2
Because the non-displacement language of Section 206 precludes
use of the EAJA only in the context of other statutes that authorize "an award"
of attorney's fees, the result here was plainly correct. 212 Section 406(b)(1)
establishes a fee payment arrangement by ensuring the payment of a claimant's

207. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
208. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 206, 94 Stat. 2325, 2330 (1980) (lapsed), as
reenacted by Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 184, 186 (1985) (not
codified).
209. 718 F.2d 104, 107-08 (4th Cir. 1983).
210. 726 F.2d 580, 582 (9th Cir. 1984).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1988).
212. See generally James R. Cromwell, A Substantial Paradox: Attorney's Fees Under the
EqualAccess to JusticeAct in Social Security Appeals, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 355, 366-67 (1984)
(discussing the pre-1985 decisions holding the EAJA applies to Social Security cases).
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attorney out of the benefit award; it is not a fee-shifting statute authorizing the
exaction of a fee award from the government. 213 Lest there be any doubt that the
Guthrie and Wolverton results were concurrent with the congressional purpose,
an uncodified section of the EAJA as re-enacted in 1985 expressly provides
Section 406(b)(1) shall not prevent the award of attorney's fees under the
EAJA.214
An illustration of the second circumstance of the EAJA supplementation of
fee-shifting schemes can be found in court approval of the extension of the
EAJA to claims or cases that are beyond the scope of other fee-shifting statutes
that apply to similar types of claims or cases. For example, in cases governed
by environmental protection statutes that allow for an award of attorney's fees
in district court actions but are silent on fees for appellate petitions for judicial
review of agency action, the courts have allowed the use of the EAJA to
supplement the district court fee provision and permit an award for attorney's
fees incurred in appellate judicial review.215
Similarly, courts applying the original EAJA held that the statute covered
eminent domain cases, 21 6 notwithstanding another fee-shifting provision in the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act that
provided for an award of attorney's fees to property owners in condemnation cases
in those rare instances when the federal agency is held to be without authority to
condemn the property or the government abandons the condemnation.2"7 At the
time these cases were decided, the question of the application of the EAJA to
condemnation cases was close. On the one hand, as the majority of courts held,
applying the EAJA to condemnation cases did "not change or invalidate the
requirements set forth in [the Uniform Act] for an award of attorney's fees and
expenses to property owners in condemnation cases" that were covered by the
Uniform Act.21 Thus, it could be contended, the use of the EAJA effected a
legitimate expansion of coverage without altering the standards for recovery in

213.

See Wolverton, 726 F.2d at 582 ("The EAJA provides for shifting the burden of attorneys'

fees from the private litigant to the government. The Social Security Act does not provide for fee
shifting.").
214. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183, 186 (1985) (uncodified).
See generally Louise L. Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 19
Ariz. St. L.J. 229, 250-52 (1987) (discussing applicability of the EAJA to Social Security judicial
review cases); Hill, supra note 10, at 77-78 (same).
215. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 918-19 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(stating the EAJA ills a gap when fee-shifting provision in Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988), does not apply to appellate petition for review); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 704-06 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating the EAJA supplements
the Clean Water Act fee jsrovision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988), which allows fees for district court
actions but is silent on fees for appellate petitions for review).
216. United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land, 751 F.2d 924, 931-36 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated, 786
F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800, 804-08 (5th Cir.
1983) (en banc); United States v. 101.80 Acres of Land, 716 F.2d 714, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1983).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (1988).
218. 341.45 Acres of Land, 751 F.2d at 933.
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those particular cases controlled by the Uniform Act. On the other hand, one could
argue the Uniform Act fee-shifting provision generally covered cases sounding in
eminent domain (and thus excluded the EAJA from overlapping coverage),
although the Uniform Act provision articulated a more limited standard for
recovery by restricting fee-shifting to cases leading to a particular result (a ruling
of lack of proper authority by the government or an abandonment of the condemnation by the government). 219 The application of the EAJA to eminent domain cases
was subsequently confirmed by Congress in the re-enactment of the EAJA by the
addition of a specific provision
defining "prevailing party" in the context of a
220
condemnation action.
Finally, in very recent decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in EqualEmployment OpportunityCommission v. 0 & G Spring
& Wire Forms Specialty Co.,221 and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Clay Printing
Co.,222 held that the EAJA was available to supplement the attorney's fee provision
223
applicable to actions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
to allow awards of fees to private employers successfully defending against claims
brought by the government as plaintiff on behalf of alleged victims of age
discrimination. Under the ADEA, which incorporates the attorney's fee provision
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 224 an award of attorney's fees is specifically authorized in favor of "the plaintiff or plaintiffs" which is "to be paid by the defendant." 22' The statute does not provide for fee awards to prevailing defendants.
In determining whether EAJA Subsection (d) could be used to correct that
omission and authorize an award to a prevailing defendant in an ADEA case against
the government as plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit stated the question as whether the
statute "prohibits awarding fees to a prevailing defendant-which would preclude
application of the EAJA--or ...is silent on the matter-which means the EAJA
or the common law steps in to fill the void. 226 Although "the language of the
provision, with its emphasis on an award 'to the plaintiffs' to be paid 'by the

219. Id. at 942 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (stating EAJA Section 206 excludes condemnation cases
from the EAJA because its application would modify or repeal the existing fee-shifting guidelines
for condemnation cases under the Uniform Act provision). See also 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d
at 816-19 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
220. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H) (1988). See also H.R. Rep. No.
120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 147 (explaining one
purpose of amendment was to make "clear that condemnation cases are covered by the Act"). See
generally infra section III.A.5 (discussing definition of "prevailing party" for eminent domain cases).
221. 38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994).
222. 13 F,3d 813 (4th Cir. 1994).
223. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
224. Id. § 626(b) (1988).
225. Id. § 216(b) ("The Court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the
plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action.").
226. EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 882 (7th Cir. 1994).
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defendants,' strongly suggests by negative implication that it precludes awarding
fees to a prevailing defendant, ' 227 both the Fourth Circuit 228 and the Seventh
Circuit 229 concluded that Congress did not actually intend to preempt the availability of fee awards to prevailing defendants through other sources of law for feeshifting. Accordingly, because the statute is silent on awards in favor of defendants, these courts concluded that supplementation of the ADEA by the EAJA does
not contravene a considered decision by Congress to preclude or restrict an award
under these circumstances.23 °

227. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988)).
228. EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813, 817-18 (4th Cir. 1994).
229. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d at 883-84.
230. Another part of the Seventh Circuit's analysis is plainly mistaken, insofar as the court treats
the scope and availability of EAJA Subsections (b) and (d) as an identical inquiry. In 0 & G Spring
& Wire Forms SpecialtyCo., the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) conceded that
EAJA Subsection (b) could be invoked to allow an award against the government to a defendant in
an age discrimination case through the common-law rule allowing recovery if a plaintiff acts in bad
faith, but nevertheless challenged the application of EAJA Subsection (d) to allow an award when
the plaintiff's position is not substantially justified. Id. at 881. The court responded:
[W]hile the EEOC concedes that EAJA sec. 2412(b) (the bad faith standard) applies to
the ADEA, it maintains that the ADEA preempts application of sec. 2412(d) (the
substantial justification standard). This distinction is untenable. The ADEA either
preempts application of EAJA sec. 2412 or it does not. We have held that it does not,
and thus nothing precludes application of all of sec. 2412, including the substantial
justification standard of sec. 2412(d).
d at 883. The Seventh Circuit's reasoning is flawed. The distinction is more than tenable; it is
explicit under the statute.
EAJA Subsections (b) and (d), although both appearing in Section 2412 of Title 28, are distinct
and independent fee-shifting provisions, related only in their mutual effect of expanding the
responsibility of the United States to compensate opponents in litigation for their costs under
appropriate circumstances. Moreover, the scope of these respective provisions differs, as dictated by
the plain language of the subsections. As discussed generally supra section I.B.2, Subsection (b)
subjects the United States to liability for fees "to the same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an
award." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988). (An award of fees against a losing party that has promoted
litigation or manipulated the judicial process in bad faith is one of the recognized common-law
exceptions to the American Rule. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
258-59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1622 (1975). For a discussion of awards for bad faith under EAJA
Subsection (b), see generally Sisk, supra note 7, at 784-85.)
By its terms, Subsection (b) is available "[ulnless expressly prohibited by statute."
Id.
Accordingly, even when another fee-shifting statute governs the precise situation at issue, Subsection
(b) remains available as an alternative to incorporate other, including common-law, bases for a fee
award-unless the statute expressly prohibits any alternative. Through Subsection (b), a party in
litigation with the federal government could properly demand attorney's fees under a common-law
exception to the American Rule, such as the bad faith rule, even when a specific statute provides for
a fee award according to particular standards for a case of that type or subject matter. In other
words, EAJA Subsection (b) may stand side-by-side with another fee-shifting statute, unless
"expressly prohibited" by the statute.
By contrast, Subsection (d) is available "[elxcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute,"
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988), which EAJA Section 206 clarifies as meaning that "[n]othing in
section 2412(d)... alters, modifies, repeals, invalidates, or supersedes" any other provision shifting
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Unfortunately, the line of reasoning applied by the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits is questionable and the analysis incomplete. As discussed in the next
section of this article, EAJA Subsection (d) may be used to supplement feeshifting statutes that do not apply to a type of claim or proceeding, but may not
be used to displace a statute that only permits a fee award under narrower
circumstances than represented in the particular case at hand. The attorney's fee
statute at issue in O&G Spring & Wire Form Specialty Co. and Clay Printing
plainly governed the subject matter or claim-age discrimination-at issue there.
That the ADEA authorizes a fee award only under the restricted circumstances
of a prevailing plaintiff and remains silent on the matter of fee awards to
prevailing defendants gives no warrant to expand fee-shifting by substituting the
substantial justification standard of EAJA Subsection (d). Neither court
mentioned, much less applied, the explicit non-displacement language of EAJA
Section 206.231

However, the result in O&G Spring & Wire Form Specialty Co. and Clay
Printingmay be defended on different grounds, limited to the unique context of
the ADEA as applied to the federal government. The non-displacement
provision in EAJA Section 206 states that "[niothing in section 2412(d) ...
alters, modifies, repeals, invalidates, or supersedes any other provision of Federal
law which authorizes an award of such fees and other expenses to any party
other than the United States that prevails in any civil action brought by or
'
against the United States."232
Thus, this limitation on the scope of EAJA
Subsection (d) is implicated only if another federal statute provides for an award
of fees in an action "brought by or against the United States," that is, if an
existing statute waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for an award
of fees in that type of proceeding. Somewhat surprisingly, and in sharp contrast
with other civil rights statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,233 the ADEA contains no waiver of sovereign immunity for fee-shifting

fees against the federal government. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 206, 94 Stat. 2325,
2330 (lapsed), as reenacted by Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 184, 186
(1985) (not codified). Thus, as discussed further in the next section of this article, Subsection (d)
may never stand side-by-side with another fee-shifting statute. Either an existing fee-shifting statute
governs the type of claim or proceeding or the EAJA does; the EAJA cannot overlap or intersect with
another fee-shifting provision that authorizes awards against the government. The silence in the
ADEA with respect to fee awards to defendants (and, more importantly, the absence of any provision
for a fee award against the government under the ADEA) left both Subsection (b) and Subsection (d)
available in the 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co. and Clay Printing cases. However, when
a fee-shifting statute does speak to the type of claim or proceeding at issue, Subsection (d) must bow
out, even as Subsection (b) remains available as an alternative basis for invoking a common-law
exception to the American Rule.
231. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 206,94 Stat. 2325, 2330 (lapsed), as reenacted
by Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 184, 186 (1985) (not codified).
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("[Tlhe Commission [EEOC] and the
United States shall be liable for costs [including attorney's fees] the same as a private person."). On
awards of attorney's fees against the federal government under civil rights statutes, see generally Sisk,
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and thus does not authorize any award of attorney's fees against the federal
government, whether acting as plaintiff or defendant.
As discussed above, the general attorney's fee provision incorporated into
the ADEA provides only for an award of fees in favor of plaintiff and makes no
provision for an award of fees to a prevailing defendant, whether private or
sovereign.234 Moreover, even when the federal government is charged as a
defendant employer with age discrimination against a federal employee, the
ADEA neglects to authorize a fee award against the Untied States. When
Congress extended the ADEA to federal employees, it added a new section
applicable only to federal employees, rather than incorporating federal employees
within the Act's existing provisions. 235 Because this specific section of federal
employees does not include a specific waiver of sovereign immunity or an
exception to the American Rule, three courts of appeals have held that attorney's
fees may not be awarded against the federal government under the ADEA. 236 In
sum, there is no fee-shifting statute applicable to the federal government under
any circumstances that could be displaced or superseded by the application of
EAJA Subsection (d) in this particular context. Because of this strange
legislative omission, age discrimination cases involving the federal government
as a party remain frontier territory for fee-shifting, wide open to exploration by
the EAJA.
3. The EAJA May Not Displace Other Statutes or Alter Standardsfor
Fee Recovery Under Other Provisions
Although the EAJA may be used to supplement the coverage of other fee
statutes, Section 206 precludes abuse of the EAJA to replace or supersede other
fee-shifting statutes that may have different standards for recovery or measurement of a fee award. Nonetheless, the EAJA will seldom come into conflict with
other fee-shifting statutes, as other provisions usually are more generous. Most
fee-shifting statutes authorize a fee award to parties who have prevailed or
substantially prevailed in litigation with the government, 37 whereas EAJA

supra note 7, at 769-72.

234.

29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 626(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

235. Id. § 633a (1988). See generally Sisk, supra fiote 7, at 770-71 (discussing attorney's fee
awards against the federal government under the ADEA).
236. Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (1 lth Cir. 1992); Palmer v.
General Servs. Admin., 787 F.2d 300, 300-02 (8th Cir. 1986); Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951,
962-66 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
237. For example, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1988), a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff is "virtually automatic." Sisk, supra note 7, at 770. See
also Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 966 (1968) (holding
under civil rights fee-shifting statutes, a prevailing party is entitled to a fee "unless special
circumstances would render an award unjust"). Similarly, under environmental protection statutes
such as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7604(d) (1988), 7607(0 (1988), both by congressional revision and judicial interpretation, the
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Subsection (d) also requires that the prevailing party establish that the
government's position in the case lacks "substantial justification." '38 Moreover,
most fee-shifting statutes authorize an award of a "reasonable" fee,239 which
allows attorneys to recover fees measured by their hours worked and an hourly
rate prevailing in the community,240 whereas EAJA Subsection (d) places a $75
"
per hour cap on fee awards.24
' Accordingly, when another fee-shifting statute is
available, a fee claimant will rarely wish to substitute the EAJA with its more
stringent entitlement standard and fee limitation.
However, under unusual circumstances, the specific limitations of another
fee-shifting statute may make the EAJA an attractive alternative. For the most
part, courts have refused to allow fee claimants the option of choosing the EAJA
over another fee-shifting statute that applies to the type of case before the court.
In Beck v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services,242 a
lawsuit was brought under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
(Vaccine Act),2 43 which provides a no-fault compensation scheme for certain
persons who die or are injured in connection with the administration of a
vaccine. 244 The Vaccine Act places a cap on the award for certain types of
expenses and damages, including attorney's fees, of $30,000.245 The Claims
Court awarded the full amount of $30,000 in attorney's fees and costs, as well
as over $1,000,000 in compensation.246 The plaintiff's attorney sought to obtain
an additional award of attorney's fees under the EAJA.247
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed the capped fee award, 24' holding an additional award under the EAJA
was barred by the language in the statute stating that Subsection (d) applied
"[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute., 249 Because the Vaccine
Act "does specifically provide for attorney['s] fees, 250 the court of appeals held
the EAJA "may not be used to supplement an award of fees under the Vaccine

standard for eligibility for a fee award is increasingly the same as that under traditional "prevailing
party" statutes. Sisk, supra note 7, at 778-81.
238. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988). See generally infra section
IV, forthcoming (discussing entitlement to an EAJA Subsection (d) fee award).
239. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562, 106
S. Ct. 3088, 3096-97 (1986), rev'don reh'g on other grounds,483 U.S. 711, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987).
240. Sisk, supra note 7, at 748-56.
241. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988). See generally infra section
V, forthcoming (discussing measurement of an EAJA Subsection (d) fee award).
242. 924 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-I to -34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
244. Beck, 924 F.2d at 1031.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1037-38.
249. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
250. Beck v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 924 F.2d 1029, 1037 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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Act."'25' The court's holding was dictated by the non-displacement mandate of
the EAJA, because a contrary holding would have eviscerated the fee cap
intentionally imposed by Congress on fee awards for claims under the Vaccine
Act.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit in an earlier case, Gavette v. Office of
Personnel Management, 52 had allowed the use of EAJA Subsection (d) in a
situation that had the precise consequence of superseding another fee-shifting
statute and evading the stricter standard for an award under that statute. In
Gavette, a federal employee challenging an involuntary disability retirement took
a successful appeal from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board.253
The claim was governed by the Back Pay Act, 254 which authorizes an award of
attorney's fees whenever it is "in the interest of justice" for the court to do so.255
Notwithstanding that the Back Pay Act contains a fee-shifting provision, albeit
with a stricter standard for an award, a divided Federal Circuit, sitting in banc,
ruled that the federal employee could alternatively seek an award of attorney's
fees under the EAJA.256 The majority stated that the EAJA could be used as a
supplement whenever another fee-shifting statute "provides for attorney['s] fees
in a narrower set of circumstances than those covered by the EAJA," which, the
court explained, included when the other statute establishes "a more difficult
standard" for an award of attorney's fees. 27 This decision cannot be reconciled
with the unequivocal and emphatic non-displacement language in EAJA Section
206.258
When the EAJA and another fee-shifting statute appear to intersect, the
courts must examine the scope, as distinguished from the standards, of the other
statute. When the other statute does not apply to the type of case or claim
before the court such that no fee award could be made by that court in a case of
that subject matter under any circumstances, the EAJA may properly be used to
supplement the statute. 259 In such an instance, the EAJA extends fee-shifting to

251. Id. at 1038.
252. 808 F.2d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (in banc). See generally Nancy A. Street, Note, Gavette
v. Office of Personnel Management: Tire Right to Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 1013, 1025 (1987) (approving the holding in Gavette that "the EAJA does
not preclude the cumulative application of another, less expansive fee-shifting statute").
253. Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1457-58.
254. 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
255. Id. §§ 5596(b)(1) (1988), 7703(c) (1988).
256. Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1463-65.
257. Id. at 1464-65. See also Beck v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 924
F.2d 1029, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining Gavette as holding "the EAJA may be used to
supplement another statute's attorney fee provision where the other statute has a more difficult or
narrow standard for awarding fees").
258. See EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 30 F.3d 58, 59 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding the EAJA
does not apply to Title VII cases which are governed by Title Vll's attorney's fee provision because
"Congress made as clear as it could that the Act was inapplicable to cases in which a statute
regulating awards of attorney's fees against the government was already in place").
259. Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1471 (Bissell, J., dissenting in part) (distinguishing other cases as
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a new field of legal claims for relief, that is, to a new type of civil action.
However, when another applicable fee-shifting statute imposes a narrower
standard or requires a more demanding showing to obtain a fee recovery,
recourse to the EAJA would make it a substitute for, rather than a supplement
to, the specific fee-shifting statute that governs that subject matter. Adhering to
the non-displacement mandate of the EAJA does not leave a "no-man's land"
between the substantial justification standard of EAJA Subsection (d) and the
stricter standard of another fee-shifting statute. 26° Rather, this position respects
the decision of Congress to adopt different and unique fee award standards and
limitations tailored to the specific context and enforcement of a particular
statutory scheme.
For example, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 26' a plaintiff
seeking attorney's fees must not only demonstrate eligibility by having "substantially prevailed" in a request for government documents, 262 but must also
demonstrate entitlement to an award.263 Among the factors to be considered by
the court in determining entitlement are (1) the benefit to the public derived from
the case, (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff, (3) the nature of the
plaintiff's interest in the records sought, and (4) whether the government's
withholding of the records had a reasonable basis in law." 6 Thus, although the
reasonableness of the government's conduct is one factor in determining
entitlement to a fee award under the FOIA, other factors such as the absence of
a public benefit or a commercial benefit to the plaintiff might preclude an award.
The EAJA, with its solitary "substantial justification" standard for entitlement to
an award, cannot legitimately be used to evade the additional FOIA entitlement
prerequisites, which reflect different policy considerations unique to that
particular statutory scheme.265

allowing use of the EAJA as a supplement only when another fee-shifting statute "did not cover the
type of action involved in those cases and thus no fee award could be made under that provision").
260. See id. at 1465 n.52 (arguing that if the EAJA did not apply to supplement the Back Pay
Act, there would be a "no-man's land" of "circumstances falling in between the 'interest of justice'
standard [of the Back Pay Act] and the 'substantial justification' standard [of the EAJA]").
261. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
262. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E).
263. Church of Scientology v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
264. Long v. IRS, 932 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1991); Aronson v. United States Dep't of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 866 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989); Church of Scientology, 653 F.2d at 590. See generally
Sisk, supra note 7, at 774-75 (discussing entitlement to fee award under the FOIA).
265. In Nichols v. Pierce, 740 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), a plaintiff who successfully
challenged the sufficiency of procedural protections accorded to tenants receiving federal housing
subsidies sought an award of attorney's fees under both the FOIA and the EAJA. Id. at 1251.
However, because the court concluded the FOIA had only "tangential relevance" and the case did
not actually arise under the FOIA, no true conflict or intersection between the FOIA and the EAJA
was presented in that case. Id. at 1252-54. See also Martenson v. United States Internal Revenue
Serv., No. 4-81-44, 1981 WL 1941, at *4 n.6 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 1981) (holding a plaintiff in a FOIA
case who failed to make the required showing for an award of fees under Section 552(a)(4)(E) was
barred under EAJA Section 206 from seeking fees under the EAJA).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Similarly, defendants in civil rights cases prosecuted by the government may
not gain access to the EAJA to avoid the rule that prevailing defendants in
discrimination cases may obtain an award only if the plaintiff's case is "frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation." 2 The courts of appeals that have specifically
addressed the issue267 have concluded that the EAJA does not apply to actions
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,268 because Title VII
contains its own specific provision governing the award of attorney's fees.2 69
Because the different and more exacting standard for an award of attorney's fees
against a civil rights plaintiff furthers the intent of Congress "to promote vigorous
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII, ' '270 the application of the EAJA to lower
that standard, even slightly, would subvert the policies underlying the specific
statutory scheme of that act.2 7 Accordingly,.as the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held in Huey v. Sullivan,272 the non-displacement language
in Section 206 prohibits the EAJA "from either narrowing or broadening the award
of fees allowed by other provisions of federal law. ' 27 3
The legislative history of the EAJA confirms this understanding. The bill
reports in both Houses of Congress explain that the EAJA does not apply to

266. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S. Ct. 694, 700 (1978).
However, given the close similarity between the "substantial jtstification"-unreasonableness standard
of EAJA Subsection (d) and the "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" standard for fee
awards to defendants under civil rights cases, we may assume there would rarely be a case in which
the government's case would be sufficiently weak to justify an award under one but not the other
standard. See generally section IV.B, forthcoming. However. since the Supreme Court has ruled a
showing by the government of "substantial justification" under the EAJA means "more than merely
undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness," Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566, 108 S.Ct.
2541, 2550 (1988), a defendant's burden in showing entitlement to fees may be slightly "lighter
under the EAJA than under" civil rights statutes. See EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 839 F,Stipp.
1285, 1287 (N.D. Il1. 1993), aff'd, 30 F.3d 58 (7th Cir. 1994).
267. EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 30 F.3d 58, 59 (7th Cir. 1994); Huey v. Sullivan, 971
F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (8th Cir. 1992) (involving request for award of expert fees under the EAJA),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1642 (1994); EEOC v. Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir.
1983).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
270. Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. at 701 (explaining that allowing
assessment of fees against a plaintiff on the same basis as against adefendant would "add to the risks
inherent in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote vigorous
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII"). Bat see Consolidated Serv. Sys., 30 F.3d at 59 (holding
the Christiansburg standard for awards of fees to defendants in Title VII cases precluded application
of the different EAJA standard for an award of fees against agovernment plaintiff in a Title VII case,
but expressing doubt about "whether the government needs the protection of a standard so friendly
to plaintiffs as that adopted in Christiansburg").
1993), aff'd, 30
271. EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 839 F. Supp. 1285, 1289-90 (N.D. I11.
F.3d 58 (7th Cir. 1994).
272. 971 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1642 (1994).
273. Id. at 1367.
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"civil actions ... already covered by existing fee-shifting statutes. 274 The
legislative reports on the EAJA further state:
[T]his section is not intended to replace or supersede any existing feeshifting statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Civil
Rights Acts, and the Voting Rights Act in which Congress has indi6ated
a specific intent to encourage vigorous enforcement, or to alter the
standards or the case law governing those Acts. It is intended to apply
only to cases (other than tort cases) where fee awards against the
government are not already authorized. 75
The language in the legislative reports thus makes clear that the EAJA does not
apply to cases of a certain type (those covered by existing fee-shifting statutes)
or to alter the standards detailed in other statutes that govern specific types of
claims. 76
In conclusion, EAJA Section 206 could not be more clear in its message,
stated with multiple synonyms to emphasize the point, that nothing in the EAJA
"alters, modifies, repeals, invalidates, or supersedes" any other fee-shifting
statute.2 7 7 In essence, Section 206 is a "hands-off" provision, instructing the
courts to steer the EAJA clear of the waters already being fished under other fee
statutes. 27' The application of the EAJA as an end-run around more stringent
standards for recovery in a particular fee-shifting statute runs up hard against this
unequivocal prohibition.

274. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96thCong.,2dSess. 18(1980),reprintedin 1980U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4997; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979).
275. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4997; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979).
276. The Federal Circuit has contended that the legislative history shows the non-displacement
provisions in the EAJA were "intended only to exclude existing statutes which were inore expansive
than the EAJA." Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 808 F.2d 1456, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(in banc). Thus, the Gavette court majority ruled, the EAJA could be used to supplement other feeshifting statutes that impose "a more difficult standard" for recovery of fees. Id. at 1464-65. As the
Fifth Circuit concluded upon reviewing the legislative history quoted above, it appears one of the
motivations behind the non-displacement provisions in the EAJA was to address the concerns of civil
rights groups that the statute not be applied to lessen the remedy provided in existing fee-shifting
statutes. In existing statutes, plaintiffs were ordinarily entitled to recover an award of fees if they
prevailed. Plaintiffs were not required to show the government's position was without substantial
justification. United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
That purpose, however, was accomplished through statutory language prohibiting the use of the EAJA
to alter, modify, repeal, invalidate, or supersede any existing fee-shifting statute-with no exception
stated for statutes less generous in standard or more demanding in requirements.
277. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 206, 94 Stat. 2325, 2330 (lapsed), as reenacted
by Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 184, 186 (1985).
278. See 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d at 818 (Rubin. J., dissenting) (stating Section 206
"indicates an intention not to trespass on territory covered by all other statutes").

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
III.

[Vol. 55

ELIGIBILITY FOR A FEE AWARD

A. Nature of the Result (Prevailing Party Requirement)
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States
fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action
... brought by or against the United States in any court having
jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust. (EAJA § 2412(d)(1)(A))27 9

1. Prevailing Party Status-The Classic Eligibility Requirement for
Fee-Shifting
The classic test of eligibility for an award under fee-shifting statutes is
whether the plaintiff has "prevailed" in the case.2 80 The meaning of "prevailing
party" underthe EAJA is the same as under other fee-shifting statutes.2 ' To
qualify as a "prevailing party," the party seeking fees must have attained "some
relief on the merits of his claim. 2 82 There must have been some final
determination of "the substantial rights of the parties, 83 such that the plaintiff
can "point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship
between itself and the defendant.'2 4 In Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland

279. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
280. See generally Sisk, supra note 7, at 742-44 (discussing prevailing party eligibility standard
for attorney's fee awards).
281. Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 767 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The meaning
of 'prevailing party' seems to be the same under the Equal Access to Justice Act as under other
attorney's fee statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988."). See also SEC v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407,
1412 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating the standards for prevailing party status under the EAJA are the
same as under other fee-shifting statutes); Guglietti v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 900 F.2d
397, 398 (Ist Cir. 1990) (same); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 870
F.2d 542, 544 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 5010 (the interpretation of the phrase, "prevailing party." "is
to be consistent with the law that has developed under existing statutes"); S. Rep. No. 253, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) (same). See generally Rueben B. Robertson & Mary C. Fowler, Recovering
Attorneys' Fees from the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 903,
905 (1982) ("The legislative history explains that 'prevailing' is to be defined as it is under existing
statutes providing for attorneys' fee awards to prevailing parties, which means that parties may
prevail by obtaining favorable settlements or voluntary dismissals or by winning on some significant,
separable issues even if not on all issues in the case.").
282. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1989 (1980) (per curiam).
283. Id. at 758, 100 S. Ct. at 1989.
284. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S. Ct.
1486, 1493 (1989). See also Milton v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 812, 813 (5th Cir. 1994).

19941

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

Independent School District,285 the Supreme Court rejected a test for prevailing party status that required a party to prevail on the "central issue" in the
litigation and not merely upon significant secondary issues. 28 6 The Court adopted
a general rule that, to be a prevailing party under fee-shifting statutes, a litigant
need only succeed on "any significant issue in [the] litigation
which achieve[d]
27
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit., 9
2 88
In its latest word on the subject, the Supreme Court, in Farrarv. Hobby,
held that the mere attainment of nominal damages is not so minimal or technical
in nature as to deprive a party of prevailing status. 2 9 Although a verdict might
be for a nominal sum, such as one dollar,29 the judgment nevertheless materially
alters the legal relationship between the parties:
A plaintiff may demand payment for nominal damages no less than he
may demand payment for millions of dollars in compensatory damages.
A judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatory or
nominal, modifies the defendant's behavior for the plaintiffs benefit by
forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would
not pay.29'
Farrarthus lowers the threshold for qualifying as a prevailing party to a
very low level. Farrar,however, also stands for the proposition that even a
party who has prevailed may be denied a fee award.292 The Court held that,
although the nominal nature of the judgment "does not affect the prevailing party
inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded" under a fee-shifting
statute.293 Indeed, the Court concluded that.the proper measure of a fee award
in a case of such limited success, with no additional equitable relief or
corresponding public benefit, was "usually no fee at all." 294 As Farrar
illustrates, the fact of success may be enough to qualify a party for fees, but the
extent of success remains important to the assessment of what constitutes a
reasonable fee.295
Similarly, the fact of partial success in a multiple claim case is far from
irrelevant to the fee award calculation. A plaintiff may qualify as a prevailing
party by winning a single claim in a multiple claim lawsuit. Nevertheless, a loss

285. 489 U.S. 782, 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
286. Id. at 792, 109 S. Ct. at 1493.
287. Id. at 789, 109 S. Ct. at 1492.
288. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
289. Id. at 573.
290. Id. at 571.
291. Id. at 574.
292. Id. at 574-75.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 575.
295. See generally Sisk, supra note 7, at 760-62 (discussing downward adjustment of fee award
to reflect a party's limited degree of success in litigation). See also section V, forthcoming
(discussing measurement of an EAJA fee award).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

on other claims may affect the amount of ultimate recovery. 296 To the extent
work done on distinct claims can be segregated, the plaintiff's attorney may be
unable to recover for time expended on those unsuccessful claims. 297 However,
if the case involves what is essentially a single claim arising from a common
nucleus of operative fact, and the plaintiff advances separate legal theories that
"are but different statutory avenues to the same goal," then all of the time spent
on all aspects of the case may be compensable. 298
In a case involving multiple claims, a plaintiff may obtain attorney's fees
even if he or she has prevailed only on a claim for which attorney's fees may
not be awarded (a "non-fee claim"), provided the plaintiff also asserted a related
claim for which attorney's fees are available (a "fee claim") that the court did
not reach in its disposition of the case. 2' The unresolved fee claim must be
"substantial" (non-frivolous) and must arise out of a common nucleus of
operative fact with the non-fee claim. 3° Because of the broad scope of EAJA
Subsection (d), applying to "any civil action" against the federal government with
limited exceptions,)' there are not likely to be many scenarios in which a nonfee claim would be combined with a claim covered by the EAJA in a suit against
the federal government.
Finally, to qualify as a prevailing party, a party need not have taken the case
to trial and obtained a judgment. A party obtaining a consent decree or a
favorable settlement has prevailed. 0 2 For a party who settles with the federal
government to be considered as having prevailed, there must be a "clear causal
relationship" between the settlement and the litigation.3 3
Although the general standards for prevailing party status are the same under
the EAJA as under other fee-shifting statutes, there are certain patterns of
litigation problems that appear to arise more frequently under the EAJA or that
present unique problems for this particular fee-shifting scheme. The remainder
of this section addresses the peculiarities of the "prevailing party" eligibility
requirement as it applies in the EAJA context.

296. See section V, forthcoming (discussing measurement of an EAJA fee award).
297. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35, 440, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940, 1943 (1983).
298. See Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 239-40 (1st Cir.
1993) (discussing prevailing party status). But see Sierra Club v. Secretary of the Army, 820 F.2d
513, 520 n.6 (1st Cir. 1987) (leaving for another day the question of whether jurisprudence on
"mixed bags of claims-some successful, some not" applies to EAJA cases). See generally Sisk,
supra note 7, at 751-53 (discussing measurement of fee award in cases with multiple claims,
successful and unsuccessful).
299. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 & n.15, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2576 & n.15 (1980).
300. Id. at 132 n.15, 100 S. Ct. at 2576 n.15; Paris, 988 F.2d at 239-40; Plott v. Griffiths, 938
F.2d 164, 167-68 (10th Cir. 1991).
301. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988). See generally supra section
II (discussing the scope of Subsection (d)).
302. Maher, 448 U.S. at 129, 100 S. Ct. at 2575.
303. Petrone v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 936 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 1161 (1992).
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2. The Prevailing Party Standard in Cases Involving Judicial Review of
Administrative Action
a. PrevailingParty Status in Administrative Procedure Cases
As a general rule under fee-shifting statutes, success on procedural,
evidentiary, or most preliminary matters, no matter how significant, is not
sufficient to qualify a litigant as a prevailing party. 3°4 Thus, for example, in
ordinary litigation, a plaintiff does not become a prevailing party by obtaining
an interlocutory ruling that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim, which only allows the case to proceed to the merits, 5 or by
obtaining appellate reversal of an adverse trial judgment, which only results in
a remand for further proceedings. 3"
However, because EAJA applications frequently are made in the context of
a petition for judicial review of agency action, the dispute on the merits may
have focused primarily upon questions of administrative procedure. For example,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)3 7 authorizes a party to petition for a
judicial order directing an agency to publish a regulation for public notice and
comment prior to adoption."' As the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reminds us,
[i]n the real world of the APA, an opportunity for comment.., is not
to be denigrated. While it does not assure that the petitioner will be
able to persuade the agency to change its proposal, of course, it does
give the petitioner a chance. And if that chance were not in itself
something of value in the real world, then there would be no need for
the notice and comment procedures of the APA. a°
Indeed, a statute providing the waiver of sovereign immunity or the cause of
action for a private party against the federal government may be intended
primarily to ensure that government decisions adhere to fair procedural standards,
without necessarily granting a private party the opportunity to directly challenge
the substance of the decision itself.

304. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
("Generally a plaintiff who has obtained a remand for further proceedings is not at that point a
'prevailing party' for the purpose of collecting its attorney's fee. Only if it ultimately succeeds on
the merits of its underlying claim may it be awarded the attorney's fee it incurred in obtaining the
remand.").
305. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S. Ct. 2672, 2675-76 (1987).
306. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758-59, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1990 (1980) (per curiam).
307. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
308. See id. §§ 553 (1988), 702 (1988), 706(d) (1988).
309. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Reilly, I F.3d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing
prevailing party requirement in context of environmental statute fee-shifting provision).
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In Golden Gate Audubon Society v. Army Corps of Engineers,310 a federal
district court considered whether an environmental organization had prevailed for
purposes of an EAJA award, when the court remanded the matter to the Army
Corps of Engineers to redetermine whether a port's dredge material discharge
area constituted protected wetlands as defined in the regulations interpreted by
the court.3t In response to the government's argument that the environmental
organization had not prevailed because of the remand to the agency, the court
stated:
[W]hat constitutes "success" in environmental litigation must take into
account that many environmental laws mandate "procedures" rather than
"results." Indeed, environmental litigation is generally undertaken to
force the relevant agency to properly perform its statutory responsibility.
Thus, although a remand may appear to be a hollow victory in another
context (e.g., a social security case), it is of considerably more
31 2
importance in the environmental context.
When considering whether a party has truly prevailed in federal government
litigation resulting in a declaration of procedural rights or a remand to the
agency, the court must exercise its discretion based upon its familiarity with the
case in evaluating three basic factors. First, the court, by referring to the
pleadings and other filings in the litigation, should determine whether the private
party sought primarily to challenge administrative procedures or instead raised
a procedural objection as a means to the end of obtaining a reversal of an
administrative decision on its merits. Second, the court must consider whether
a judgment with a strong procedural component has enforced the central purpose
of the statute, by asking whether the statute creating the cause of action was
designed to ensure that administrative decisions conform to procedural
requirements or instead to allow private parties to seek substantive benefits or
relief. Third, the court should judge whether, as a practical matter, the outcome
of the litigation amounts to a mere technical victory that is of little lasting value
to a litigant or instead constitutes a meaningful success that affects the

310. 732 F. Supp. 1014 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (hereinafter Golden Gate I1).
311. See Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 717 F. Supp. 1417 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (hereinafter Golden Gate 1).
312. Golden Gate !!,
732 F. Supp. at 1023 n.13. See also Reilly, I F.3d at 1257-58 (allowing
an environmental group to prevail in its challenge to hazardous waste rule when the court vacated
the rule on judicial review, even though the identical rule was later adopted after the agency provided
the required opportunity for notice and comment); Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Carlucci, 867
F.2d 1224, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that a declaration that environmental statute requires agency
to prepare an environmental impact statement constitutes a "substantive" victory on the merits for
purposes of the EAJA); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 316-17 (4th Cir. 1988)
(allowing a fee award under the EAJA). See generally Michael D. Axline, Environmental Citizen
Suits § 8.03(A), at 8-7 to 8-8 (1992) (explaining "success often is measured differently" in
environmental suits than in other litigation).
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substantive rights of the parties or promotes the public interest represented by the
statutory purpose.
The decision in National Wildlife Federationv. FederalEnergy Regulatory
Commission3 t3 evaluates these considerations, and comes to opposite conclusions
for different claims in the same case. Petitioners, environmental organizations, had
challenged the issuance by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission of
preliminary permits to develop license applications for hydroelectric power
projects, resulting in a judicial remand of the matter back to the Commission for
reconsideration. On the subsequent EAJA fee application, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that part of this procedural victory was
inadequate to support a claim for attorney's fees, but simultaneously found that
another part of the remand judgment provided sufficient benefits to qualify the
environmental organizations as prevailing parties.314 In the first claim, the court
had found that the Commission's decision not to formulate a comprehensive plan
for the river basin was not supported by adequate evidence, which left the court
unable to evaluate the merits of the decision on the present record.315 Because this
part of the remand order permitted the agency to develop a clearer evidentiary
record while offering no commentary on the merits of the decision or the
Commission's application of the pertinent statute, the court concluded that "this
victory is insufficient to establish [the environmental organizations] as 'prevailing
part[ies]' under EAJA." 3t 6
However, with respect to another claim, the court had remanded the matter to
the Commission with explicit direction to give special weight to a fish and wildlife
factor when considering the suitability of the river basin for electrical power
development. 37 The Ninth Circuit found the environmental organizations were
prevailing parties as to this claim.318 Several factors supported this conclusion.
First, although the remand with guiding directions did not require a particular
outcome, the decision "clarified and strengthened" the substantive environmental
legal protections asserted by the organizations.3" 9 Second, the "significance of the
decision [went] well beyond the particular facts of th[e] case," meaning the
litigation had promoted a general public interest. 32 ° Finally, the directive that
special weight be given to this particular factor on remand effectuated the purposes
of the environmental statute at issue, thereby enforcing the legislative mandate of
Congress. 32'

313. 870 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1989) (hereinafter National Wildlife Fed'n i).
314. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1505 (9th Cir.
1986) (hereinafter National Wildlife Fed'n 1).
315. Id.at 1511.
316. National Wildlife Fed'n II,
870 F.2d at 545.
317. National Wildlife Fed'is I. 801 F.2d at 1515.
318. National Wildlife Fed'n II, 870 F.2d at 545.
319. Id. at 545-46.
320. Id. at 546 (quoting Mantolete v. Bolger, 791 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1986)).
321. Id.
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Similarly, in Moseanko v. Yeutter,322 farmer-borrowers brought an action
challenging the procedures adopted by the Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) to offset the farm program payments of farmers whose FmHA loans
were delinquent.323 The court found the lawsuit had served as a catalyst for a
moratorium on the use of the challenged regulations and the later adoption of
new regulations which provided many of the procedural protections sought by
the lawsuit.3 24 Although the relief sought in the action was only procedural in
nature, and did not necessarily mean that the farmers would avoid the offset of
payments, the court concluded attorney's fees under the EAJA were nonetheless
justified. First, the lawsuit specifically sought procedural safeguards, focusing
upon the validity of the procedures applied by FmHA rather than upon the
particular merits of an individual offset decision. 325 Second, the Debt Collection
Act 3 26 expressly provided for procedural rights to borrowers in connection with
a government decision to use administrative offset. 327 In this instance, both the
relief sought by the litigant and the purpose of the governing statute were
distinctly procedural in nature; indeed, the only success available in the litigation
was procedural.
By contrast, in A. Hirsch, Inc. v. United States,328 the litigant pursued a
substantive goal but obtained only a procedural victory, depriving it of prevailing
party status. In that case, an importer sought judicial review of a determination
by the International Trade Commission not to review an order imposing an
import duty. 329 The Court of International Trade remanded the case, holding that
the Commission was required to provide a more detailed explanation for its
conclusion that allegations of changed circumstances did not warrant a review
of the order.3 Significantly, the court did not grant the importer's alternative
request that the Commission be ordered to reconsider its rejection of the review
petition.33' Ultimately the Commission reaffirmed its determination with a more
33 2
detailed explanation, and the Trade Court later upheld the agency's action.
The importer argued it qualified as a prevailing party and was eligible for
an EAJA award because the statute at issue required the Commission to articulate
its reasons for a decision and because a remand for that purpose was one of the
forms of relief requested in its complaint. 333 On appeal from the Trade Court's
denial of attorney's fees, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

944 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 419-20, 427.
Id. at 427.
31 U.S.C. § 3716 (1988).
Moseanko v. Yeutter, 944 F.2d 418, 427-28 (8th Cir. 1991).
948 F.2d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1241-42.
Id. at 1242-43.
Id. at 1243.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
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Circuit held that "[aiscertaining the 'prevailing party' in litigation requires the
court to 'look to the substance of the litigation to determine whether an applicant
has substantially prevailed in its position, and not merely the technical
disposition of the case or motion. ' ''3 4 Examining "the claimed 'victory' in the
context of the litigation as a whole," reviewing the arguments made by the
parties, and granting some deference to the Trade Court's characterization of the
case, the Federal Circuit concluded the importer's true goal was to force a review
by the Commission of the import duty determination.335 Under the totality of the
circumstances, "the remand ordered was simply an interim procedural win with
no lasting substantive benefit" to the importer. 36
In conclusion, "the judgment as to whether someone has won depends upon
the game being played. 337 Success in each case must be analyzed in terms of
the nature of the underlying statutory cause of action, the purpose of the lawsuit,
and the importance of the outcome. When a party is seeking primarily
procedural relief pursuant to a statute designed to structure the procedures for
governmental action, then a judicial decision directing the agency to reexamine
a decision under the correct procedures may constitute significant relief on the
merits that qualifies the litigant as a prevailing party. However, the court
considering a fee application must examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the litigation to ensure that the prominent aim of the lawsuit is to
achieve a procedural directive to the agency, that such relief would promote the
principal purpose of the pertinent statute, and that the victory would be one that
provided meaningful benefits to the party or the general public.
b. PrevailingParty Status in Government Benefit Cases and the
PeculiarContext of Social Security Claims
In contrast with claims for procedural relief brought pursuant to statutes
designed primarily to ensure administrative compliance with procedural rules, a
disappointed claimant or applicant who seeks review of the denial of a
government benefit or government funding is asking for substantive relief in its
purest form. Although objections to procedures followed by the agency in
making an adverse benefits or funding determination may feature prominently in
the litigation, the manifest aim is the substantive one of obtaining the payment
of the benefit or funds. 33' Because claims for disability benefits brought under

334. Id. (quoting Devine v. Sutermeister, 733 F.2d 892, 897-98 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
335. Id. at 1245-46.
336. Id. at 1245. See also Austin v. Department of Commerce, 742 F.2d 1417, 1420-21 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (determining the substance of the action by federal employees adversely affected by a
reduction in force was to obtain reinstatement; thus, a remand of the matter to the Merit Systems
Protection Board to remedy a defect in a hearing, without expressing any opinion on the validity of
the reduction in force, did not entitle the employees to an EAJA award).
337. Sisk, supra note 7, at 781.
338. See Cromwell, supranote 212, at 368 (stating "the central issue in any appeal from a claim
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the Social Security Act 339 constitute by far the largest class of government
benefits litigation, 34 and because individual benefit claims "comprise the vast
majority of all EAJA litigation,""' these issues have arisen with persistence in
that context.3 2
Until recently, it was settled law in the courts of appeals that a procedural
victory in an individual benefits case, followed by a remand to the agency, was

insufficient to qualify the litigant as a prevailing party. 43 In McGill v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit explained its denial of an EAJA award to a party who obtained
a remand in a Social Security benefits case:

for social security benefits is whether the claimant is eligible for benefits").
339. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). Title I1of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988
& Supp. V 1993), establishes the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, under which workers
with adequate quarters of employment may apply for disability benefits. Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§
1381-1383d (1988), establishes the Supplemental Security Income Program, which provides disability
benefits to individuals with minimal income and assets. In the Social Security Independence and
Program Improvements Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 101, 108 Stat. 1464, 1465 (1994), the
Social Security Administration was removed from the Department of Health and Human Services and
established as an independent agency in the executive branch.
340. The Social Security Administration is "probably the largest adjudicative agency in the
western world," Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1954 n.2 (1983)
(citing Jerry L. Mashaw et al., Social Security Hearing and Appeals at xi (1978)), processing over
2 million disability claims each year. Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106, 104 S.Ct. 2249, 2251
(1984).
341. Krent, supra note II, at 495. Although other federal statutes may also authorize benefits,
most individual benefits claims arise under the Social Security Act. Id. at 495 n.127. The vast
majority of EAJA awards have been made to claimants who succeeded in challenging adverse Social
Security disability benefit decisions. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2549
(1988). See also Mezey & Olson, supra note 6, at 13, 17 (stating Social Security disability claimants
have "flooded the federal courts with EAJA petitions" and finding Social Security cases constituted
60.5% of a federal court decision sample).
342. Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1988), the court may allow payment
of attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of past-due benefits owed to the claimant.
However, this fee is paid entirely out of the past-due benefits; the Social Security Act itself does not
provide for an award of attorney's fees. An uncodified section of the EAJA as re-enacted in 1985
expressly provides that Social Security claimants may seek an award of attorney's fees under the
EAJA. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3(b), 99 Stat. 183, 186 (uncodified). If
the attorney obtains fees for the same work under both the Social Security Act and the EAJA, the
attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee. Id.
343. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling aSocial Security
disability claimant does not qualify as a prevailing party until he has received an award); Myers v.
Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 (1 ithCir. 1990) (same); Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711-12 (7th
Cir. 1988) (same); Brown v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 747 F.2d 878, 881-83 (3d Cir.
1984) (same); Cook v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 240, 241 (8th Cir. 1984) (same); Swenson v. Heckler, 801
F.2d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1984) (same). See generally Winold, supra note 9, at 931 (stating the
"circuits have agreed that obtaining a remand alone will not support an award of fees").
344. 712 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S.Ct. 1420 (1984).
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Unlike a plaintiff who files a lawsuit alleging violations of a procedural
due process right and seeks compensation for such deprivation, the
ultimate relief to which a social security claimant is normally entitled
is not vindication of procedural rights but an award of benefits for a
claimed disability. While it is true that a favorable ruling on plaintiff's
procedural claim that the [administrative law judge] should have
conducted a more thorough hearing may ultimately affect the outcome
on the merits of plaintiffs disability claim, nevertheless her procedural
claim is not a matter on which plaintiff can be said to prevail for
purposes of shifting counsel fees."
The Supreme Court endorsed this understanding in Sullivan v. Hudson," 6
stating that "where a court's remand to the agency for further administrative
proceedings does not necessarily dictate the receipt of benefits, the [Social
Security] claimant will not normally attain 'prevailing party' status within the
meaning of § 2412(d)(1)(A) until after the result of the administrative proceeding
is known."3'47 The Court characterized a remand under such circumstances as the
kind of "procedural or evidentiary rulings" that are not themselves "matters on
which a party could 'prevail' for purposes of shifting his counsel fees to the
opposing party."' 8 For purposes of the EAJA, the Court ruled that "the Social
Security claimant's status as a prevailing party" in the civil action is "often
completely dependent on the successful completion of the remand proceedings
before the Secretary."' 9
This approach is consistent with the analysis outlined above. For purposes
of prevailing party status, while relief that is procedural in effect may be
sufficient in an action brought pursuant to administrative procedural statutes to
compel an agency to adhere to procedural constraints, an interim procedural
victory is insufficient in a lawsuit that is brought for the purpose of obtaining
substantive relief from the government in the form of an entitlement, such as
restoration of employment or payment of a benefit. 350 In the latter case, "correct

345. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
346. 490 U.S. 877, 109 S. Ct. 2248 (1989).
347. Id. at 886, 109 S. Ct. at 2255. See also id. at 887, 109 S. Ct. at 2255 (observing "the vast
majority of the courts of appeals have come to this conclusion"). But see Shalala v. Schaefer, 113
S. Ct. 2625, 2631 (1993) (characterizing this.statement in Hudson as dicta).
348. Hudson, 490 U.S. at 886-87, 109 S. Ct. at 2254-56 (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U.S. 754, 759, 100 S. Ct. 1987, 1990 (1980)).
349. Id. at 887, 109 S. Ct. at 2255. Under the Social Security Independence and Program
Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 101, 108 Stat. 1464, 1465 (1994), remand
proceedings would be held before the Social Security Administration as an independent agency in
the executive branch.
350. A class action suit brought by Social Security disability claimants to challenge the agency's
procedures for determining eligibility for benefits might fall under the former classification of
administrative procedure actions rather than the latter classification of substantive benefit claims. See
McDonald v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 1468, 1474-75 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
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procedures and use of correct substantive standards are largely (if not entirely)

instruments to a desired end ... relief from a restriction, grant of a benefit,

imposition of a restriction on others, etc." '' When the goal is substantive in
nature, any remand that does not effectively dictate the receipt of the claimed
benefit cannot confer prevailing party status "since [the claimant's] rights and
liabilities and those of the government have not yet been determined. 352
In Shalala v. Schaefer,a53 the Supreme Court abruptly changed course. The

Court announced that a Social Security claimant who obtains ajudgment reversing
the denial of benefits and remanding the case to the administration becomes a
prevailing party at the time of the court judgment, notwithstanding that an actual
award of benefits will not occur without further administrative proceedings on
remand (and, in fact, might not occur at all).3 54 The Court reached its conclusion
with little evaluation ofthe considerations discussed above, other than to pronounce
that obtaining a remand "certainly meets [the] description" of success on a

disability claimants who successfully brought class action challenging Social Security Administration's application of severity regulations and denial of benefits were prevailing parties for purposes
of the EAJA). Although the plaintiffs in such a case would also be seeking an award of benefits on
an individual basis, the class action nature of the lawsuit would make the administrative procedural
question of predominant or even solitary importance in the litigation and the success on that issue
would have significant benefits for a large segment of the public.
351. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Maritime Subsidy Bd., 901 F.2d 1119, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(ruling that remand to agency to allow shipping companies to contest grant of authority allowing
competitor to conduct around-the-world shipping service with unsubsidized ships did not qualify them
as prevailing parties for the EAJA because while the order shifting the burden of proof may have
improved their chances of winning substantive benefit, they had not yet prevailed; however, since
the outcome on the remand may have represented a victory on the merits, the case had to be
remanded to the district court to determine whether there was such a victory and whether their
litigative success caused it).
352. John J. Sullivan, Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 Colum.
L. Rev. 1089, 1100 (1984). See also Brown v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 747 F.2d 878,
883 (3d Cir. 1984).
By contrast, if the court rules in favor of a party's entitlement to government benefits or funding,
the party has prevailed, even if the case is remanded to the agency for further proceedings or to
calculate the amount of benefits. See, e.g., Massachusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Assistance
Admin., 776 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (ruling applicant for government funding was
prevailing party notwithstanding remand to the agency because applicant established an entitlement
to relief on the merits and the agency agreed to award funding); Najor v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 675 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (allowing a Social Security claimant to
prevail when court reversed decision of administration and remanded solely for calculation of
benefits); Barrige v. Bowen, 673 F. Supp. 1167, 1168 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (same). Under such
circumstances, of course, the victory was not procedural in any sense, but resulted in substantive
relief.
353.
113 S.Ct. 2625 (1993).
354. Id. at 2631-32. Subsequent to the Shalala .v. Schaefer decision, courts of appeals have
recognized prior settled circuit law has been overturned and Social Security claimants securing even
a procedural remand now qualify as prevailing parties under the EAJA. See, e.g., Breaux v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 20 F.3d 1324, 1325 (5th Cir. 1994); O'Connor v. Shalala,
23 F.3d 1232, 1234-35 (7th Cir. 1994); Kershaw v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1993).
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significant issue.35 Upon close examination, one finds the Court's decision was a
special one tailored to the idiosyncratic disjunction of the governing statutes and
designed to avoid the "Catch-22" situation that would otherwise prevent even an
ultimately successful benefits claimant from obtaining an EAJA award.
Several aspects of the Social Security adjudication process combine with the
requirements of the EAJA to make the "prevailment question" awkward in this
peculiar context. 56 First, even a successful Social Security claimant cannot obtain
an award for legal expenses incurred at the administrative level. The administrative
version of the EAJA357 applies only to "adversarial adjudications" conducted
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act in which the United States is
represented by counsel or otherwise. 358 Social Security disability claims are
processed in a non-adversarial manner, even when they come before an administrative law judge.359 During the reenactment of the EAJA, Congress expressly
considered and rejected a provision that would have extended the administrative
EAJA to Social Security benefits proceedings. 36
Second, although EAJA Subsection (d) applies to "proceedings for judicial
review of agency action,"'3 6 including judicial review of adverse Social Security
benefit determinations, the court's authority to grant attorney's fees under the
EAJA begins and ends with the judicial proceeding. Thus, unless the court may
retain jurisdiction over the claim pending further administrative proceedings, the
court relinquishes any authority to award attorney's
fees based upon a subsequent
3 62
grant of benefits at the administrative level.
Third, the EAJA requires a party seeking attorney's fees to file an
application "within thirty days of final judgment in the action. 363 For purposes

355. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2632.
356. See Guglietti v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 900 F.2d 397, 399 (1st Cir. 1990)
(characterizing the prevailing party determination as the "prevailment question").
357. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988).
358. Id. § 504(b)(1)(C). See generally Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 112 S.
Ct. 515, 519-21 (1991) (holding administrative deportation proceedings are not "adversary
adjudications" for which fees may be awarded under the EAJA Section 504 because such proceedings
are not subject to or governed by Section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act).
359. Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 891, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 2257-58 (1989) (holding Social
Security administrative proceedings are not adversarial for purposes of the EAJA Section 504); Willis
v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1991) (same).
360. 130 Cong. Rec. 24828-29 (statements of Rep. Morrison explaining proposal to extend the
EAJA to Social Security administrative proceedings was rejected in the House), 29280 (statements
of Sen. Heflin explaining proposal to extend the EAJA to Social Security administrative proceedings
was not included in the bill passed by Congress and that this "seems to be a fight which will have
to be fought another day"). See generally Hudson, 490 U.S. at 897-98, 109 S.Ct. at 2260-61 (White,
J., dissenting) (describing the legislative history of this proposal).
361. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
362. See supra section II.A.2 (discussing the limitation of EAJA Subsection (d) to judicial
proceedings).
363. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988). See generally infra section
VI, forthcoming (discussing the procedures for seeking an EAJA award).
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of the EAJA, Congress has defined "final judgment" as a court judgment that is
"final and not appealable." 3' 6 A "final judgment" means "a judgment rendered
by a court that terminates the civil action for which EAJA fees may be
received"; it "does not encompass decisions rendered by an administrative
agency. ' 65 Accordingly, if a court judgment remanding a Social Security case
for further administrative proceedings is one that terminates the civil action, a
claimant has only thirty days after all appellate rights have expired to request an
award. The claimant does not have the luxury of waiting until the administrative
proceedings on remand have run their course with a final decision on allowance
366
of benefits.
At first, it appeared the Supreme Court had found a way around this
dilemma, although this approach ultimately was circumscribed by the plain
language of the Social Security judicial review statute. In Sullivan v. Hudson,367
the Court held the EAJA fees may be collected for administrative proceedings
in a Social Security benefits case that follow a court remand to the agency,
provided the court has properly retained jurisdiction over the matter and

364. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (1988).
365. Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 97, 111 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1991).
366. See Cromwell, supra note 212, at 369 ("It is improbable that the decision on the postremand hearing will occur within the 30-day period following final judgment in the court action that
is the statutory limitation for the filing of a fee petition.").
In a Supreme Court brief, the government suggested an alternative approach to this problem, but
one that was both inefficient and contrary to the language of the Social Security Act and the EAJA.
Under the government's approach, a Social Security claimant would file an EAJA fee application
within 30 days after the court's remand judgment became final, thereby satisfying the timeliness
requirement. The court then would hold the application until after the claimant had satisfied the
remaining prerequisite to an EAJA fee award by prevailing through a successful award of benefits
before the agency on remand. Brief for the Petitioner (Secretary of Health and Human Services) at
25-28, Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993) (No. 92-311). To begin with, this approach is
wasteful and inefficient, as it requires the Social Security claimant to petition for a fee award at a
point in time before he or she had prevailed (assuming an actual award of benefits is the crucial
element of prevailing) and also requires the court to accept this premature application for filing,
notwithstanding that the claimant may be unsuccessful on remand, thus making the application for
fees ineffective. Moreover, the EAJA requires a party submitting an application for fees to "show[]
that the party is a prevailing party." Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(B) (1988).
If the prerequisite to being deemed a prevailing party is success on the remand, the claimant cannot
satisfy this explicit statutory requirement for a fee application at the time of the court judgment.
Finally, the indirect effect of this approach would be to confer a type of continuing jurisdiction upon
the district court over the Social Security dispute that had been remanded, which, as discussed below,
is narrowly circumscribed under the Social Security Act. Even though the EAJA fee award dispute
is collateral to the merits, it is also ancillary to the Social Security dispute and not independent of
it. In any event, the Supreme Court in Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993), did not accept
the government's suggested approach. See also id. at 2633 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting "the
Government's rather bizarre proposal of requiring all Social Security claimants who achieve a
sentence-four remand to file a protective EAJA application within 30 days of the remand order, and
then update or amend their application if they are successful on remand"). See generally infra part
VI, forthcoming (discussing the procedures for seeking an EAJA award).
367. 490 U.S. 877, 109 S. Ct. 2248 (1989).
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368
contemplates the entry of a judgment upon completion of all proceedings.
Thus, although the administrative version of the EAJA does not apply, EAJA
Subsection (d) would cover legal expenses on remand as having been incurred
369
Under the
ancillary to, and thus as part of, the civil action in the court.
Hudson approach, when the court has maintained supervisory powers over the
remand, an EAJA award may be made to a successful claimant when the
administrative proceedings have concluded and the case has returned to the court
for final adjudication.
Although the Hudson approach continues to have validity, its application has
been limited to a small subclass of Social Security remands. As the Supreme Court
explained and clarified in Shalala v. Schaefer,37° the statute permits retention of
continuing jurisdiction over a remanded case only in narrow circumstances. Under
the Social Security Act, a district court may remand a Social Security benefits case
37
to the agency under either sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). '
Sentence six, which allows a remand only if the agency requests the remand before
answering the complaint or where new evidence is properly adduced, specifically
provides that the new agency decision is to be filed with the court after proceedings
on remand.372 Thus, the statute plainly contemplates that the court will retain
jurisdiction pending a sentence-six remand, which in turn would permit the court
to entertain an EAJA application after a claimant received an award of benefits in
the administrative proceedings. The Hudson answer to the dilemma retains full
force in the context of a sentence-six remand.3"
The vast majority of Social Security case remands, however, fall under
sentence four of Section 405(g), which generally authorizes the reviewing court to
affirm, modify, or reverse a benefits determination, with or without a remand.374

368. Id. at 892, 109 S. Ct. at 2258.
369. Id. (ruling "administrative proceedings may be so intimately connected with judicial
proceedings as to be considered part of the 'civil action' for purposes of a fee award").
370. 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993).
371. Id at 2629 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988)).
372. Id. at 2629 & nn.1-2. Sentence six of Section 405(g) reads:
The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he files his
answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may
at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a
showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the
failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the
Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if
so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and shall file
with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a
transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or
affirming was based.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
373. Schaefer, 113 S.Ct. at 2631 n.4 ("Hudson remains good law as applied to remands ordered
pursuant to sentence six.").
374. Sentence four of Section 405(g) reads: "The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, ajudgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision
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By the plain language of sentence four, the court is directed to enter a judgment at
the time of any remand.373 In Sullivan v. Finkelstein,376 the Court ruled that "each
final decision of the Secretary [is] reviewable by a separate piece of litigation," and
that a sentence-four remand "terminate[s] the civil action" seeking judicial review
of the agency benefits decision.377 Because judgment must be entered immediately
upon a court's grant of a sentence-four remand, the court may not retain jurisdiction
and, thus,
may not award attorney's fees in the forthcoming administrative proceed378
ings.
Accordingly, since most remands under the Social Security Act are granted
pursuant to sentence four rather than sentence six, meaning that a final judgment
will be entered at a point in time well before the conclusion of the proceedings
on remand, a court will rarely be able to consider an application for EAJA fees
after the final resolution of a benefits claim on the merits. Indeed, even if the
claim were again denied on remand and benefits were subsequently granted by
the court after a new petition for judicial review, the Finkelstein holding that
each agency decision is reviewable by a separate piece of litigation means the
court's award would be limited to legal expenses attributable to the second
judicial review. In sum, the interaction between the Social Security Act's
provision authorizing retention of jurisdiction pending remand only under narrow
circumstances and the EAJA's requirement that an application for a fee award
be made within a short period after the court's entry of judgment effectively
dictates that attorney's fees be awarded at the time of the initial remand
judgment-or not at all.
In sum, if a Social Security claimant were held ineligible to seek an award
until such time as benefits were awarded, few claimants who obtained an
ordinary sentence-four remand-even as a prelude to an administrative award of
benefits--could qualify. As the Shalalav. Schaefer Court recognized, the rule
that a Social Security claimant does not become a prevailing party until benefits
are actually awarded is "at war" with the view that a sentence-four remand is a
final judgment for purposes of EAJA procedures.379
To avoid this anomalous result, the Supreme Court in Shalala understandably deemed the Social Security claimant to be a prevailing party eligible to

of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing .... " 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(1988). Shortly before publication of this article, Congress passed the Social Security Independence
and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 101, 108 Stat. 1464, 1465 (1994),
under which administration of disability programs has been assigned to the Social Security
Administration as an independent agency in the executive branch. Accordingly, the reference to
"Secretary" in Section 405(g) has been stricken and replaced by "Commissioner of Social Security."
Id. § 107, 108 Stat. at 1477.
375. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) (the court "shall have power to enter.., ajudgment" with or
without a remand).
376. 496 U.S. 617, 110 S. Ct. 2658 (1990).
377. Id. at 624-25, 110 S. Ct. at 2663.
378. Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993).
379. Id. at 2630 n.3.
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apply for the EAJA fees at the time of the remand. Whatever the ultimate
outcome of the sentence-four remand proceedings, the claimant may now obtain
an award of attorney's fees-assuming, of course, the government's position is
found to be without substantial justification.3" In light of the peculiar statutory
constraints, and the unfortunate disjunction between the Social Security Act and
the EAJA, any other approach would improperly deny recovery of attorney's fees
to virtually every Social Security claimant who did not succeed in obtaining an
outright reversal of a denial of benefits by the court.
While this seems to be the only reasonable outcome under these somewhat
unique circumstances, the result is, nevertheless, unsatisfactory both in terms of
a general understanding of the prevailing party requirement and in practical terms
of extending the full benefit of the EAJA to successful Social Security claimants.
First, as discussed above, a claimant for government benefits has not truly
prevailed on the merits of the claim prior to receiving the benefits that are the
goal and purpose of the litigation. However necessary such a deviation from
ordinary understanding and established attorney's fees jurisprudence may be in
this context, it remains an unfortunate departure from sound general principles. 38 '
Second, a Social Security claimant who obtains a remand is likely to have
a weaker claim for EAJA fees than he or she might have later upon obtaining a
victory on the merits. Because attorney's fees may be awarded only when the
government's position is found to be without substantial justification, the
claimant may find it difficult to contend that the government's conduct was
unreasonable when the court has merely identified a procedural defect justifying
a remand.38 2 If, instead, the EAJA evaluation were delayed until after further
exploration of the merits of the claim on remand, it might become apparent that
the agency's initial denial of benefits had been substantively unreasonable on the
merits, thus justifying an award of attorney's fees for lack of substantial
justification. In sum, as a practical matter, the EAJA inquiry is premature at the
time of a judgment for remand and would be better informed if made after
further administrative proceedings.
Third, although a claimant obtaining a sentence-four remand may obtain an
EAJA award for legal expenses attributable to the judicial review proceeding, the
claimant may not recoup legal expenses incurred in the post-remand administrative proceedings. 38 3 This remains the case even if the claimant is successful in
receiving benefits on the remand and even if the changed outcome or additional
administrative proceedings reveal the unreasonable nature of the earlier denial of

380. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
381. See Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2633 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing earlier Hudson ruling
that Social Security claimants are not prevailing parties absent successful conclusion of the remand
proceedings as "consistent with 'prevailing party' jurisprudence in other areas of the law").
382. Of course, depending upon the circumstances, a significant procedural error may justify a
finding of lack of substantial justification by the government as much as an untenable decision on
the merits.
383. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2631; Curtis v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 97, 100-01 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1993).
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benefits." 4 Moreover, if the claimant should ultimately fail to obtain an award
of benefits, even after a remand, then the claimant should not receive any fee
award. Under such circumstances, the remand will have been nothing more than
a technical winning of one battle on the way to defeat in the war.
In the end, the best resolution of this problem would be legislative action by
Congress,8 5 either through an amendment to the Social Security Act to provide
generally for retention of jurisdiction by the court pending remands of claims to
the agency or through a narrow amendment to the EAJA allowing a party, after
prevailing in a remand to an agency, to return to the court for the limited
purpose of filing an application for attorney's fees. 6
3. Prevailing Party Status When Litigation Has Served as a Catalyst to a
Change in Federal Law, Policy, or Conduct
a. Introduction to "Catalyst Theory" in EAJA Cases
Federal law regulating private actors and providing federal benefits to
citizens is constantly evolving, both through administrative promulgation of new
or modified regulations and congressional enactment of new statutes and
amendment of old ones. Consequently, the legal landscape may shift right out
from under parties involved in ongoing federal government litigation, and the
governing rules may change in the middle of the journey from the filing of an
action to the final judgment. In some instances, the litigation in question may
itself have been a material factor in prompting the intervening change in federal
law or policy by attracting the attention of federal policymakers or by causing
administrators to change course for fear of an adverse judicial determination.

384. See Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2635-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing "allowing for the
recovery of legal fees incurred on remand before the Agency [is] necessary to effectuate the purposes
underlying EAJA," especially because a sentence-four remand "necessarily means that the Secretary
has committed legal error" and that the expenses incurred on remand are attributable to the agency's
error).
385. See Curtis, 12 F.3d at 101 n.5 (finding "considerable merit" to the argument that the
purposes of the EAJA would be served by allowing recovery of fees for legal expenses incurred in
sentence-four remands but saying "if any change is to be made, it is up to Congress alone to do so").
386. When the reenactment of the EAJA was considered in 1984, the Senate version would have
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) to expressly provide that a Social Security claimant who
obtained a remand was not a prevailing party, but would have added a new 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(H)(iii) allowing a claimant who prevailed by obtaining an award of benefits on remand
to file an EAJA application within 30 days of the success on remand. 130 Cong. Rec. 30,151 (1984).
These provisions were not included in the EAJA as reenacted in 1985. See also Dawn C. Bradshaw,
EAJA: An Analysis of the Final Judgment Requirement as Applied to Social Security Disability

Cases, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1287 (1990) (arguing, as an interpretation of the statute under the
case law prior to Shalala v. Schaefer, "[wlhen a disability claimant is found to be disabled and
entitled to benefits by the Secretary on remand [so as to qualify as a prevailing party], he should be
able to apply immediately for EAJA fees").
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A primary purpose of the Equal Access to Justice Act is to encourage
private parties to initiate litigation to challenge unreasonable government rules
and policies and, thereby, to directly influence the policy deliberations of
administrative agencies." 7 As stated in an early decision concerning the EAJA,
"Congress hoped to refine the administration of federal law-to foster greater
precision, efficiency, and fairness in the interpretation of statutes and in the
The legislative
formulation and enforcement of governmental regulations."3
reports on the EAJA stated:
The bill rests on the premise that a party who chooses to litigate an
issue against the Government is not only representing his or her own
vested interest but is also refining and formulating public policy. An
adjudication or civil action provides a concrete, adversarial test of
Government regulation and thereby insures the legitimacy and fairness
of the law.3" 9
Accordingly, if a private party resists an unreasonable government policy or
initiative-with the result that the policy or initiative is changed during the
pendency of the action-should not that litigant be deemed a prevailing party for
purposes of an EAJA award?
Under general fee-shifting jurisprudence, a plaintiff need not obtain a final
judgment to recover a fee award. A party may also qualify as a prevailing party
if the lawsuit played a "provocative role" or served as a "catalyst" in prompting
the defendant to take favorable actions 39that mooted the lawsuit. 39 As the
Supreme Court noted in Hewitt v. Helns: 1
A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the defendant that
affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought through a judgment--e.g., a monetary settlement or a change in conduct that redresses
to
the plaintiffs grievances. When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed 392
have prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor.

387. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96thCong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980), reprintedin 1980U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4991 (stating purpose of the EAJA as "help[ing] assure that administrative decisions reflect informed
deliberation"). See generally Krent, supra note 11, at 467-76 (discussing purpose of the EAJA in
encouraging monitoring of administrative decisions and deterring governmental wrongdoing but
suggesting the EAJA has had little success in promoting this purpose).
388. Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S.
Ct. 1908 (1984). See also Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 165 n.14, 110 S. Ct. 2316, 2322
n.14 (1990) (quoting the committee reports accompanying the EAJA legislation in 1980 and stating
they reflect "the dual concerns of access for individuals and improvement of Government policies").
389. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4988-89; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
390. Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 241 (1st Cir. 1993);
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Young, 909 F.2d 546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Williams v.
Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980).
391. 482 U.S. 755, 107 S. Ct. 2672 (1987).
392. Id. at 760-61, 107 S. Ct. at 2676. See also Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d
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Until recently,393 the validity of the catalyst theory was settled both in
general and as applied under the EAJA.a3 4 Three different scenarios raising
questions about the application of the catalyst theory are addressed below. These
scenarios are discussed in descending order of plausibility, that is, in terms of the
strength of a claim that a single lawsuit has served as a true causal agent leading
to a change in a government position. First, when a party can demonstrate that
the government voluntarily changed its case-specific application of a policy or
regulation or ceased conduct adversely affecting the party in direct response to
the filing of the lawsuit, the catalyst theory reflects the existence of an informal
settlement of the dispute. Second, when an agency has adopted a change in a
general policy or promulgated new or amended regulations with general
application, it may be more difficult (although not impossible) for a party to
show that his or her individual action provoked the change as opposed to other
general factors influencing the evolution of policy. Finally, when Congress
adopts new legislation that affects the outcome of ongoing litigation, and fails to
expressly indicate whether the statutory revisions establish litigants in pending
litigation as prevailing parties, the courts should view with skepticism any
argument that an individual party's lawsuit constituted the moving force behind
the enactment of new laws by our nation's legislative body.
b. Catalyst Theory Applied to Voluntary Change of Case-Specific
Conduct or Policy Enforcement by the Government
Professor Harold Krent, in analyzing whether the EAJA has been successful
in deterring unjustifiable government action, has concluded that the prospect of
an award of attorney's fees is more likely to motivate a federal official
implementing a policy in a fact-specific case context than it is to influence
government policymakers in formulating general government positions.395 Thus,
"[t]he prospect of litigation costs might make the [Federal Aviation Administration] pause before levying a small fine against a pilot under a novel theory of
culpability. 396 Similarly, concern about an adverse outcome in a particular piece

541, 544 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating under the "catalyst theory," "a plaintiff who can prove that the
existence of the lawsuit accomplished the original objectives of the lawsuit without a formal judgment
can be a prevailing party").
393. See infra section lll.A.3.e (discussing controversy about the future of catalyst theory in feeshifting cases).
394. See generally Hill, supra note 214, at 248 n.l 11 (stating it is "the consensus of the courts
that is it not necessary that the specific relief sought in an action be achieved for one to be a
prevailing party in a lawsuit," provided the party can "show that the litigation effort was a causal
factor in achieving his basic objectives or improving his situation," with citation to the EAJA cases).
See generally infra sections ll.A.3.b-d (discussing application of catalyst theory in EAJA cases).
395. Krent, supra note 11, at 471-76.
396. Id. at 472-73. See also 131 Cong. Rec. S9992 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen.
Grassley, one of the primary sponsors of the EAJA, stating during presentation of the bill to the
Senate for final passage that "the purpose of the Equal Access to Justice Act is to make Government
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of litigation may well cause a federal official to cease an enforcement action
against a private party or alter application of a standard to a party seeking a
government benefit. Indeed, the very fact of a change in government position
in such a fact-specific context would suggest that the reason for the change was
related to the dispute with the individual, 397
rather than flowing from general
government or agency-wide policy interests.
The paradigmatic catalyst scenario arises when the government has proposed
to take a particular action in a concrete factual setting but, in direct response to
a litigation challenge, changes course and alters its conduct. For example, in
Thomas v. Peterson,398 conservation groups brought an action under environmental protection statutes against the Forest Service to enjoin construction of a
timber road in a national forest.399 The district court granted summary judgment
for the government,4" but the court of appeals reversed on the merits."tl
Although the court of appeals did not specifically order the district court to
enjoin the construction of the road, it held the district court had erred by denying
the injunction and remanded the matter to the district court to fashion an
appropriate remedy for the Forest Service's failure to comply with environmental
statutes. °2 On remand, the Forest Service, rather than complying with the
environmental statutes, withdrew the proposal to construct the road.40 3 Although

bureaucrats think long and hard before they start an enforcement action").
397. Of course, it may be difficult in some cases to draw the fine line between a change in a
case-specific application of apolicy and a change in the underlying policy. For example, in Montes
v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990), a group of political asylum applicants challenged new
filing requirements imposed by an individual immigration judge beyond those required by regulation.
Id. at 533. After the filing of the lawsuit, the Executive Office for Immigration Review suspended
those additional requirements and reopened the cases in which those requirements had been applied.
Id. The court had little difficulty concluding the litigation had been the catalyst prompting the
change and thus the asylum applicants were prevailing parties for purposes of an EAJA fee award.
Id. at 538. Although the additional requirements were imposed by a single immigration judge, and
were arguably contrary to the regulations, those requirements had some general effect beyond an
individual case. Nevertheless, in view of the limited application of the additional requirements to
cases considered by a single official, this example likely falls on the case-specific application side
of the line rather than the general policy side of the line. In any event, the distinction is not a
magical one upon which the outcome of the prevailing party inquiry should directly depend. Rather,
it is an analytical device that can assist the court in determining the kinds of cases to which a catalyst
theory properly applies and in assessing the circumstances surrounding the case to determine whether
the lawsuit truly was the provocative agent in bringing about the change in government conduct or
policy.
398. 841 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1988) (hereinafter Thomas I11).
399. Id. at 334.
400. Thomas v. Peterson, 589 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Idaho 1984) (hereinafter Thomas 1).
401. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (hereinafter Thomas I).
402. Id. at 765. See also Thomas I11,
841 F.2d at 334 (describing court of appeals ruling on the
merits).
403. Thomas III, 841 F.2d at 334. The district court ruled that if the Forest Service decided to
revive the road construction project in the future, the conservation groups could return to the court
for an appropriate order or injunction consistent with the appellate court's ruling. Id.
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the government argued otherwise,'
the conservation groups plainly had
prevailed by halting the very government project they had challenged. As the
Ninth Circuit ruled, "given [the] court's unequivocal reversal of the district
court's decision [on the merits] and the clear causal connection between [the]
court's decision and the Forest Service's decision to withdraw the road proposal,
it is indisputable that [the environmental groups] are a prevailing party .... , 405
In effect, the government had responded to the adverse preliminary decisions by
informally agreeing to settle the case on the opposing side's terms.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a party will not qualify as having
prevailed if the specific conduct challenged is terminated for reasons unrelated to
the lawsuit. In McQuiston v. Marsh,406 a manufacturer brought suit to prevent the
United States Army from awarding a contract to a competitor in alleged violation
of federal procurement laws.40 7 Meanwhile, the Army conducted an audit and
determined the item covered by the contract was no longer necessary. 4 8 Although
the manufacturer moved for an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA, the trial
court found and the appellate court affirmed that "no causal nexus existed between
[the] lawsuit and the action taken by the Army, and that his lawsuit did not prompt
the Army to cancel its... contract. ' '4c9 In sum, the switch in direction was due to
changed circumstances, not the existence of the party's lawsuit. 4
The first prong of the catalyst theory test is whether the lawsuit was a material
factor in the particular outcome. 4 ' In cases that end short of a judgment by the
court on the merits, the district court in exercising its discretion is "presented with
the task of choosing between two interpretations of the same sequence of events"
in deciding whether the lawsuit was truly a catalytic factor in bring about the
desired end.4 2 As long as alternative explanations are plausible, the district court's

404. Id. at 337.
405. Id.
406. 790 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1986).
407. Id. at 799.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 801.
410. Id.
411. Under the catalyst theory, it is the lawsuit-not prelitigation efforts-that must play a
provocative role in bringing about the result before the party is eligible for attorney's fees incurred
in bringing the lawsuit. In Forest Conservation Council v. Devlin, 994 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1993), the
Ninth Circuit rejected an organization's argument that the concept of prevailing party under the EAJA
be extended to allow an award of fees "where a party's pre-litigation activities were solely
responsible for bringing about the desired result." Id. at 712. The EAJA authorizes an award only
with respect to fees "incurred by [the prevailing party) in any civil action." Equal Access to Justice
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988). The court could "discern no congressional intent to subsidize
a party's pre-litigation efforts to convince a government agency that its actions are misguided. The
EAJA does not serve to compensate public interest groups for their lobbying efforts, no matter how
successful those efforts may be." Forest Consenation Council, 994 F.2d at 713. If the lawsuit does
not "precipitate the outcome," then there is no justification for an award of fees expended on that
lawsuit. Id.
412. Wilderness Soc'y v. Babbitt, 5 F.3d 383, 387 (9th Cir. 1993).
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choice of one over the other will stand. 41 3 In making-this evaluation of the
circumstances, the court should look not only at the chronology of events, 41 4 but
also the substance and texture of the developments, asking whether the circumstances suggest that the government's change of course was motivated by concerns
about the litigation as opposed to other general factors or policies.4"'
The second prong of the catalyst theory requires a determination whether the
government's voluntary change in approach, even if responsive to the lawsuit, was
truly an acknowledgment of the strength of the party's legal claim rather than a
generous gesture:
"Ifit has been judicially determined that defendants' conduct, however
beneficial it may be to plaintiff's interests, is not required by law, then
defendants must be held to have acted gratuitously and plaintiffs have not
prevailed in a legal sense." For prevailing party purposes, a claim has a
basis in law as long as it is not "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless."4 6
The catalyst theory applies most comfortably in federal government litigation
when the government has effectively agreed to settle a case by altering its
particularized conduct specifically directed to the individual party and in direct
response to the filing of the action. "[In litigation as in battle one may prevail by
persuading one's adversary to retire from the field," thereby establishing eligibility
for a fee award.4 7
c. CatalystTheory and Change ofGeneral Policy or Adoption of
Regulations by the Government
When governmental agencies adopt general policies or promulgate regulations, they generally do so "only after considerable internal debate and after

413. Id. See also ForestConservation Council,994 F.2d at 712 ("Whether the requisite causal
connection existed between the lawsuit and the result is a factual question for the district court.").
414. See Braafladt v. Board of Governors, 778 F.2d 1442, 1444 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[C]hronological events are important, although not a definitive factor, in determining whether or not a defendant
can be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to a plaintiff's lawsuit.").
415. See Wilderness Soc'y, 5 F.3d at 387-88 (reversing district court's conclusion that
environmental organizations were not prevailing parties under the EAJA where the surrounding
circumstances, including testimony by government officials, indicated the government's decision was
part of a deliberate attempt by high-level officials to avoid the precedential impact of the underlying
lawsuit).
416. Sablan v. Department of Fin., 856 F.2d 1317, 1327 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting California
Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 721 F.2d 667, 672
(9th Cir. 1983), and Fitzharris v. Wolff, 702 F.2d 836, 838 (4th Cir. 1983)). See also Wilderness
Soc'y, 5 F.3d at 388 (quoting Sablan, 856 F.2d at 1327, in an EAJA case); Associated Builders &
Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
plaintiff could not obtain a fee award if the defendant's action was a "wholly gratuitous response to
a lawsuit that lacked colorable merit").
417. Stomper v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 27 F.3d 316, 317 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing
general prevailing party fee-shifting riles).
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interested private parties have a chance to influence the process."4' 8 Because
these decisions are generally influenced by political forces, follow a lengthy
internal deliberative process, and reflect a response to a multitude of concerned
interests within and outside the government, the likelihood that a change in
general governmental policy is attributable to the filing of a particular lawsuit is
greatly diminished. As Professor Krent has observed, "[it is myopic to think
that officials at the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) consider the potential
financial impact from an adverse attorney-fee award in setting seatbelt policy or
effluent standards, any more than Congress would consider litigation costs in
enacting broad social policy."4 9 Even when a specific complaint has been
lodged in court against a policy, "[flew government policymakers consider it
likely that their policy will be set aside upon judicial review, let alone that it
would be considered ex post to be unreasonable."42 For the same reason, it is
likely to be the unusual case in which the pendency of a lawsuit can be said to
have served as the catalyst for a change in general government policy, even
when the lawsuit sought a similar policy outcome.
In Beach v. Smith,42' a father brought an action challenging the government's
policy with respect to issuance of arrest warrants under the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act.422 The action was dismissed for lack of standing, 2 3 but the
father filed an appeal. 24 In the meantime, the Justice Department was engaged
in frequent discussions with congressional critics of its guidelines for issuing
arrest warrants in such cases. The Department's Criminal Division recommended
changes in the guidelines. Congress scheduled hearings on the matter.
Ultimately, the guidelines were changed. Shortly before the change in the
guidelines, the Department also authorized issuance of an arrest warrant for the
father's former wife.425 Based upon these developments, the court of appeals
dismissed the appeal as moot.4 26 The father sought attorney's fees under the
EAJA, asserting that the sequence of events demonstrated that his lawsuit had
prompted the Department's issuance of the warrant and change in policy. 427 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
finding that the Justice Department's actions were prompted by new evidence
justifying the issuance of the warrant and congressional criticisms of the
guidelines which led to the Criminal Division's recommendations of changes in

418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Krent, supra note 11, at 468.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
743 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1304-05.
Beach v. Smith, 535 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
Beach, 743 F.2d at 1305.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1306.
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the guideline requirements. 28 Moreover, there was no evidence in the record that
the Department had reached its decision because it feared an adverse decision in
the case on the merits.429
When the government adopts a general policy or promulgates a new
regulation, a party in pending litigation challenging that policy has a heavy
burden in demonstrating that government policymakers were moVed by fear of
an adverse outcome in that litigation rather than by broader social and policy
concerns. Even heavy burdens, however, can be lifted under the right circumstances. For example, in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Young,430 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a
finding that a public interest group was a prevailing party in its effort to force
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to require a warning about Reye's
Syndrome on aspirin labels. 3' Under the particular circumstances of the case,
it was apparent the efforts of the plaintiffs led directly to the promulgation of
new regulations by the FDA. The D.C. Circuit observed that there was an
"absence of alternative explanations" for the agency's action. 32 The agency's
action was a complete reversal of its prior position that its alternative voluntary
labeling program was working well.433 Moreover, there was no new scientific
data to explain the change in position, as the final study of the association
between the Reye's Syndrome and aspirin was not completed until after the
promulgation of the new regulations.434 Given that the key change in government position came just eleven weeks after oral argument of motions in the
district court, during which the court gave the plaintiff public interest group "a
very hospitable reception,"43 there was strong evidence that the government was
motivated in its change of policy by what it perceived the courts were about to
do.

436

d. CatalystTheory and Legislative Changes Enacted by Congress
Except in rare circumstances, it would seem presumptuous indeed for a party
litigating a case pending in the courts to contend that his or her initiation of a
lawsuit compelled the Congress of the United States to enact new legislation for'

428. Id.
429. Id.
430. 909 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
431. Id. at 549-51.
432. Id.at 551.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 548, 551.
435. Id at 550.
436. See also Martin v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding plaintiffs
challenging federal agency policy on Aid to Families with Dependent Children program were
prevailing parties when agency changed its policy after counsel for the agency stated in court it
would rescind the policy, reinstate all applicants, and pay retroactive benefits), vacated on reh 'g on
other grounds, 773 F.2d 1145 (1985).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

his benefit. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated
in Milton v. Shalala,437 "[tihe mere possibility that Congress acted because of an
individual claimant's suit (or reacted to a large number of similar suits) is too
speculative in our view considering the many influences upon members of
Congress in casting their votes. 43 The courts of appeals have appropriately
been hesitant to hold that a lawsuit by an EAJA fee petitioner caused the United
4 39
States Congress to change the statutory law governing the claim at issue.
Awarding EAJA fees to those who obtain a favorable outcome because of
an intervening change in the statutory law does not promote the statutory purpose
and reflects conceptual error. One of the primary purposes of the EAJA is to
compensate those who force the government to conform to the law. When the
underlying statutory law is changed, however, a party simply has not prevailed
by showing that the government's prior conduct or decision was wrongful.
When Congress changes the statutory law, the very shape and substance of the
claim is altered. The party has not prevailed upon the claim that was brought at
the time the lawsuit was filed, nor has the government's position developed at
that time been defeated." 0 Instead, the party has been the "fortuitous beneficiary" of new legal standards that changed the legal landscape, and "serendipity is
not a reason for rewarding lawyers.""' Unless it can be said that Congress was
moved to revise statutory law for fear of a judicial declaration of its unconstitu-

437. 17 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 1994).
438. Id. at 815. See also Truax v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir'. 1988) (stating "even
granting that Congress' enactment of [a statute changing the law] was partly a result of the thousands
of suits filed" to challenge the administrative application of the statute, "the causal link between [the
plaintiff's] individual lawsuit and Congress's action is too tenuous to satisfy the catalyst test").
439. See, e.g., Milton, 17 F.3d at 814-15, Petrone v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 936
F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1161 (1992); Guglietti v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 900 F.2d 397, 400 (1st Cir. 1990); Shepard v. Sullivan, 898
F.2d 1267, 1272 (7th Cir. 1990); Hendricks v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 1255, 1258 (7th Cir. 1988); Truax,
842 F.2d at 997. But see Perket v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 129, 134-35 (6th
Cir. 1990) (holding the pendency of a suit was a necessary cause of the ultimate victory after a
change in the law, and this was sufficient to make the plaintiff a prevailing party for purposes of the
EAJA); Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820, 108
S. Ct. 79 (1987); Robinson v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (D. Kan. 1988) (same), af'd, 867
F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The Perket decision and the similar rulings of other courts
have justly been criticized as confusing a condition of recovery (the pendency of a suit at the time
of the change in the law) with a cause of recovery. Guglietti, 900 F.2d at 400. Although the
pendency of the lawsuit may have been necessary to take advantage of the change in the law, the
"proximate cause of [the litigant's] victory was the congressional enactment of a standard under
which he was entitled to relief." Hendricks, 847 F.2d at 1258.
440. See Hendricks, 847 F.2d at 1258 (holding a Social Security benefits claimant who obtained
benefits under a statutory reform was not a prevailing party since "[t]he Secretary did not reinstate
[his] benefits because the Secretary wanted to compromise a dispute or because he became convinced
that his prior position was unprincipled" but rather because "Congress mandated reconsideration of
all such currently pending claims under a newly enacted standard") (footnote omitted).
441. Id. at 1259 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).

19941

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

tionality, a rare occurrence," 2 the enactment of new legislation initiates a new
legal regime and cannot be said to convey prevailing party status upon those
whose suits were filed and whose claims were litigated under the old and nowdiscarded standards." 3
It would appear, however, to be consistent with the underlying principles of
the EAJA to award attorney's fees if the party were able to demonstrate that he
or she would inevitably have prevailed under the prior standards of law and
notwithstanding the beneficial change in the statute." 4 As Judge Easterbrook
said, concurring in Hendricks v. Bowen," 5 "[wihen the EAJA otherwise would
have required the government to pay .... the creation of a new entitlement in
the [statutory revision] should not make [the party] worse off."446 If a litigant
can demonstrate that the government's position was unreasonable and thus not
substantially justified under preexisting law, then the lawsuit as it stood prior to
the statutory revision was precisely the type of challenge to wrongful government
action that the EA-JA was designed to encourage. However, lest this door swing
open too wide, this approach would only apply in cases of inevitable victory and
demonstrable unreasonableness in the government's position and would not
permit recovery of attorney's fees for work performed on the merits of the case
past the date of the statutory change. Of course, the best approach of all would
be for Congress to anticipate the effect of statutory changes on pending litigation
and expressly provide for whether those parties may obtain
a fee award for legal
7
expenses incurred prior to the legislative enactment."4

442. See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Catto, 815 F. Supp. 338, 341 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding plaintiffs
challenging constitutionality of regulations issued pursuant to treaty were prevailing. parties for an
EAJA award because the litigation was "the catalyst in sparking the enactment" by Congress of
legislation setting forth new statutory standards for implementation of the treaty).
443. But see Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 241 (1st Cir.
1993) ("The fact that Congress delivered the plaintiffs' requested relief rather than the parties sued,
[the agencies], provides no relevant distinction. [The agencies] and Congress are manifestations of
the same entity, the government.").
444. The majority of courts of appeals have rejected this approach. See, e.g., Milton v. Shalala,
17 F.3d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding the "inevitable victory" theory falsely confuses the separate
standards that the party have prevailed and that the government's position lack substantial
justification); Petrone v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 936 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting theory without substantial discussion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1161 (1992); Guglietti v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 900 F.2d 397, 402 (lst Cir. 1990) (same).
445. 847 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1988).
446. Id. at 1261 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). See also Petrone, 936 F.2d at 431 (O'Scannlain,
J., dissenting); Perket v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 129, 133-34 (6th Cir. 1990).
447. See Hendricks, 847 F.2d at 1259 (observing "Congress was on full notice that there were
thousands of outstanding claimants whose claims would be remanded and reconsidered by the
operation of the Reform Act," but there was "nothing in the Reform Act express[ing] a desire or
expectation that those claimants would receive attorneys' fees if their benefits were reinstated"). Cf.
Paris, 988 F.2d at 238, 241 (holding that because the particular litigation was referenced in the
legislative history, the plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to a fee award).
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e. The Future of the Catalyst Theory
In a closely divided en banc decision rendered on rehearing, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held, in S-I & S-2 v.
State Boardof Education,448 that the catalyst theory was no longer a viable legal
basis for determining prevailing party status. The sole basis for the majority
view was that the Supreme Court's most recent decision on prevailing party
status in a fee-shifting case, Farrarv. Hobby," 9 had not mentioned the theory.
Because the Farrardecision stated that "[t]he plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable
relief through a consent decree or settlement,, 450 the Fourth Circuit en banc
45
majority concluded that cases applying the catalyst theory had been overruled. '
The catalyst theory, however, simply was not at issue in Farrar,where the only
question was whether an actual judgment, but one for nominal damages, was
sufficient to qualify a plaintiff as a prevailing party.45 2 Nor did the Fourth
Circuit majority explain why a plaintiff should be denied a fee award when a
defendant has voluntarily acceded to the plaintiffs demands in direct response
to a legal 53action and thereby mooted the need for the litigation to proceed to
judgment.
The Fourth Circuit en banc minority is likely on stronger ground in rejecting
the conclusion that Farrarabrogated the catalyst theory sub silentio.454 The
dissenters adopted the majority opinion issued by the original panel, which
observed that the FarrarCourt's reference to enforceable judgment, consent
decree, or settlement must be read in the context of the actual issue raised in the

448. 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 205 (1994).
449. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
450. Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
451. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51. See also Joel H. Trotter, Note, The Catalyst Theory of Civil
Rights Fee Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1429, 1430-31, 1450-51 (1994) (arguing
while Farrar "[a]dmittedly ...did not explicitly concern catalyst theory," the Court consolidated
criteria for prevailing party status into a "coherent test" that "forecloses catalyst theory," although
also concluding that a plaintiff may sometimes be able to obtain an enforceable judgment and thus
prevail in such cases pursuant to an exception to the mootness doctrine that allows a court in
appropriate circumstances to issue an injunction despite a defendant's voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice).
452. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 573-74.
453. The en banc majority, S-i & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51, did adopt the dissenting opinion of the
original panel, S-1 v. State Bd. of Educ., 6 F.3d 160, 168-72 (4th Cir. 1993) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting), which provides more explanation for the result. Judge Wilkinson argued the term
"prevailing party" means litigants "must prevail in their status as parties, not as agents of reform."
Id at 170. Moreover, he contended "the catalyst theory of fee recovery engenders confusion and
unnecessary litigation." Id. at 171. For these reasons, he contended any "voluntary change in
conduct must be formalized in a legally enforceable settlement agreement to transform aplaintiff into
a prevailing party" for purposes of fee-shifting. Id.
454. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
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case. 43 "Given the importance that the catalyst theory long has had in prevailing
party doctrine[,]" the original panel decision, adopted by the en banc dissenters,
stated, "we would expect that if the Court intended to hold it no longer a viable
theory it would address the issue head-on in a case in which it was dispositive., 4 6 Both before and subsequent to S-I & S-2, other courts of appeals have
concluded that the catalyst theory survived Farrar.57
Although the S-I & S-2 en banc decision sets the stage for Supreme Court
review of this issue, the Court is unlikely to discard the catalyst theory outright
and require that every lawsuit be driven through to a judgment before the
checkered flag can be waved. Nevertheless, the S-I & S-2 decision may have
the salutary effect of prompting a reconsideration of the parameters of the theory.
The Supreme Court may well emphasize that the theory may be applied only
when the causal connection between the filing of the lawsuit and the change in
conduct or policy is close and unattenuated. In that way, the Court may find a
middle ground between allowing defendants to "deprive plaintiffs of attorney fees
by unilaterally mooting the underlying case by conceding to plaintiffs' demands"45 8 and discouraging public officials from policy initiatives for "fear that
worthwhile changes may be retroactively linked to a lawsuit and result in a hefty
bill for attorneys' fees."'459
4.

Interim Attorney's Fee Awards Under the EAJA

In general, a court will consider an application for attorney's fees only at the
end of the litigation, thereby avoiding repeated requests for new awards of fees
at each successive stage of litigation.' 6 Courts will consider fee petitions on an
interlocutory basis only "in cases of protracted litigation where a party's ability
to obtain redress ... would be imperiled without such an award., 461 If courts
prematurely assess attorney's fees, "the ultimately successful party might end up
having subsidized a large segment of the losing party's suit.'' 462 Accordingly,

455. S-1, 6 F.3d at 166-67.
456. Id. at 166 (citation omitted). See also Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541,
547 (3d Cir. 1994) ("We believe it is not likely that the Supreme Court would overturn such a widespread theory without even once mentioning it, particularly when it was inapplicable to the case at
hand.").
457. See, e.g., Baumgartner, 21 F.3d at 546-50; Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 274-76 (7th Cir.
1994); Craig v. Gregg County, 988 F.2d 18, 21 (5th Cir. 1993); American Council of the Blind, Inc.
v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249, 250-51 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 184 (1993).
458. Baumgartner, 21 F.3d at 548 (arguing against rejection of catalyst theory from a policy
standpoint).
459. S-I, 6 F.3d at 172 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (arguing the catalyst theory with its reliance
on a simple chronology of events to show causation discourages officials from taking initiative to
change laws or improve conditions).
460. Gregory C. Sisk, Interim Attorney's Fees Awards Against the Federal Government, 68 N.C.
L. Rev. 117, 151-52 (1989).
461. Yakowicz v. Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 1982).
462. Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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interim fee awards should be the exception and restricted to situations where
"delay[ing] a fee award until the entire litigation is concluded would work
substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their counsel. 46 a When such an award is
permitted, the court should protect the opposing party's right to recoup those fees
if the court's order is later overturned, such as through "the simple device of
requiring the party recovering interim fees to post a bond guaranteeing repayment
in the event of reversal." 46 And, as an absolute requirement to any successful
petition for attorney's fees at4 65any stage of litigation, the party must establish that
it is truly a prevailing party.
In the context of the federal government, however, interim fee awards are
not generally available because of two special statutes which authorize payment
of judgments against the United States only when the government has exhausted
its appellate rights and the judgment has become final. Subsection 1304(a) of
Title 31, United States Code, establishes a general appropriation, called the
Judgment Fund, as the sole source for payment of court awards and judgments
against the United States and its agencies, except when another statute designates
a different payment source. 4 Section 2414 of Title 28, United States Code,
which is referred to in Subsection 1304(a), establishes one of the primary
conditions on payments from the Judgment Fund.467 Section 2414 authorizes
payment only of "final judgments," and a judgment is deemed to be final only
when "the Attorney General determines that no appeal shall be taken from a
judgment or that no further review will be sought from a decision affirming the
same." 468 As this author has written previously, "[tihe manifest purpose of these
statutes is to protect the public Treasury. Congress has determined that the
United States ought not to pay unreviewed awards by district courts when the
United States contemplates appellate
action, because a successful appeal will
4 69
render such payments unjustified.
By virtue of the explicit statutory restrictions on payments from the
Judgment Fund, interim attorney's fees generally may not be awarded against the
federal government because, by their very nature, they remain subject to eventual
appellate review and thus do not qualify as "final judgments" under Sections
2414 and 3104.470 Nevertheless, a few federal courts, sympathetic to the private

463. See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 723. 94 S. Ct. 2006, 2022 (1974) (citing the
substantial hardship factor as a justification for interim fee awards, although not stating expressly that
a finding of hardship was a necessary prerequisite to such an award). See generally Sisk, supra note
460, at 156-59.
464.
Michael D. Green, Fro, Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fainess in
the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 207, 271 (1984). See generally Sisk, supra

note 460, at 159.
465. See generally Sisk, supra note 460, at 153-56.
466. 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1988).
467.

28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1988).

468.
469.
470.

Id.
Sisk, supra note 460, at 123.
See generally id. at 124-25.
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litigant pleading hardship, have permitted interim fee awards against the United
States, notwithstanding these express statutory provisions precluding payments
of awards before the government has exhausted its rights to appellate review.47
In Office ofPersonnelManagementv. Richmond,4" the Supreme Court held
erroneous advice given by a government employee to a benefits claimant could
not estop the government from denying benefits which were not otherwise
permitted by law. 4 The Court emphasized the "straightforward and explicit
command of the Appropriations Clause" of the Constitution that "no money can
be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of
Congress. '4 74 The Court specifically admonished that the general appropriation
to pay judgments "does not create an all-purpose fund for judicial disbursement.
A law that identifies the source of funds is not to be confused with the
'
conditions prescribed for their payment."475
Of course, one of the "conditions
prescribed for ... payment" from the Judgment Fund is that the judgment be
final. When Congress has explicitly directed that appropriations be used to pay
only final judgments, an interim or premature court award of public funds would
disregard "the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress
for charging the public Treasury. 476 In light of the Richmond decision, those
earlier court decisions granting interim fee awards against the United States are
of doubtful validity and are subject to reconsideration.
This general rule precluding interim fee awards, however, does not apply to
Subsection (d) of the Equal Access to Justice Act.477 When a fee award is
payable from agency funds, rather than from the Judgment Fund, the express
finality requirement in Section. 2414 does not apply.478 In contrast with most
attorney's fees provisions waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States,479

471.
Trout v. Garrett, 891 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (approving interim fee award under Title
VII); Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988) (approving interim fee award under
Freedom of Information Act). But see Sisk, supra note 460, at 125-37 (concluding interim fee
awards may not be paid by the United States from the Judgment Fund prior to exhaustion of
appellate rights and criticizing court decisions allowing such awards as contrary to the statutory
language and the principle of strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity).
472. 496 U.S. 414, 110 S.Ct. 2465 (1990).
473. Id. at 423, 110 S. Ct. at 2471.
474. Id. at 424, 110 S.Ct. at 2471 (discussing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.7).
475. Id. at 432, 110 S.Ct. at 2475.
476. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385, 68 S.Ct. 1, 3 (1947). See also
Richmond, 496 U.S. at 420, 110 S.Ct. at 2469.
477. See generally Sisk, supra note 460, at 139-42.
478. See generally id. at 137-38.
479. Subsection (b) of the EAJA remains subject to the award payment provisions of the
Judgment Fund statutes. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988). EAJA Subsection
(b) makes the United States liable for fees "to the same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an
award." Id. Awards of attorney's fees made pursuant to Subsection (b) are payable by the United
States, id. § 2412(c)(2), unless the award is based upon the common-law rule permitting fees for bad
faith conduct, in which case the award must be charged against agency funds. Id. The EAJA makes
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EAJA Subsection (d) expressly provides that "[flees ...awarded under this
subsection to a party shall be paid by any agency over which the party prevails
from any funds made available to the agency by appropriation or otherwise."480
Consequently, such payments are not made from the Judgment Fund, and thus
are not subject to any statutory finality requirement.
Although the EAJA contains no language expressly providing that interim
fees are available, the legislative history offers strong support for the implication
of interim fee authority. The Conference Report accompanying the bill stated:
"An award may ... be appropriate where the party has prevailed on an interim
order which was central to the case, or where an interlocutory appeal is
'sufficiently significant and discrete to be treated as a separate unit."' 4 8' In
Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese,482 the Eleventh Circuit cited the legislative
history and concluded such a remedy should be available. 483 Thus, "[t]he path
toward permitting interim fee awards under Subsection 2412(d) of the EAJA...
appears well marked. 484 Nevertheless, interim fee awards properly remain as
uncommon in the EAJA context as they do elsewhere.
Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit also held, in accordance with the
legislative history quoted above, that the party seeking an interim fee must have

payment of Subsection (b) fee awards (other than for bad faith) expressly subject to the Judgment
Fund limitations of Section 2414. Id.
480. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4) (1988). The EAJA makes fee awards
under Subsection (d) payable from agency funds as part of the statute's purpose in deterring
unreasonable government conduct. As Professor Krent explains,
if fee awards come out of the implementing agency's budget, as they largely do under the
EAJA, then the possibility of deterrence increases. Agency officials, like managers in
private firms, are then forced to internalize the costs of their actions more fully, for they
recognize that adverse fee awards may prevent them from pursuing other policy
objectives.
Krent, supra note 49, at 2066 (footnote omitted).
481. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5003, 5011; H.R. Rep. No. 1418. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4990; S.Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., IstSess. 7 (1979). These reports quote Van Hoomissen
v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974).
482. 791 F.2d 1489 (1Ith Cir.), miodified on reh'g, 804 F.2d 1573 (1986) (per curiam).
483. Id. at 1495-96. See also Kopunec v. Nelson, 801 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing
legislative history concerning interim fee awards and permitting award of fees tinder the EAJA when
case was remanded to the agency for ultimate disposition).
484. Sisk, supra note 460, at 141. In Gillikin v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 261 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), a district court held interim fee awards are not available under the EAJA because "the
'prevailing party' may not be identified until a final, unappealable judgment has been entered." Id.
at 269. The court mistakenly relied upon 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H) (1988) for the proposition a
judgment must be entered before a party can be deemed to have prevailed. Paragraph 2412(d)(2)(H)
(1988) defines "prevailing party" only for the purpose of eminent domain proceedings. This
paragraph provides that only a party who obtains a "final judgment" for an amount closer to the
party's valuation of the property than to the government's valuation qualifies as a prevailing party.
However, the court also cited 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988), which provides that aparty seeking
an award of fees shall submit an application "within thirty days of final judgment in the action." If
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actually "prevailed" upon a main or central issue in the case.48s In the
subsequent case of Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. GarlandIndependent School
District,486 the Supreme Court rejected a proposed test for prevailing party status
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988,187 that required a
party to prevail on the "central issue" in the litigation and not merely upon
significant secondary issues."' The Court strongly criticized the central issue
standard as an unworkable test "focusing on the subjective importance of an
issue to the litigants" and thereby turning "largely on the mental state of the
parties."48 9 The Court instead held that, to be a prevailing party, a litigant need
only succeed on "any significant issue in [the] litigation which achieve[d] some
of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit."4
Although the Texas State TeachersAss'n Court made clear it was enunciating a general prevailing party rule for fee-shifting statutes,49' particular statutory
contexts may require exceptions to the general standard. The legislative history
of the EAJA, the only authority respecting the possibility of interim fee awards
under that statute, expressly contemplates such an award "where the party has
prevailed on an interim issue which was central to the case."'4 92 Moreover,
attorney's fees are available under the EAJA only when the government's
position in the litigation is not substantially justified,493 a standard that requires
the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the government's position in the
context of the case as a whole,4 94 an inquiry that cannot be made before the court
resolves the heart of the case. Even though the Supreme Court found the
"central issue" standard to be unwieldy, it nevertheless appears to be the
appropriate standard for interim fee awards under the EAJA.

this provision is read not only to limit the time within which an application must be made after a
final judgment but also to preclude any application before final judgment, then the Gillikin court
would be correct inconcluding that an interim award isnot available under the EAJA. However, the
statute does not expressly preclude a party that has truly prevailed in the case from seeking a fee
award before final judgment, nor has it been read to prevent acourt from entering an order as to fees
simultaneously with or in the absence of a formal judgment on the merits. The Gillikin court's
analysis should give pause to courts considering whether the EAJA authorizes interim relief. Under
the rare circumstances where such an award ismerited and the party has clearly prevailed on a central
issue, the stronger authority appears to be such an award ispermissible.
485. Haitian Refugee Center, 791 F.2d at 1496.
486. 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486 (1989).
487. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
488. Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1493-94.
489. Id.at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 1493.
490. Id.at 789, 109 S.Ct. at 1492. See generally supra section III.A.!
(discussing the general
requirements for prevailing party status).
491. Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 784, 791, 109 S.Ct. at 1489, 1493.
492. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5003, 5011; H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4990. See also S.Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. 7 (1979).
493. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
494. See generally infra section IV,forthcoming (discussing the entitlement inquiry of whether
the government's position was substantially justified under the EAJA).
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In any event, as this author has written previously:
The distinction between prevailing on a "central" issue or a
"significant" issue often may be largely a semantical debate and should
not obscure the underlying basis for a strict standard of success,
however articulated, before an interim award against the government is
appropriate. The question is less whether a party has prevailed on some
issue than whether the party's entitlement to fees is sufficiently clear at
an interlocutory stage to justify an early award of fees. The objective
is to ensure that fees are not awarded prematurely when there remains
substantial doubt as to the party's ultimate entitlement to fees. The
court should resolve any doubts about whether a party has achieved
sufficient relief on the merits to qualify as a prevailing party by denying
any interim award and waiting until the litigation has reached a more
mature stage. Likewise, if the court found the merits of the underlying
claims close so that there is a fair prospect of reversal on appeal, the
court properly may regard the litigant's prevailing party status as
tentative and uncertain. Under such circumstances, the court should be
reluctant to order any immediate payment of fees. Again, the presumption remains that interim awards are disfavored.4 9
5. The Statutory Rule for Prevailing Party Status in Eminent Domain
Cases
"[Pirevailing party", in the case of eminent domain proceedings,
means a party who obtains a final judgment (other than by settlement),
exclusive of interest, the amount of which is at least as close to the
highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on
behalf of the property owner as it is to the highest valuation of the
property involved that is attested
to at trial on behalf of the Government
49 6
(EAJA § 2412(d)(2)(H)).
When Congress re-enacted the EAJA in 1985, it amended the statute to
confirm the application of the EAJA to eminent domain cases and to define the
meaning of "prevailing party" in this context.497 Under this definition, a
landowner litigating a condemnation case with the federal government qualifies
as a "prevailing party" eligible for an EAJA award only if the ultimate award for
the subject property is as close or closer to the valuation which the landowner
advocated at trial than that award is to the figure for which the government

495. Sisk, supra note 460, at 155-56.
496. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H) (1988).
497. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 184, 186 (1985)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H) (1988)). See generally supra section II.E.2 (discussing scope
of the EAJA as applying to eminent domain cases).
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contended. 498 "If the award is exactly in the middle, [the statute] gives the
benefit to the property owner. ' "
The determination is a simple mathematical calculation. For example, in
United States v. 50.50 Acres of Land,5°° the landowner appraised the land at
$5,530,000; the government valued the land at $3,467,000; and the court's just
compensation award was $4,485,771.50'
Thus, the landowner's appraisal
evidence was $1,044,229 greaterthan the court's award, while the government's
appraisal evidence was $1,018,771 lower than the court's award.50 2 Accordingly,
the government was the prevailing party, and the landowner was ineligible for
any fee award.
The courts have adhered strictly to the terms of the statute, irrespective of
the equities of the case, the distance between the ultimate award and the
government's valuation, or the landowner's recovery of far more than the
government had offered for the property. Thus, in United States v. 1002.35
Acres of Land,503 although the government undervalued the land at $441,000,
while the court awarded the landowner $4,890,000, the goyernment nevertheless
was the prevailing party under the EAJA definition because the landowner went
too high and asserted the valuation of the land at $11,000,000. 5o4 The statute is
explicit and leaves no room for manipulation on this point.
By the plain language of the provision, an attorney's fee award is not available
to parties in eminent domain cases who obtain a settlement from the government.
The statute defines "prevailing party" for this peculiar context as one "who obtains
a final judgment (otherthan by settlement)" for an amount which is at least as close
to the property's valuation as to the government's valuation.0 5 The House Report
explains that "it is presumed that any claim for expenses and fees under the Act
which a party might have asserted in the event of trial would be considered by the
parties in their negotiations and that an appropriate allowance, if any, would be
made in the settlement amount agreed upon, so that a final judgment achieved
through settlement shall foreclose thereafter the assertion of any such claim." 5°6
For that reason, property owners considering settlement with the government in
eminent domain cases are advised to evaluate the settlement offer with the

498. See generally Gina A. Leahy, Note, Attorneys' Fees-Are Fees and Costs Collectible Under
the EAJA in an Eminent Domain Proceeding, 23 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 96 (1989).
499. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
147.
500. 931 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1991).
501. Id. at 1358.
502. Id. at 1358 n.7.
503. 942 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1991).
504. Id. at 735.
505. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H) (1988) (emphasis added).
506. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
147. However, the House Report emphasizes that the exclusion of settled cases from the scope of
the EAJA in eminent domain cases "is [not) meant to limit the definition of 'prevailing party' under
other circumstances." Id. at 19.
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understanding that acceptance of the settlement bars any subsequent claim for
attorney's fees. The Department of Justice has instructed its counsel "to vigorously
contest any claim for
attorneys' fees filed by a party after settlement of a
50 7
condemnation case.
B. Nature ofthe Party(Net Worth and Employment Size)
"[Plarty" means (i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed
$2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, or (ii) any owner of
an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which
did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and
which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was
filed; except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)) exempt
from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or a cooperative
association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing
Act (12 U.S.C. § 1141(j)(a)), may be a party regardless of the net
worth of such organization or cooperative association ...(EAJA §
2412(d)(2)(B))."5

1. Net Worth and Employment Size Limitations
The EAJA sweeps broadly, allowing fees to both plaintiffs and defendants
who prevail in a civil action by demonstrating unjustified government conduct.
The statute, however, imposes certain threshold requirements before a party,
plaintiff or defendant, is eligible for a fee award-although the thresholds are set
rather high. One of the primary purposes of the statute is to equalize the
litigating strength between private litigants of modest means and the federal
government with the substantial resources it can marshal.5 09 During the
legislative hearings for the EAJA, Senator Domenici, one of the primary sponsors
of the bill, explained:
The basic problem this bill seeks to overcome is the inability of many
Americans to combat the vast resources of the Government in administrative adjudication. In the usual case, a party has to weigh the high
cost of litigation or agency proceedings against the value of the rights
to be asserted. Individuals and small businesses are in far too many
cases forced to knuckle under to regulations even though they have a

507. Office of Legal Policy, United States Department of Justice, Award of Attorney Fees and
Other Expenses in Judicial Proceedings Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 40 (1985).
508. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988).
509. Hill, supra note 214, at 243; Krent. supra note 11, at 462-67.
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direct and substantial impact because they cannot afford the adjudication
process. In many cases the Government can proceed in expectation of
outlasting its adversary. The purpose of the bill is to redress the
balance between the Government acting in its discretionary capacity and
the individual.10
To implement this purpose, Paragraph (d)(2)(B) of the EAJA etablishes
various eligibility qualifications for a Subsection (d) award, excluding very wealthy
individuals and large organizations. 5" Under this provision, only individuals with
a net worth that does not exceed $2 million, 2 and unincorporated business owners,
partnerships, corporations, associations, units of local government, and organizations with a net worth that does not exceed $7 million at the time the civil action
was filed are eligible for attorney's fees. 513 Tax-exempt organizations and
cooperative agricultural organizations are exempt from the net worth limitation. 514
In addition, non-individual party entities (without any exception for tax-exempt or
cooperative agricultural organizations) are eligible only if they employ fewer than
500 persons. 515
For the administrative proceeding version of the Equal Access to Justice Act,
5 U.S.C. § 504,516 Congress directed the agencies to consult with the Chairman of
the Administrative Conference of the United States and then, by rule, to establish
uniform procedures for the submission and consideration of applications for EAJA
awards.517 In 1981, the Chairman of the Administrative Conference issued "Model
Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings,"5 ' which included suggested regulations for determining party eligibility
under the EAJA.519 Reuben B. Robertson, the Chairman of the Administrative

510. Award ofAttorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Conmm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1980). See also Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163, 110
S. Ct. 2316, 2321 (1990) ("[T]he specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person
the financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions."); H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 133 (stating the purpose of the EAJA
is to "reduce[] the disparity in resources between individuals, small businesses, and other
organizations with limited resources and the federal government").
511. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988).
512. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i).
513. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii).
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988). See generally supra section II.A.2
(discussing limitation of scope of EAJA Subsection (d) to judicial proceedings and the alternative
Section 504 for adversary adjudications before administrative agencies).
517. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988).
518. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,907 (1981) (codified at I C.F.R. §§ 315.101-.310 (1994)). After the
reenactment of the EAJA in 1985, the Model Rules were revised to reflect the changes in the law.
51 Fed. Reg. 16,659 (1986).
519. 1 C.F.R. § 315.104 (1994). The definition of "party" for purposes of the administrative
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Conference at the time the Model Rules were initially drafted, and Mary Candace
Fowler, a staff attorney in the Chairman's office, authored a law review article
published in 1982 that further explained the Model Rules and analyzed the EAJA.120
Although the Model Rules are not binding upon the courts in interpreting the
statute 2' and the commentary in this present Article departs at points from the
approach of the Model Rules, those rules serve as helpful guidelines and thoughtful
suggestions on interpretation of the statutory eligibility requirements.
a. Net Worth Ceiling
The term "net worth" plainly requires a valuation based upon a person's or an
entity's total assets less total liabilities. 22 In Kuhns v. Board of Governorsof the
FederalReserve System,5 23 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit suggested the better practice is to establish net worth in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or with a description of
the principles used in valuation of assets and liabilities together with a statement
that such principles were applied uniformly in determining net worth.5 24 Without
more explicit indication in the statute, one would expect that Congress anticipated
that net worth would be determined in the ordinary way according to accepted
accounting principles. In requiring a net worth determination for eligibility,
"Congress would not have wanted [the courts] to create a whole new set of
'
accounting principles just for use under the Equal Access to Justice Act."525

proceedings version of the EAJA is now identical to that in Subsection (d) for judicial proceedings.

Compare 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (1988) with 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988).
520. Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281.
521. Indeed, the Model Rules represent the consultative advice of the Chairman of the
Administrative Conference and are not directly binding upon individual agencies, although most
agencies have generally followed this approach. See Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281, at 914-16.
See also 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900 (1981) (explaining "the Chairman's statutory role is consultative;...
the Act does not empower the Chairman to compel other agencies to adopt specific procedures or
interpretations").
522. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4994 ("'Net worth' is calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets."); S.Rep. No.
253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979) (same). Because net worth is to be determined as of "the time
the civil action was filed," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988), assets acquired or liabilities incurred
during the course of the litigation should be excluded from the net worth calculation. 46 Fed. Reg.
32,900, 32,902 (1981) (explaining "assets acquired or obligations incurred during a proceeding should
be excluded from net worth").
523. 930 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (considering the identical definition of a party under 5 U.S.C.
§ 504 (1988), the EAJA provision applying to "adversary adjudications" at the administrative level).
524. Id. at 41-42.
525. Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 767 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1985). See also
American Pac. Concrete Pipe Co. v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
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i. Acquisition Cost v. FairMarket Value

The statute does not specify on what basis assets are to be valued. Under
generally accepted accounting principles, the acquisition cost of an asset, that is,
"the actual incurred cost-arrived at through agreement by two independent
entities," would be recorded.526 The legislative history also states that valuation of
assets should be made on the historical cost of acquisition of assets, rather than fair
market value.527 A fair market value approach would be both contrary to generally
accepted accounting principles and would require parties to engage in the additional
effort of obtaining appraisals of the current value of assets.528 Even in the unique
context of an eminent domain case, where an appraisal of the land was readily
available because it had been performed as part of the case on the merits, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the net worth of an
individual who prevailed in a condemnation case should be calculated based upon

the acquisition cost of the land owned by him as $43,001, rather than the present
fair market value of the land at $1,404, 190.529
In addition to being consistent with established accounting practices, the
acquisition cost measure is consonant with the "legislative design to equalize
litigating resources" between private parties and the government. 530 The alternative
fair market value approach might exclude from eligibility a party of modest means
that owns real property that has appreciated significantly in value, notwithstanding
the likely unavailability of that asset to support the individual's or business' efforts
"
to resist unjustifiable government action. 53
' For example, a farmer who acquired

526. A. Douglas Hillman et al., Principles of Accounting 550 (6th ed. 1992). For very large
public companies, with assets substantially in excess of the net worth ceilings established by the
EAJA, financial statements are recomputed to show the current cost of certain assets. See E.
McGruder Faris, Accounting and Law in a Nutshell 353-55 (1984). See also Hillman, supra, at 55759 (discussing alternative methods to historical cost principle).
527. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4994; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979).
528. Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281, at 925 ("[Acquisition cost will often be easier to
prove than market value, which might require expert appraisals or similar evidence, particularly since
the relevant market value will be on the date the proceeding began and not at the time the evidence
of net worth is presented."). See also Continental Web Press, 767 F.2d at 323 ("[T]he net worth
figure must be derived from the company's books rather than from an appraisal.").
529. United States v. 88.88 Acres of Land, 907 F.2d 106, 107-08 (9th Cir. 1990). See also
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Watt, 569 F. Supp. 943, 945 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (valuing assets of Indian tribe
according to historical cost of acquisition).
530. Krent, supra note 49, at 2074 n.121 (stating "the EAJA ... obviously reflects a legislative
design to equalize litigating resources and not merely to satisfy a compensation design"). See
generally Krent, supra note 11, at 463-67 (discussing the legislative purpose of the EAJA in
equalizing the strength of the parties).
531. Under other circumstances, the law turns a deaf ear to protestations by a person or entity
that they lack the "wherewithal" to meet an obligation without liquidating or borrowing against an
asset essential to continuation of a business enterprise. A taxpayer would not be able to avoid a due
and owing tax payment by claiming insufficient liquid assets to pay the obligation without
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farm land at relatively low cost when originally purchased, but which land has now
significantly appreciated in value, often can be described as "land rich but cash
poor." Although a net worth determination calculated with respect to current
market value might show a significant positive balance, the land is committed to
ongoing use as part of the farming enterprise. An appreciation of land value on
paper, which has not been realized in a true gain through sale, is a poor measure of
an individual's or entity's true resources available to cope with legal expenses in
the litigation at hand.532
ii. Depreciation
The fact that assets should be listed at acquisition cost does not mean that
depreciation should not be applied to those types of assets that decline in value over
time because they have a limited useful life (in contrast with land). The government has argued in the past that, if the cost of acquisition rather than fair market
value is the measure, then neither loss nor gain in the value of assets should be
considered.5 3 At first glance, it may appear a party is trying to have its cake and
eat it too, when it is argued assets that have appreciated should be valued at
acquisition cost, while assets with a limited useful life should be depreciated.
However, for at least two reasons, typical accounting adjustments for depreciation
should be permitted in calculating a party's net worth for purposes of EAJA
Paragraph (d)(2)(B).
First, "subtracting accumulated depreciation from the cost of acquisition 'is a
generally accepted accounting practice.'- 3 4 Unless the statute were to clearly
indicate otherwise, one would not expect a party to be obligated to create a special
balance sheet crafted under peculiar accounting methods unique to the EAJA. As
the United States Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit stated, in concluding that
net worth should be based on a party's ordinary financial statements including an
accounting for depreciation, the EAJA fees proceeding "is intended to be summary;

mortgaging or selling a capital asset. See United States v. Tucker, 686 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir.)
(holding, absent exceptional circumstances, "mere unavailability of liquid assets on the tax due date
does not excuse criminal liability" for failure to pay taxes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S. Ct.
492 (1982). Likewise, an individual cannot avoid payment of contractual debt or a criminal penalty
by seeking to shield capital business assets. However, the very purpose behind the EAJA is to
protect individuals and entities from suffering financial hardship because of the need to expend
resources on legal fees to resist unjustifiable governmental conduct. Accordingly, a cost basis
approach for valuing assets comports with the statutory purpose.
532. See Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281, at 925 ("[l~n an inflationary economy, the
acquisition cost approach will enable more parties to meet the eligibility ... standards.").
533. See American Pac. Concrete Pipe Co. v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1986)
(describing government's argument); 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,907 (1981) (describing argument of
government agencies that the strict adherence to an acquisition cost standard "would avoid the need
for appraisals and would also exclude adjustments to basis for items like depreciation or capital
additions").
534. American Pac.Concrete Pipe Co., 788 F.2d at 591; Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB,
767 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
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it is not intended to duplicate in complexity a public utility commission's rate of
return proceeding." 3 s
Second, because net worth is a rough measure of the resources available to pay
legal expenses, the fact that assets have declined in value is further evidence of the
limited resources the individual or entity may apply to attorney's fees.536 Even if
the asset were liquidated, the depreciation in value would leave the party less able
to withstand the government's conduct than at the time the asset was purchased.537
Moreover, net worth of a business should be determined on the assumption that the
entity is an ongoing enterprise, which means depreciation is necessary to reflect the
realistic limitations on the useful life of an asset. When an asset is depreciable, the
party must constantly anticipate the eventual need to replace that asset, thus
requiring an outlay of additional liquid resources simply to maintain an ongoing
enterprise and thereby further diminishing the assets truly available to sustain
litigation with the federal government.
iii. Exclusion of Assets from Net Worth Calculation
Based upon reasoning similar to that supporting valuation of assets at
acquisition cost rather than fair market value, some claimants for attorney's fees
under EAJA Subsection (d) have argued that assets not available to pay legal
expenses should not be considered at all in calculating the party's net worth. For
example, in City of Brunswick v. United States, 3 g a city government argued that
certain "restricted" assets, such as its water and sewage system, that were not
generally available to meet payment of debts should not be counted as assets in
determining net worth. 39 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the argument that "restricted" assets should be excluded from the
calculation, saying the "ability to pay" factor was taken into account by Congress
in choosing the $7 million figure for eligibility and should not further enter into the
calculation of net worth.-"

535. Continental Web Press, Inc., 767 F.2d at 323.
536. See Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281, at 926 ("Where ...parties can demonstrate that
the market value of their assets when the proceeding began was significantly lower than the
acquisition cost, they should be permitted to use market value. In this way, eligibility will turn on
the actual financial condition of the party, as it should, rather than on a technicality.").
537. To be more accurate, depreciation is "the process of allocating the cost of an asset to the
periods the asset benefits," not a process of valuing the asset in terms of its current market value.
Hillman, supra note 526, at 505. Nevertheless, because depreciation is based upon the estimated
useful life of an asset, in view of such factors as expected wear and tear, climate and use conditions,
and obsolescence, id.. depreciation over the course of time roughly approximates decline in value.
See Continental Web Press,Inc., 767 F.2d at 323 ("[A] balance sheet only approximates economic
reality, and does not reflect it perfectly.").
538. 849 F.2d 501 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053, 109 S. Ct. 1313 (1989).
539. Id. at 502-03.
540. Id. at 503.
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The court's remark that the "ability to pay" factor should play no role in the net
worth calculation was an unfortunate overstatement, as this statutory purpose is
quite properly adduced in interpreting the statute. As stated above, in the absence
of any explicit definition of "net worth" in the statute, the congressional intent to
ease the burden of individuals and entities with limited resources enmeshed in
litigation with the federal government sustains the conclusion that acquisition cost
is the proper measure for appreciable assets and that depreciation is properly
accounted for with respect to assets having a limited useful life.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit reached the correct result in City of
Brunswick by requiring that all assets be considered in the net worth evaluation.
Nor does the argument for use of acquisition cost ultimately support a contrary
result. In concluding earlier that an asset should be valued on the basis of
acquisition cost rather than fair market value, when the appreciation has not been
realized through sale so as to enhance the party's ability to pay legal expenses, one
is interpreting the statute's reference to net worth in the manner most consistent
with the statutory purpose of alleviating the disparity in resources between citizens
and the government in ability to maintain legal action. By contrast, with respect to
the suggestion that certain assets should be excluded altogether from the net worth
calculation, one is confronted with an argument that takes the statute's general
purpose and extrapolates it out in a manner that directly conflicts with the plain
language of the statute.
When faced with the need to interpret a statutory term, a court's interpretive
choice is properly informed by an ascertainment of the statute's purpose. However,
a court may not divorce the general intent of a statute from its actual text and use
that abstract purpose to either add or delete language from the provision. EAJA
Paragraph (d)(2)(B) directs the court to determine the "net worth" of eligible
parties, without any suggestion that the court may choose which assets to include
and which to omit from the calculation. In sum, the court must decide, by reference
to the statute's text, structure, context, and purpose, how to properly value assets
for purposes of determining net worth. It may not, however, decide to construct an
artificial or false figure of net worth by excluding any asset from the calculation.
If a party holds title to an asset, that asset must be included in the net worth
calculation.-"' By the same token, if the very government conduct at issue in the
case has brought title to an asset into question and removed the control of that asset
from the party, thereby effectively depriving the party of the attributes of
ownership, that asset cannot be said to be part of the party's net worth at the time
the action was commenced. 2 In United States v. All Monies ($637,944.57) in

541. Id. at 503 & n.5 (holding since it was undisputed the city held title to the water and sewage
system, these assets must be included in the net worth calculation, but pension assets were properly
excluded from the net worth calculation because the city did not have title to them).
542. If title to an asset is in dispute for reasons other than the government's actions at issue in
a case, the question of whether to include the asset in the net worth calculation should be determined
according to generally accepted accounting principles governing preparation of a balance sheet with
respect to contested assets and liabilities.
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AccountNo. 29-0101-62,5 3 the government seized $637,944.57 from the claimants'
bank account pursuant to civil forfeiture statutes, contending the money was
traceable to the illegal exchange of a controlled substance.5 4 The claimants
brought an action for return of the funds, resulting in a judgment that they were
innocent owners who neither knew about nor consented to any illegal transfer into
the account. "5 5 In determining eligibility for an EAJA award, the district court ruled
that, because it was not clear whether the claimants retained title to the account and
the government had deprived them of these monies during the crucial stages of the
litigation, these funds should not be included in the calculation of their net worth.5 "
This decision is not only equitable but fully consonant with the statute. EAJA
Paragraph (d)(2)(B) directs that net worth be determined as of "the time the civil
action was filed."5' 7 If, at the time the action is filed, the government specifically
denies that the party has proper title to an asset, then the government is in no
position to later insist that the party be deemed to have had full ownership of the
asset for purposes of computing net worth as of that same point in time.
iv. ProofofNet Worth
Under EAJA Paragraph (d)(1)(B), a party seeking attorney's fees "shall, within
thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application ...
which shows that the party ... is eligible to receive an award" under Subsection
(d)." 8 Accordingly, courts agree a party must make some showing of eligibility,
including some establishment that the claimant falls beneath the net worth
ceiling. 4 9
The Model Rules for the administrative version of the EAJA propose that the
fee claimant be required to submit both a sworn statement asserting the party's net
worth falls below the ceiling 550 and a "detailed exhibit" providing "full disclosure
of the applicant's ... assets and liabilities." 55' This provision is intended to be

543. No. 89-00386-DAE, 1991 WL 335150 (D. Haw. Sept. 11, 1991).
544. Id. at *1-2.
545. Id. at *6.
546. Id.
547. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988).
548. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
549. United States v. 68.94 Acres of Land, 736 F. Supp. 541, 546-47 (D. Del. 1990) (refusing
to allow an individual to qualify as a party under the EAJA where she did not establish or even
allege in her application that her personal net worth was under the statutory cap); United States v.
Hopkins Dodge Sales, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (D. Minn. 1989) (disallowing an award to an
EAJA fee applicant who failed to demonstrate eligibility status in terms of net worth and number of
employees until after the 30-day period for filing an application).
550. Model Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings,
I C.F.R. § 315.201(b) (1994).
551. Id. § 315.202(a). The Model Rules also provide the net worth exhibit will be part of the
public record in the case, unless the applicant establishes legal grounds for withholding confidential
financial information from public disclosure. Id. § 315.202(b).
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flexible and not place undue burdens upon the applicant, 5 2 thus making it
unnecessary for every party in every case to support a claim for an award of
attorney's fees by presentation of an audited balance sheet before any question
has been raised about eligibility.
In D'Amico v. IndustrialUnion ofMarine& ShipbuildingWorkers, 53 a district
court held that, as part of the initial application, a fee claimant should be obliged
to submit an affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, that he, she, or it meets the
net worth limitation. 554 However, the court stated, "it would impose unnecessarily
burdensome restrictions on recovery to require an applicant to prove, to the
government's satisfaction and in its initial application for fees and costs under the
EAJA, that the applicant met all of the eligibility requirements." 55 5 The court ruled
that, before an applicant should be required to prepare a balance sheet with detailed
information about net worth, the government must make "some at least minimally
factually supported argument" that the applicant is not eligible. 56
However, the express provision in the statute, that a fee petitioner "submit...
' 557
an application.., which shows that the party.., is eligible to receive an award,
must be taken seriously and strictly adhered to, especially as part of a statute
waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States. Contrary to the D'Amico
court's ruling, a conclusory assertion in an affidavit that the party is eligible is
merely an allegation, not a "showing." Especially in the case of businesses,
associations, organizations, and other entity fee claimants, a detailed balance sheet
establishing net worth is a legitimate requirement and represents an appropriate
judicial application of the statutory demand for a "showing." Moreover, businesses
and other entities ordinarily will have financial or accounting records that allow
relatively easy preparation of such a balance sheet.
A somewhat lesser and more informal showing may be appropriate in the case
of individual applicants, given the vast majority of individual litigants will fall
under the $2 million eligibility ceiling. Although more than a mere conclusory
assertion in an affidavit is required, an individual's net worth exhibit might
appropriately consist of an informal statement that the person owns certain major
assets, such as a house or car, that were purchased at a certain cost, and that the
person does not believe other personal possessions would exceed the net worth
limitation. As the administrative Model Rules contemplate, the adjudicator may

552.

Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281, at 924.

553.

630 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1986).

554. Id. at 921-23.
555. Id. at 922. See also Cabo Distrib. Co. v. Brady, No. C-92-2591-DLJ, 1993 WL 313112,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1993). But see Fields v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 376, 381-83 (1993)
(disagreeing with D'Anico and rejecting as inadequate an affidavit by applicant stating his net worth
was less than $2 million, the net worth of his unincorporated business was less than $7 million, and
he did not employ more than 500 employees, and holding that a complete balance sheet, reflecting
all assets and liabilities, was required).
556. D'Anico, 630 F. Supp. at 922. See also Cabo Distrib. Co., 1993 WL 313112, at *2.
557. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(I)(B) (1988).
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always "require an applicant to file additional information to determine its
eligibility for an award. 55 8 Once the issue has been fully joined, with a supported
contesting opposition from the government challenging the net worth claim, the
petitioner for a fee then must establish eligibility based upon net worth calculated
according to generally accepted accounting principles."5 9
b. Employment Size Ceiling
For all non-individual parties, without exception, there is a limitation on size
Since there apparently have been few entities whose
to 500 employees5s
employment size has bordered upon this eligibility line and who have sought
EAJA awards, this limitation has not yet aroused substantial controversy.
However, assuming an entity with a large number of employees would not have
already exceeded the net worth ceiling, one could anticipate a case in which
disputes arise as to the proper counting of part-time employees or of those
characterized as independent contractors.
With respect to part-time employees, there are two possible approaches.
First, the statute's reference to "500 employees" '56' as the limitation measure
could be read to mean any natural person who receives a salary or wage from
the entity, other than non-employee contractors. Second, the statute could be
understood to contemplate a standard of full-time employment equivalents. The
of the EAJA measures part-time
Model Rules for the administrative 5 version
62
employees on a "proportional basis.
The "full-time equivalent" approach best conforms with the purpose of the
provision in excluding large employers from eligibility based on the likely
assumption that an entity able to maintain a large payroll has sufficient available
resources to withstand unreasonable government conduct. An entity (such as an
educational institution providing part-time employment to students or a charitable
organization employing numerous people as part-time support staff) that employs
a large number of part-time employees may not truly be classified as a large

558. Model Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings,
1 C.F.R. § 315.202(a) (1994).
559. See supra section III.B.l.a (discussing calculation of net worth).
560. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
561. Id.
562. Model Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings,
1 C.F.R. § 315.104(e) (1994). The commentary to the Model Rules states temporary or seasonal
workers should be excluded from this calculation. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,902 (1981). As one commentator
has argued, if part-time employees are to be counted on a proportional basis, then it should follow
temporary or seasonal workers should also be included on a prorated basis. Rutcofsky, supra note
8, at 318. However, given employment size is to be measured at the time the action is initiated, it
is arguable temporary or seasonal employees should be counted only if they are actually employed
as such on that date, although this could permit manipulation of employment size through selection
of the date for filing a civil action. Id.
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employer or possess substantial resources sufficient to maintain litigation with
the federal government.
Nevertheless, the first approach has the merit of being tethered closely to the
literal language of the statute, which refers to "employees" without qualification
and does not make any exception for part-time employment or otherwise suggest
adding together multiple employees to reach a sum of a single full-time
employee. Congress apparently did view employment size as a rough measure
of an entity's available resources. Congress could have made more particular
distinctions among employers based upon the status of employees, the total hours
worked by employees, or, for that matter, the actual payroll based on total
salaries and wages paid to employees, all of which might have been a more
refined measure of litigation resources. Congress did not make that choice.
With respect to the question of independent contractors, the statute's
reference to "employees" would clearly exclude them, based upon common legal
principles for determining employment status. 563 Existing standards for other
purposes, including federal tax purposes,: should be applied here to determine
which individuals should be characterized as employees and which as independent contractors.
2. Individual Party Eligibility
a. Natural Persons
Under EAJA Paragraph (d)(2)(B)(i), an "individual" is eligible for a fee
award if his or her "net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil
action was filed.,1 65 The legislative history explains that the term, "individual,"
means "a natural person." 5 Other than the net worth ceiling, the statute places
no limitations on the characteristics of individuals eligible for a fee award, thus
extending eligibility, for example, to non-citizen aliens as well as to United
States citizens.567

563. See Hill, supra note 10, at 55-56 n.29 (stating for purposes of the EAJA, "the common law
definition of 'employee' would likely control").
564. Whether a "relationship is one of employment or of independent contractor is often
litigated," Michael D. Rose & John C. Chommie, Federal Income Taxation § 13.06, at 775 (3d ed.
1988), and thus substantial case precedent exists to assist in the resolution of this question. Multiple
factors for classifying workers as independent contractors or employees have developed through the
tax case law, beginning with United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716, 67 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (1947),
and discussed in Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
565. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i) (1988).
566. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
143.
567. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Smith, 644 F. Supp. 382, 386 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding
Haitian nationals who successfully challenged the legality of asylum procedures instituted by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service qualified as parties under EAJA Section 2412(d)(2)(B)), affid,
791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986).
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b. Married Persons and Personswith Jointly Owned Property

In United States v. All Monies ($637,944.57) in Account No. 29-0101-62,56 8
the government contended that married claimants to money seized from a joint
bank account comprised a single unit for purposes of EAJA's $2 million net
worth ceiling. 69 The district court properly rejected this argument, relying upon
the express language of the statute that the net worth limitation applies to an
"individual," not to a group or class of people. 570 Moreover, interpreting the
statutory term, "individual," to comprehend the marriage community invokes the
declining legal fiction of the common law that husband and wife become one
"
' When Congress intends to establish a special rule
person upon marriage.57
572
applying to the marital community, as for example in the income tax laws, it
does so explicitly.
Accordingly, for a husband and wife who jointly own property, as well as
for non-married individuals who jointly own property, the net worth ceiling of
$2 million must be applied to each individual separately. The court must
determine what share of jointly owned property should be allocated to each
individual for a net worth calculation, applying principles of property law
prevailing in the state whose law governs the property at issue in the net worth
calculation.
c. Decedents' Estates
In Hoffman v. Heckler,573 a federal district court awarded EAJA fees to the
representative of a deceased person's estate. The court concluded that
"[pirecluding attorneys from receiving attorney's fees if their clients died before
the filing of attorney's fees motions would discourage attorneys from representing sick people entitled to benefits. 5 74 For purposes of the EAJA, the estate of
575
whose
a decedent represents "the posthumous interest of an individual,
individual net worth must be calculated to determine eligibility.

568. No. 89-00386-DAE, 1991 WL 335150 (D. Haw. Sept. 11, 1991).
569. Id. at *4.
570. Id.
571. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611,614, 31 S. Ct. 1111, 1111 (1910) (observing
"[a]t the common law the husband and wife were regarded as one"). See also All Monies, 1991 WL
335150, at *4 (ruling that only by ignoring the "plain meaning [of 'individual'] and employing an
outdated legal fiction could the court conclude that [the married couple] together represent a single
natural person" for application of the EAJA net worth limitation).
572. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (1988) (allowing "[a] husband and wife [tol make a single
return jointly of income taxes").
573. 656 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
574. Id. at 1137.
575. In re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136, 1143 n.15 (11th Cir.) (describing the holding in Hoffman), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990).
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3. Non-Individual Party Eligibility
Paragraph (d)(2)(B) lists a number of entities, other than individuals, to
whom the provisions of EAJA Subsection (d) apply-unincorporated businesses,
partnerships, corporations, associations, units of local government, and organizations. 576 For parties other than individuals, there are two eligibility requirements,
one measured by net worth and the other measured by size:
0 First, the net worth of these entities may not exceed $7 million at the time
the action was filed, with the exception of tax-exempt, non-profit organizations
and agricultural cooperative associations, which are not subject to the net worth
limitation.

577

* Second, these entities may not have more than 500 employees at the time
the action is filed, regardless of whether they are a tax-exempt entity or an
agricultural cooperative association.57
Both the net worth and the employment size limitations must be satisfied for
579
non-individual entity eligibility.

a. Business Enterprises
Paragraph (d)(2)(B) defines "party" to mean, inter alia, an "owner of an
unincorporated business, or any partnership, [or] corporation."'8 The statute thus
describes commonly-recognized business organizations.

576. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988).
577. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii).
578. Id. See also American Ass'n of Retired Persons v. EEOC, 873 F.2d 402, 404 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
579. Prior to the re-enactment of the EAJA in 1985, the definition of "party" in the original
statute was awkwardly phrased and susceptible to the interpretation that the net worth and
employment size limitations were disjunctive, such that an entity that failed tinder one limitation
(such as having more than 500 employees) but passed under the other (such as by having a net worth
under the statutory ceiling) would remain eligible for a fee award. See Unification Church v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077, 1083-91 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (providing a detailed
discussion of the possible interpretations of the "party" definition under the original EAJA and
concluding the limitations should be read conjunctively, such that an entity would not be eligible for
an award unless it fit under both the net worth and employment size ceilings). In 1985, Congress
revised the definition of "party" in Paragraph (d)(2)(B) to mean either (1) an individual which has
a net worth that does not exceed $2 million, or (2) an entity which has a net worth that does not
exceed $7 million and which does not have more than five hundred employees. H.R. Rep. No. 120,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 142-43. See generally 1
Derfner & Wolf, supra note 76,1 5.03[12][a], at 5-55 n.149 (explaining confusion under original Act
and stating the "1985 Act specified that a corporate entity would have to meet both tests [net worth
and employment size] to be eligible for fees" under both the administrative and judicial proceeding
versions of the EAJA).
580. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
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i. Owners of Unincorporated Businesses

The sole proprietorship is "the oldest, simplest, and most prevalent form of
business enterprise." '' Rather than the $2 million net worth ceiling for an
individual,5 2 an individual who sues or is being sued with respect to activities as
a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business benefits from a higher net worth
ceiling of $7 million.583 However, this higher ceiling is available only when the suit
is brought or defended in the proprietor's capacity as the owner of an unincorporated business, that is, with respect to the operations of the particular business
enterprise,
as opposed to litigation relating to the personal or other activities of the
584
owner.

Although the net worth ceiling is more generous, the calculation of the net
worth of the owner of an unincorporated business presumably must include both
the proprietor's personal and business assets.58 5 Although for accounting
purposes a sole proprietorship may be treated as an entity separate from its
owner,586 as a matter of law, the sole proprietor retains unlimited personal
liability for the debts and torts of the business.58 7 Assets are held in the name
of the individual owner, and credit is extended based upon the owner's personal
creditworthiness. Moreover, the EAJA does not refer to the unincorporated
business as the eligible entity, but rather to "the owner of an unincorporated
business" as the eligible party. Accordingly, it is the net worth of the "owner,"
not of the business conceived of as a separate entity, that must be determined for
this purpose.
ii. Partnerships
Although each of the general partners remains personally liable for partnership debts,588 states have increasingly recognized partnerships as separate entities,
rather than mere aggregations of individuals, for at least some purposes.5 89 As.

581. Harry G.Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 18, at 57 (3d ed. 1983).
582. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i) (1988).
583. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii).
584. Model Rules for Implementation ofthe Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings,
1 C.F.R. § 315.104(d) (1994); Rutcofsky, supra note 8,at 316. See also Moody v. United States,
783 F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1986) (disallowing a party with individual net worth above the EAJA
ceiling from claiming the higher ceiling for owner of an incorporated business when the record
supported the district court's factual determination that the suit was brought in his individual
capacity).
585. Model Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings,
I C.F.R. § 315.104(b)(2) (1994); Rutcofsky, supra note 8,at 316.
586. Hillman, supra note 526, at 16.
587. Henn & Alexander, supra note 581, § 18, at 58; Hillman, supra note 526, at 16.
588. 1Alan R.Bromberg & Larry E.Ribstein, Bromberg & Ribstein on Partnership § 1.03(c)(4),
at 1:28 (1988).
589. See generally id. § 1.03, at 1:19-1:42; William S. McKee et al., Federal Taxation of
Partnerships and Partners 1.02, at 1-5 to 1-6; Harold G.Reuschlein & William A. Gregory, The
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a leading treatise on partnership law suggests, the entity approach is attractive
"mainly because it is realistic and closely in accord with the expectations of most
businessmen. '' 590 In contrast with sole proprietorships, partnerships have long
been regarded in actual business practice as entities, rather than collections of
individuals, by those engaging in commercial transactions with them.59
Under the Uniform Partnership Act,5 92 contracts may be executed5 93 and real
property may be acquired5 94 in the name of the partnership.9 5 Many states allow
a partnership to sue and be sued in its own name, with the judgment binding all
joint property of the partnership.596 Although a partnership is not a taxpaying
entity, the Internal Revenue Code recognizes the partnership as a separate
accounting entity 97 and provides for preparation of a partnership tax return to
determine the amount of income that should be taxed to the partners.5 98 The
partners have a fiduciary responsibility to the other partners,'" which includes
making an account to the partnership for any benefits derived from any
transaction connected to the partnership or its property." Accordingly, under
common practice, the net worth of a partnership may easily be calculated
pursuant to its financial statements and tax reporting documents.

Law of Agency and Partnership § 182, at 264-65 (2d ed. 1990). These sources all discuss entity and
aggregate concepts of partnerships.
590. Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 589, § 182, at 264.
591. Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 588, § 1.03(b), at 1:20.
592. Uniform Partnership Act, 6 U.L.A. 1(1969). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act was
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August, 1992.
Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 6 U.L.A. 227 (Supp. 1994). For contrasting views on the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, compare Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. Law. 1 (1993) with Larry t. Ribstein, The
Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prine Time, 49 Bus. Law. 45 (1993). However,
because the original Uniform Partnership Act has been enacted and remains the law in most of the
states, while the Revised Uniform Partnership Act has been enacted in only a few states, this article
relies upon the original uniform act as a more representative statement of the law on partnership
extant among the several states. For purposes of the EAJA, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
is even more explicit in affirming the entity theory of partnership. Revised Uniform Partnership Act
§ 201 (1994) ("A partnership is an entity.").
593. Uniform Partnership Act § 9, 6 U.L.A. 132 (1969).
594. Id. §§ 8(3) and 10, 6 U.L.A. 115, 155.
595. The Uniform Partnership Act "reveals a definite preponderance of entity-based over
aggregate features." Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 588, § 1.03(b), at 1:22. The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act applies the entity approach "in virtually every situation" and the final version was
amended "to include a statement that partnerships are entities." Weidner & Larson, supra note 592,
at 3. See also Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 201 (1994) ("A partnership is an entity.").
596. 2 Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 588, §§ 5.06(c) and 5.12(c), at 5:42-:45, 5:90-:100;
Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 589, § 207, at 313-17.
597. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
598. Id. § 6031 (1988).
599. See generally Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 588, § 6.07, at 6:67-:94 (discussing
fiduciary duty among partners); Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 589, § 188, at 278-81 (same).
600. Uniform Partnership Act § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 258 (1969).
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The EAJA appears to speak directly to the issue whether a partnership
should be considered a separate entity or an aggregation of its members for
purposes of the net worth eligibility ceiling. 6° ' The definition of "party" under
EAJA Paragraph (d)(2)(B) refers to "any partnership" as the eligible entity,
without any reference to the individual members of the partnership. 6 2
Accordingly, and in contrast with the reference to the "owner of an unincorporated business," 3 the statute appears to contemplate that the partnership be
conceived of as an entity separate from its members. 6' The net worth of a
partnership, therefore, should be calculated, according to generally accepted
accounting principles, on the basis of partnership assets and liabilities, without
including separate property and liabilities of the individual partners."S

601. Because the EAJA expressly lists "any partnership" as among the discrete entities eligible
for a fee award and subject to the net worth and employment size limitations, 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(B) (1988), this situation is distinguishable from that raised in Carden v. Arkoma Assocs.,
494 U.S. 185, 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990). In Carden, the Supreme Court ruled that, in contrast with
corporations, partnerships are not separate legal entities for purposes of determining diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, meaning the citizenship of each individual partner (including limited partners
investing in a limited partnership) had to be taken into account to determine whether there was
complete diversity for federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 187-97, 110 S. Ct. at 1017-1022. The Court
ruled that whether a particular artificial entity should be considered as a citizen, separate from its
members, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction was a question that should be left to Congress. Id.
at 196-97, 110 S. Ct. at 1021-1022. By contrast, as discussed above, Congress in the EAJA
expressly listed the partnership as a separate entity, meaning its eligibility should be considered apart
from its individual partners.
602. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
603. Id.
604. See also Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 588, § 1.03(c)(3), at 1:27 ("[P]ractical
considerations and the trend of authority favor entity treatment of the partnership in litigation.").
605. In addition to governing the determination of eligibility of a general partnership for EAJA
fees, the same approach should also apply to other forms of partnerships, including the limited
partnership and the new "variation on the partnership theme, a 'limited liability partnership."' See
generally Robert W. Hamilton, Cases and Materials on Corporations 146-61, 174 (5th ed. 1994)
(discussing limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships). Moreover, a majority of states
authorize "the creation of a limited liability company, a relatively new orgainzational form that
combines acorporate liability shield with favorable [partnership] tax treatment." Richard C. Reuben,
Added Protection, A.B.A. J. 54, 54 (Sept. 1994). See generally Larry E. Ribstein & Robert A.
Keatinge, Ribstein & Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies (1993). Although the limited liability
company is not incorporated (and thus is not a corporation), it does provide limited liability for all
investors, who are called members. Hamilton, supra, at 162. The entity "may be conceptualized
most easily as a limited partnership in which there is no general partner." Id. An appropriately
organized limited liability company qualifies for partnership treatment for federal income tax purposes
and thus is not taxed as a corporation. Id. at 163. For purposes of eligibility under the EAJA, a
limited liability company should be treated as a partnership.
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iii. Corporations
The corporation as a separate juridical entity is a common character in the
law.6
The meaning of "corporation" as an eligible party under the EAJA
should not provoke controversy or confusion. As a business enterprise with a
separate legal personality, the net worth of a corporation should be determined
on the basis of its own separate assets and liabilities, unless unusual bases for
disregarding the corporate identity are present."
The Model Rules for the administrative version of the EAJA propose that
the net worth of affiliated corporations be aggregated to determine eligibility.'
As Robertson and Fowler state, "[tihe test of the model rules turns on ownership
or control of a majority interest of another entity, whether the applicant for an
award is the controlling entity or the controlled entity."" They further explain
the purpose of this rule: "Parties that meet the eligibility standards only because
of technicalities of legal or corporate form, while having access to a large pool
of resources from parent or affiliated companies, do not fall within [the group
of those with limited resources] of intended beneficiaries; and the Act's purposes
610
will best be achieved if these parties are excluded from eligibility.
To the contrary, the statute's purpose, by its plain language, is to make
corporations eligible for an award on each corporation's own terms. A small
corporation that is properly organized as an independent entity should not be
excluded from eligibility merely because a majority of its stock is held by an
ineligible company, any more than any corporation should be excluded from
liability because some, most, or all of its individual shareholders are wealthy
individuals. A fundamental characteristic of a corporation, which the Congress
presumably understood in specifically listing "corporation" among eligible
parties, is the separation of ownership from management and the creation of a
separate legal personality.61 ' The statute directs us to consider the net worth of
the "corporation," not to look to the wealth of those who have invested in the
company's stock. As Robertson and Fowler acknowledge, to "read the eligibility
provisions of the statute to exclude [subsidiaries and affiliates of ineligible
corporations], of course, adds a substantial amount to their explicit terms. ''62
Nor is it necessary to depart from the statute's terms to achieve the statute's
purpose. Although the concern underlying the Model Rules on affiliated corpora-

606. See generally Henn & Alexander, supra note 581, ch. 3 (discussing nature of corporateness
or corporate personality).
607. See id. §§ 146-153, at 344-75 (discussing disregard of the corporate entity).
608. Model Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings,
1 C.F.R. § 315.104(f) (1994).
609. Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281, at 927.
610. Id. at 926.
611. Henn & Alexander, supra note 581, §§ 78-80, at 144-52.
612. Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281, at 926.

1994]

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

tions is understandable, it can appropriately be addressed by means other than
generally refusing to respect corporate personality whenever a corporation is a
subsidiary or affiliate. First, as discussed below in section III.C of this article,6,"
a party, even if otherwise eligible by means of net worth and employment size,
cannot ask for an award of attorney's fees unless he, she, or it has actually
incurred an obligation to pay legal expenses.6 14 Thus, if a subsidiary. or affiliated
corporation does not bear its own legal expenses, but rather has "access to a
large pool of resources from parent or affiliated companies," 615 then the
subsidiary or affiliated corporation has simply failed to "incur" legal expenses
for which it may be reimbursed under the EAJA.
Second, if the corporate form is ignored or abused by parent or affiliated
corporations, thereby dissolving the line of independence between corporate
entities, then established law would permit disregarding the corporate personality
under those circumstances. In United States v. Lakeshore Terminal & Pipeline
Co., 6 6 a federal district court held a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation was
ineligible for an EAJA Subsection (d) award by taking into account the high net
worth and large employment size of the principal corporation. 617' The court found
the totality of the facts indicated that the principal and subsidiary were "not
autonomous and independent companies." 618 Both companies had the same
president and shared the same office; the principal corporation performed various
administrative, accounting, and other functions at the subsidiary; and, most
importantly, the principal corporation responded to the litigation, remained
actively involved in the litigation, and described the interest in the subject matter
of the litigation as being the interest of the principal corporation.60 9 The court
reached its conclusion that the subsidiary was ineligible for an EAJA award as
a representative of the principal only after carefully noting that it did "not believe
that the fact that [the subsidiary corporation] is a wholly owned subsidiary of
[the principal corporation] is, in itself, dispositive of this issue. 620
By contrast, in Design & Production, Inc. v. United States,621 the Claims
Court ruled a corporation was eligible for an EAJA Subsection (d) award,
notwithstanding that it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a larger, ineligible
corporation and that the president, certain vice presidents, and one director of the
corporations overlapped. 622 The evidence established that the subsidiary

613. See infra section IIl.C (discussing the requirement a party incur an obligation for legal
expenses to be eligible for an EAJA Subsection (d) award).
614. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988) (providing for a fee award
for expenses "incurred by that party in any civil action").
615. See Robertson & Fowler, supra note 281, at 926.
616. 639 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
617. id. at 961-63.
618. Id. at 962.
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. 20 Cl. Ct. 207 (1990).
622. Id. at 211-12.
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corporation acted independently of its parent in bringing the civil action, that the
parent corporation never took an active role nor financed the litigation, that the
corporation offices were at different locations, and that the subsidiary corporation
performed its own administrative, accounting, and insurance functions.623 Based
upon "the totality of the facts," the Claims Court concluded the subsidiary was
eligible for an award as an independent entity. 24
As in other areas of the law, the separate corporate identity of subsidiary and
affiliated corporations should be respected, unless the business transactions and
accounts become intermingled, corporate formalities are not observed, the
corporations are inadequately financed as a separate unit to meet normal
obligations foreseeable for that business, or the respective enterprises are not held
out to the public as separate entities.625 Even if a corporation is the sole or
primary shareholder of a subsidiary corporation, the principal corporation's net
worth should be calculated based upon its own assets (which, of course, would
include the acquisition value of the shares of stock held in the subsidiary
corporation) and its reported employment size should reflect only its own
employees. Similarly, the subsidiary corporation's net worth and employment
size should be determined separate from its parent for eligibility purposes.
b. Associations
Associations in the United States today engage in a multitude of activities,
including establishing safety standards, continuing education, public information,
professional standards, research and statistics, political education, and community
service.26 "Association" is a "term of vague meaning used to indicate a
collection or organization
of persons who have joined together for a certain or
617
common object.,
The inclusion of "association" as an eligible party under EAJA Paragraph
(d)(2)(B) 611 may have reference to any number of entities, including unincorporated business enterprises that have corporate attributes, professional societies,
public interest groups, fraternal clubs, and trade associations. Any entity
composed of a number of persons which has been formed for some special
purpose or business, but does not fit comfortably into another category, may
qualify as an "association. '"629

623. Id. at 212.
624. Id. at 211-12.
625. Henn & Alexander, supra note 581, § 148, at 354-56. A different approach also may be
appropriate with respect to professional or personal service corporations, as discussed infra section
lII.B.3.b.i.
626. George D. Webster, The Law of Associations § 1.01, at 1-2 to -5 (1992).
627. Black's Law Dictionary 121 (6th ed. 1990).
628. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
629. See Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 627, at 121 (defining "association," inter alia, as
the "act of a number of persons uniting together for some special purpose or business").
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i. Business Associations

In the business context, the word "association" may have several meanings.
First, most states authorize licensed professionals, although traditionally unable
to practice
in a corporate form, to create a professional corporation or association. 630 Although most state statutes providing for this form of business
enterprise authorize incorporation, some provide for the formation of "associations. '63' For federal income tax purposes, professional corporations are
classified as "associations," and are taxed as corporations. 632 Professionals who
have formed a professional corporation enjoy certain tax or other advantages, but
remain personally liable for their professional acts.633 For similar reasons, states
may allow a professional or other person to create a personal service corporation. 634
As a general policy, the law "favor[s] the recognition of corporations as
entities independent of their shareholders. 635 When a professional corporation
operates as a typical corporation, this general policy should be followed and net
worth should be determined based upon separate corporate assets and liabilities.
However, the question becomes more difficult, at least for net worth calculation
purposes, when, in the case of a professional or personal service corporation,
"most, if not all, of the income [is] attributable to the controlling shareholder's
personal skill and effort. '636 When the professional or personal service corporation's income is generated primarily through the services performed solely by the
individual professional, courts have struggled with the question of when
corporate personality should be disregarded in this unique context. 637 Moreover,
because the primary "asset" of a service corporation or association may be that
of the individual, it is difficult to imagine how net worth could be calculated
without taking into account the individual whose services are the basis of the
entity's existence. Accordingly, in the context of professional or personal service
corporations representing the work efforts of a single individual without other
significant capitalization, net worth for purposes of EAJA eligibility likely should

630. Boris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders 12.06, at 2-27 to -29 (6th ed. 1994); Henn & Alexander, supra note 581, § 77, at 138.
631.
Henn & Alexander, suspra note 581, at 139.
632. Bittker & Eustice, supra note 630, l2.06, at 2-28.
633. Henn & Alexander, supra note 581, at 140-41.
634. See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra note 630, 1 2.07, at 2-29 to -40 (discussing personal
service corporations).
635. Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014. 1031 (1981), affd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983).
636. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 630, 1 2.07, at 2-30 (discussing the concerns of the
Internal Revenue Service with separate taxation of service corporations when the primary income of
the corporation is based upon the efforts of the sole or primary shareholder).
637. See, e.g., Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding professional
hockey players were "employees" of personal service corporations that had contracted with the
hockey team, while dissenting judge would have affirmed Tax Court finding that players were subject
to control of and thus were "employees" of the hockey team).
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be calculated in the same manner as for the owner of an unincorporated busi63 8

ness.

Second, an enterprise that, while not actually holding a corporate charter,
possesses the primary attributes of a corporation may be characterized as an
"association." For example, an entity that is designated as a business trust or
partnership under state law may nevertheless be classified under federal tax laws
as an "association," and thus may be taxable as a corporation, if it exhibits such
corporate attributes as centralized management, continuity of existence, free
transferability of interests, and limited liability. 639 If an association or business
trust would be treated as a corporation for purposes of federal taxation statutes,
presumably it should likewise be treated as a corporation for purposes of the
EAJA. In any event, EAJA Paragraph (d)(2)(B) refers to "association" as a
separate entity. Thus, when an association has some level of formal and
independent existence, its net worth and employment size should be determined
separate from that of its members.
Finally, the term "association" would comfortably apply to farmer cooperatives organized by agricultural producers. Indeed, EAJA Paragraph (d)(2)(B)
explicitly classifies this type of cooperative business association, as defined under
an agricultural statute, as an "association," and establishes a special eligibility
rule for this entity, as discussed below.6 0
ii. Trade Associations
A "trade association" is a group of businesses within an industry,, often
competitors with one another, who have united to further a common business
purpose, such as to establish standards, promote relations with the government, or
educate the general public."' For EAJA eligibility purposes, trade associations
cause a degree of consternation because their participation in litigation will usually
be as a representative of the interests of the members of the industry, which may
include businesses and corporations that would not be eligible in their own right for

638. See supra section Ili.B.3.a.i (discussing eligibility of an owner of an unincorporated
business for an EAJA award).
639. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1988) (defining "corporation" for tax purposes as including
"associations"); 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2 (1994) (listing for purposes of classifying an organization
as an "association" such characteristics as the existence of associates, continuity of life, centralization
of management, limited liability for debts, etc.). See also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344,
356-57, 56 S. Ct. 289, 294-95 (1935) (holding an entity may be classified as an "association" and
thus may be taxable as a corporation if it has more corporate characteristics than non-corporate
characteristics). See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra note 630, 71 2.02 and 2.03, at 2-6 to -10, 210 to -15.
640. See infra section IlI.B.3.b.iii (discussing eligibility of agricultural cooperatives for an EAJA
award).
641. See Webster, supra note 626, § 15.03[3], at 15-22 to -24 (defining "trade association").
See also id. §§ 17.10 (discussing role of associations in setting standards for the industry), and 17.12
(discussing sponsoring of joint trade shows or conventions by trade associations).
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an EAJA award. Thus, it may be argued, since the ineligible business enterprise
members of the association would have ample resources to pursue litigation with
the federal government, a trade association may not institute that litigation on their
behalf and claim eligibility for a fee award because the association, regarded as a
separate entity, would come under the net worth and employment size ceilings.
The Model Rules issued by the Chairman of the Administrative Conference
with respect to the administrative version of the EAJA state that a party "that
participates in a proceeding primarily on behalf of one or more other persons or
62
The
entities that would be ineligible is not itself eligible for an award.""
was
provision
this
accompanying explanation to the Model Rules stated that
3
Some
adopted with particular attention to the situation of trade associations.
government agencies had suggested a trade association should be deemed ineligible
if any member would be ineligible individually or if all the members, when
aggregated, would not be eligible. 644 The Chairman responded:
[T]rade associations may sometimes become involved in litigation on their
own account (e.g., as employers) as well as in the interests of their
membership. On reflection, we believe the best way of handling this
situation is through the provision on participation on behalf of others.
When a proceeding involves a trade association independent of its
membership, the association's eligibility should be measured individually,
like any other applicant's; when an association is representing primarily
the interests of its members, the agency can examine the facts of the
particular situation. 64s
Accordingly, while aggregation of the net worth of all members may not be
required, the Model Rules contemplate "individual consideration of each member;
associations with ineligible members are not eligible for the Act.''646 If the
association were to represent only "a discrete group of members," then "only those
businesses' net worth should be aggregated." 7
The courts have divided on this issue. In National Truck Equipment
Associationv. NationalHighway Traffic SafetyAdministration, 648 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled the net worth and employment size of
a trade association representing some 1,400 manufacturers must be measured by an
aggregation of all of its members. 6 9 Thus, since at least six member organizations
employed over 500 persons and at least one member had a net worth in excess of

642. Model Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings.
1 C.F.R. § 315.104(g) (1994).
643. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,903 (1981).

644.
645.

Id.
Id.

646.

Rutcofsky, supra note 8, at 317 (describing the position of the Model Rules).

647.

Id.

648.

972 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1992).

649.

Id.at 671-74.
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$7 million,"" the trade association was ineligible for an EAJA award. Relying
upon the Model Rules and its commentary, the Sixth Circuit stated that the
members had received significant benefits from affiliating with the trade
association in the litigation.6"' The court held the purposes of the EAJA would not
be served by an award to a trade association whose membership "contains a number
of companies who can readily afford the costs [of litigation] to protect their own
interests."652
By contrast, in Love v. Reilly, 653 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that, if a trade association is a legitimate party with standing in
the litigation, the fact that one of its constituent members who has also benefited
from the lawsuit is ineligible does not preclude an EAJA fee award to the
association.6 54 Because the trade association had a net worth of $265,000 and only
seven employees, it was eligible for an award. 65 The court expressly rejected the

650. Id. at 671.
651. Id. at 672-73.
652. Id. at 674. The Sixth Circuit also reasoned that by excluding agricultural cooperatives and
tax-exempt organizations from the net worth requirement, Congress specifically contemplated the
aggregation of net assets for other organizations. Id. at 673-74. Indeed, the court invoked the
interpretive canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is to the
exclusion of the other), apparently meaning the special non-aggregation rule for agricultural
cooperatives and tax-exempt organizations was in contrast with a general aggregation requirement
for all other entities listed in the EAJA. Id. at 674. For several reasons, this argument cannot
withstand careful analysis. First, contrary to the court's suggestion, id. at 673-74, Congress did not
exclude agricultural cooperatives and tax-exempt organizations from the net worth limitation because
they would otherwise be subject to aggregation. There is nothing in the statute or legislative history
to suggest concerns about ineligibility due to aggregation of assets motivated the special eligibility
rule for these two entities. Nor is there any reason to believe that, but for the special exception from
the net worth requirement, the net worth of agricultural cooperatives and tax-exempt organizations
would be determined on an aggregation basis (or that a tax-exempt organization's net worth even
could be so calculated). Instead, as discussed infra sections lll.B.3.b.iii (discussing agricultural
cooperatives) and lll.B.3.d.iii (discussing non-profit tax-exempt organizations), Congress apparently
intended to preserve the assets of these two entities for use in farmer cooperative ventures and
charitable purposes, however their net worth might be calculated. In sum, the special exception has
nothing to do with or to say about aggregation. Second, agricultural cooperatives and tax-exempt
organizations are excepted only from the net worth ceiling, not the employment size limitation. Thus,
if aggregation were truly the general rule under the statute, aggregation would still apply to these two
entities in measuring number of employees, an argument that no one has made. Finally, EAJA
Paragraph (d)(2)(B) cannot reasonably be read to create a general aggregation rule governing all
entities, with the sole exceptions of agricultural cooperatives and tax-exempt organizations.
Corporations are also listed as eligible parties; and, while controversy has arisen in the special context
of affiliated corporations, no one has suggested acorporation's net worth and employment size should
generally be calculated by reference to the assets and employees of individual shareholders. Thus,
the inclusion of corporations (as well as other separate entities, such as partnerships, etc.) precludes
the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the "obvious meaning" of the statute is "Congress intended
aggregation in circumstances not covered by the exceptions" from the net worth ceiling for
agricultural cooperatives and tax-exempt organizations. Id. at 674.
653. 924 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991).
654. Id. at 1494.
655. Id.
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government's argument that an association had the additional burden
of proving
66
each of its members was individually eligible for the EAJA fees.
The Ninth Circuit, in the Love case, presents the better argument. EAJA
Paragraph (d)(2)(B) appears to contemplate consideration ofeach of the listed nonindividual parties as an entity. There is nothing in the statute that suggests an entity
is to be valued based upon its constituent parts or members, with the explicit
657
exception of unincorporated businesses, where the eligible party is the "owner."
Accordingly, in the absence of a compelling reason, such as the practical inability
of meaningfully determining an entity's separate net worth,6 8 the entity focus of the
EAJA should be respected. Many of the parties that may be eligible under the
EAJA can be said to participate in litigation in a representational capacity. Yet it
would be a tenuous argument indeed to suggest that a labor union's net worth
should reflect an aggregation of its individual members659 or that an environmental
organization becomes ineligible because its litigation goal of protecting a natural
preserve would benefit a wealthy individual member who hikes through the
affected area. 660
Moreover, as with other concerns raised about supposed free-riding of
ineligible parties on the litigation efforts of eligible parties"6 and with whether an
eligible party is the real party in interest when the litigation is financed by an
ineligible entity, 66 2 the courts have often failed to appreciate that strict adherence
to the essential eligibility requirement that a party have actually incurred an
obligation for legal expenses resolves most concerns. 66 3 As a threshold matter, the
question of a trade association's net worth and employment size need not even be
addressed unless it has first demonstrated it is a legitimate entity, it has incurred
legal fees, and it is a proper party to the civil action.
First, the trade association must be a separate entity that possesses attributes
of individuality and independence, and is not a captive of a single company or small
discrete group of companies. Because an association's membership will ordinarily
consist of businesses in the particular industry, it will appropriately be responsive
to their interests and subject to their collective direction. Nevertheless, a legitimate

656. Id.
657. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
658. See supra section IlI.B.3.b.i (discussing professional or personal service corporations).
659. 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4456, at 489 (1981)
(observing representation of members by various types of trade associations "parallels the authority
of labor unions").
660. Id. § 4456, at 491 (noting associational representation issues typically "emerge from
litigation by the multitude of 'public interest' groups that have been formed for the specific purpose
of airing grievances in court").
661. See infra section III.B.5
(discussing situation of multiple parties to successful litigation
against the federal government, both eligible and ineligible).
662. See infra section III.C.2
(explaining courts have mistakenly analyzed the issue of eligibility
for a fee award in terms of whether the eligible party is a real party in interest to the litigation).
663. See infra section III.C.3 (discussing the requirement that a party have incurred an obligation
for legal fees to be eligible for an EAJA award).
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trade association (as contrasted with the lobbying office of a particular company)
must be a representative of the entire industry, have independent management, and
have a separate and regular source of funding. Most trade associations "are formed
with far broader purposes than could be represented by a single piece of legislation
or other policy challenged," and may take positions in litigation that are not
supported unanimously within the association. 6" However, if a trade association
is controlled by a single company or discrete group of companies, and thus lacks
meaningful independence, then its separate existence should be disregarded in the
same manner that courts will pierce the corporate veil when the corporate form is
abused."3
Second, if a trade association is not responsible for payment of its own
attorney's fees, then it may not recover a fee award for the simple and straightforward reason that it has not actually incurred any legal expenses, which is an
eligibility requirement under the EAJA. 6 " If the trade association does not have a
separate source of funds to maintain legal representation (such as regular
membership dues)," 7 and the litigation is actually supported by an outside
financier, the trade association is ineligible for an EAJA award for that adequate
reason,66 quite apart from any general objection that might be made to the
eligibility of trade associations as a class of entities.
9
Third, because EAJA fees are available only to actual parties in litigation,"
a trade association may apply for a fee award only if it had standing to participate
in the lawsuit. In Hunt v. Washington StateApple Advertising Commission,670 the
Supreme Court upheld the ability of an association to sue on behalf of its members
if it shows that (a) the members individually would otherwise have standing to sue
in their own right, (b) the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to
its purpose, and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
participation in the lawsuit by the individual members. 671 Although this form of

664. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1409 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1670 (1992).
665. See supra section 11l.B.3.a.iii (discussing eligibility of corporations for an EAJA award).
666. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (requiring a court to award
fees "incurred by that party" in a civil action with the government). See generally infra section III.C
(discussing the requirement that a party have incurred legal expenses to be eligible for an EAJA fee
award).
667. In commentary accompanying the Model Rules for the administrative version of the EAJA,
the Chairman of the Administrative Conference suggested the eligibility of a trade association for
EAJA fees might turn on "whether the association is financing its participation in the litigation out
of its general budget or through special assessments against members that have agreed to participate."
46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,903 (1981). In the latter situation, the trade association arguably is not
incurring any obligation to pay its own legal expenses because a discrete group of outsiders are
financing the litigation.
668. See infra section IlI.C.3.b (discussing ineligibility of party when an outside financier has
supported the cost of legal counsel).
669. See infra section I.B.4.a (discussing ineligibility of amicus curiae for an EAJA fee award).
670. 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434 (1977).
671. Id. at 343, 97 S. Ct. at 2441. See also International Union, (UAW) v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274,
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associational or representational standing remains controversial 672 and creates other
uncertainties, such as the preclusion results that flow from judgments in
associational cases,673 the Supreme Court has affirmed its general validity.
If the trade association is a legitimate party with standing to pursue a claim
against the federal government (and if it has incurred fees), that one of its
constituent members who also benefits from the outcome of the lawsuit is ineligible
should not preclude an award in the ordinary case.674 The arguments made against
fee recovery by a trade association litigating on behalf of an industry's interests
parallel the concerns about the propriety of associational standing in general, given
the inevitable questions that arise about whether the association adequately and
truly represents the interests of its members. However, if the courts are willing to
recognize an association's standing in a representational capacity, it is difficult to
justify excluding such an association, if otherwise eligible, from a fee award under

281-82, 106 S. Ct. 2523, 2525 (1986). See generally Webster, supra note 626, § 170.09, at 17-54.7
to -55 (discussing association standing to sue on behalf of members).
672. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental
Retardation Ctr., 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding an advocacy organization lacked
associational standing to sue on behalf of developmentally disabled persons, since allegedly injured
party was not member of organization); Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 595-97 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding an association representing landlords lacked standing to challenge city's rent
stabilization scheme where resolution of claims required participation of individual members due to
fact that challenges were to regulations as applied); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Coalition for
Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1405-09 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding an organization of construction
contractors had standing to challenge city ordinance giving preference to minority contractors
notwithstanding organization's position was contrary to interest of minority members), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1670 (1992); Maryland Highways Contractors Ass'n v. Maryland, 933 F.2d 1246, 1253
(4th Cir.) (holding an association of contractors lacked standing to challenge minority business
enterprise statute because of conflict of interest existing by reason of minority members of association
who benefit from statute), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 373 (1991).
673. Wright et al., supra note 659, § 4456, at 486 ("The status and legal incidents of ...
associations remain in often spectacular uncertainty. The preclusion results that flow from litigation
involving association matters are correspondingly confused."). See also Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v.
Baliles, 830 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding by divided court that non-profit association of public
and private hospitals in Virginia was not a party to earlier litigation on same issue by an individual
hospital, notwithstanding association's non-controlling participation in earlier suit, and thus was not
bound by judgment under collateral estoppel).
674. In an unusual case, such as where the trade association's position in the lawsuit conforms
to an agenda set by a dominating industry member that itself would be ineligible for a fee award, the
government might oppose the fee request on the ground "that special circumstances make an award
unjust." See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988). See also Louisiana ex
rel. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219, 1224 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting from a Department of Justice policy
document suggesting government attorneys argue litigation by an eligible party, such as a trade
association, on behalf of an ineligible party is an "attempt to avoid the eligibility limitations of the
Act [and thus] constitutes special circumstances which make an award unjust"). However, at least
two courts have concluded the "special circumstance" reference applies only to "substantive issues,
such as close or novel questions of law," and does not include financial circumstances as a basis for
defeating an award. National Truck Equip. Ass'n v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 972
F.2d 669, 672 (6th Cir. 1992); Grason Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the EAJA. Congress explicitly included "association" within the definition of
"party" in Paragraph (d)(2)(B),675 presumably with the knowledge that associations
are, by their nature, representational in character and function.
iii. AgriculturalCooperatives
The EAJA applies a special eligibility rule to certain agricultural cooperative
associations. Under EAJA Paragraph (d)(2)(B), "cooperative association as defined
in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C. 1l41j(a))" is
excepted from the $7 million net worth ceiling in the EAJA.676 Section 15(a) of the
Agricultural Marketing Act defines "cooperative association": "[A]ny association
in which farmers act together in processing, preparing for market, handling, and/or
marketing the farm products of persons so engaged, and also means any association
in which farmers act together in purchasing, testing, grading, processing,
'6
distributing, and/or furnishing farm supplies and/or farm business services. 11
An agricultural cooperative is a mutual association of individual farmers who
organize together to market agricultural products and acquire farm supplies. 6 It
is owned by member agricultural producers and is operated for the mutual benefit
of those members on a non-profit, cost basis.67 9 As with any collective effort, an
agricultural cooperative provides farmers with the greater bargaining and
organizational strength that is provided by group action, allowing them to reduce
merchandising and transportation costs, market products on a basis comparable to
other industries, and obtain goods and services necessary for production at a
reasonable price.680 Because farming remains so uniquely dependent upon changes
in the weather and the whims of nature, "[aigricultural production is a peculiarly
precarious area of the national economy." 68' The benefits obtained through pooled
marketing and cooperative purchasing enhance the ability of individual farmers to
survive the annual and seasonal ebbs and flows in production yield and agricultural
commodity pricing.
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929682 was the first of a series of federal
68 3
statutes authorizing federal financial assistance to agricultural cooperatives.

675. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
676. Id.
677. 12 U.S.C. § l141j(a) (1988). In addition, the statute requires the association be operated
for "the mutual benefit of the members," states certain rles with respect to voting rights of members
and payments of dividends to members, and imposes restrictions on the amount of business transacted
with non-members. Id.
678. See generally United States Department of Agriculture, Legal Phases of Farmer
Cooperatives 1-18 (1976); Mary Beth Matthews, Recent Developments it the Law Regarding
Agricultural Cooperatives, 68 N.D. L. Rev. 273 (1992).
679. Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives. supra note 678, at 3.
680. Id. at 16-18.
681. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 355 F. Stpp. 408, 409 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
682. 12 U.S.C. § 114 1(a)-U) (1988).
683. Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives, supra note 678, at 525-32.
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684
Congress has taken special account of agricultural cooperatives in other statutes,
frequently by reference to the definition of cooperatives in the Agricultural

Marketing Act, including certain exemptions from securities laws,
66

685

transportation

67

regulations, 1 and antitrust laws.
Accordingly, Congress has established "a
special regulatory framework" to encourage the creation and operation of
agricultural cooperatives to strengthen the economic independence and viability of
farmers.6 8
The EAJA does not explain the purpose behind the special eligibility rule for
these associations. Cynics have suggested this exception merely reflects the
political power of a special economic interest, arguing that some agricultural
cooperatives cannot be characterized as entities of modest means with limited
resources." 9 Nevertheless, as it has in the past, Congress has determined that these
associations serve an important public purpose, and, therefore, notwithstanding the
higher net worth of some cooperatives, they should remain eligible to obtain an
EAJA award.
Moreover, the criticism directed at this eligibility rule reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of cooperatives, or at least of the way in which Congress has
viewed farmer cooperatives. Although an agricultural cooperative is a business
association, it is not a for-profit enterprise which accrues financial benefits to those
who have invested money in the business.6" A cooperative provides its services
at cost to its members, 69 meaning that the actual beneficiaries of its activities are
the individual agricultural producers, most of whom presumably would be eligible
for an EAJA Subsection (d) award as owners of their independent farming
enterprises. In other words, if an agricultural cooperative is forced to expend legal
fees to resist unjustifiable governmental action, the price ultimately would be paid
by the farmer. Based upon its favorable view of farmer cooperatives and their role
in the agricultural economy, Congress determined that an attorney's fee award
should be available to such entities irrespective of net worth. However, the special

684.
685.
686.
687.
688.

See generally id. at 510-39.
15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(E) (1988).
49 U.S.C. § 10526(a)(5) (1988).
7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1988).
Terence J. Centner, Retained Equities of Agricultural Cooperatives and the Federal

Securities Act, 31 U. Kan. L. Rev. 245, 248 (1983).
689. See Award ofAttorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before
the Subcomin. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary
Comtn., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, 86 (1980) (statement of Nan Aron, Director, Council for Public
Interest Law, observing six agricultural cooperatives were listed on the Fortune 500). See also Keith
G. Meyer et al., Agricultural Law: Cases and Materials 574 (1985) (reporting nine agricultural
cooperatives appear on the 1983 Fortune 500 list).
690. Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives, supra note 678, at 6.
691. Farmer members receive dividends based upon patronage, not upon capital investment. Id.
at 2-7; Matthews, supra note 678, at 274-75.
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exception is only with respect to the net worth limitation; agricultural cooperatives
that employ more than 500 employees are excluded from EAJA Subsection (d). 692
c. Units ofLocal Government
Under the original EAJA, the courts generally concluded local government
bodies did not qualify for an award of EAJA fees because they had not been
included in the Paragraph (d)(2)(B) definition of "party." 69' With the re-enactment
of the EAJA in 1985, Congress specifically added "unit of local government" to
this paragraph. 94 Congress determined that "small governmental units face the
same inherent problems and deterrence factors as do small private businesses when
involved in adversary adjudications or litigation with the United States." 6" As the
committee report accompanying the 1985 re-enactment bill noted, municipal and
county governmental units are frequently involved in disputes with the federal
government concerning programs providing federal assistance and funding to local
696
governments.
In determining what constitutes a discrete "unit" of local government for
purposes of the net worth and employment size limitations, the court presumably
should respect the structures and divisions created by statute or ordinance
antecedent to the dispute and determine which unit of local government is the
proper party to the litigation in terms of entitlement to the particular benefit or
assistance under the federal government program at issue.6 97 By explicitly adopting
the term "unit of local government," Congress excluded state governments and
divisions of state governments from eligibility for a fee award under EAJA
Subsection (d). 6 98 The "net worth" of a "unit of local government" should be
determined according to the same accounting principles as those applied to other

692. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
693. Citizens Council v. Brinegar, 741 F.2d 584. 590-92 (3d Cir. 1984); Commissioners of
Highways v. United States, 684 F.2d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 1982).
694. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c)(1), 99 Stat. 184, 185 (1985)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988)).
695. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
143.
696. id.
697.- Id. at 14-15 (stating the term "unit of local government" is "intended to have broad
applicability and includes cities, counties, villages, parishes, Indian tribes, and incorporated or
unincorporated towns or townships," as well as "any general or special purpose district organized
under State law (such as a school district, sewer district, irrigation district or planning district)").
698. Certain entities separately organized by a state government as a tax-exempt organization,
like a hospital or higher educational institution, may be able to qualify for an EAJA award tinder the
separate party category of "organizations." See H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1985),
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 143 (observing terms "corporation" or "organization" have not
generally been interpreted as applying to governmental units, other than "hospitals and higher
educational institutions separately organized by States or localities under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code"). See generally infra section Il.B.3.d (discussing eligibility of organizations
for an EAJA fee award).
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entities,' including the valuation of all assets to which the local governmental unit
has title. 7°°
d. Organizations
The last entity listed in Paragraph (d)(2)(B) is "organization." This appears to
be something of a catch-all provision, although it is not open-ended. The term
"organization" has been understood to express the concept of a group of people that
has a more or less constant membership and shares a common purpose.'O Some
specific examples are discussed below.
i. Indian Tribes
As an example of an organization of people with a common purpose, one
federal district court in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Watt,0 2 found that an Indian tribe
qualified as an eligible party for an EAJA fee as "an 'association' or 'organization.' 703 The tribe, not its individual members, was the party, and therefore its net
worth and not the net worth of its members determined its eligibility to seek a fee
award.7" Depending upon the circumstances and its functions and powers, an
Indian tribe may also qualify as an eligible party as a "unit of local government."7 5
ii. Labor Unions
With respect to a labor union, which plainly qualifies as an organization, the
issue has been whether the local union's eligibility in terms of net worth and
employment size should be determined without reference to the national or
international union with which it is affiliated. Although the EAJA is silent on the
matter, there is no reason to believe Congress would have intended to unsettle the
structural character of labor unions established under pre-existing labor law. In
Millerv. Hotel & RestaurantEmployees & BartendersUnion, Local2,'0 6 a federal

699. See supra section III.B.1.a (discussing the calculation of "net worth" under the EAJA).
700. City of Brunswick v. United States, 849 F.2d 501, 502-03 (1lth Cir. 1988) (holding the
city's net worth must be calculated based on total assets, with no exclusion of certain "restricted"
assets not generally available to pay debts), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053, 109 S. Ct. 1313 (1989).
701.
In re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136, 1144 (1lth Cir.) (concluding trustee of a bankruptcy estate was
not an "organization" eligible for EAJA fees), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990).
See also infra part III.B.4.b (discussing the exclusion of bankruptcy estates from the definition of
"party" for purposes of EAJA Subsection (d)).
702. 569 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
703. Id. at 945.
704. Id.
705. See H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
132, 143 (stating the term, "unit of local government," is to have "broad applicability" and include
"Indian tribes").
706. 107 F.R.D. 231 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev"d on other grounds, 806 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1986).
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district ruled that eligibility for an EAJA award should be based on the local
union's own net worth, and persuasively noted:
Congress was certainly aware of the institutional structure of union[s]
when it enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959,29 U.S.C. §401, et seq., which explicitly recognizes the distinctions
between local, intermediate, and national/international organizations, and
in part, concerns the use of trusteeship powers by international unions
over locals. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66. o7
Moreover, as the Millercourt pointed out, because "the vast majority of unions
are affiliated or connected in some manner to a national or international union,"
most of which report assets above the EAJA net worth ceiling, a requirement that
the local union's assets be aggregated together with its affiliated national or
international union would exclude almost all local unions from the EAJA. 70 8 Such
a general exclusion of labor unions from the benefits of the statute would be
contrary to the enacted findings of Congress in the preamble to the EAJA, which
spccifically included labor among the intended beneficiaries of the act:
The Congress finds that certain individuals, partnerships, corporations,
and labor and other organizations may be deterred from seeking review of,
or defending against, unreasonable government action because of the
expense involved in securing the vindication
of their rights in civil actions
79
and administrative proceedings. 0
Accordingly, just as a court considering eligibility for an EAJA Subsection (d)
award should respect the separate identity of individual corporations, notwithstanding a subsidiary or affiliated relationship, 7'0 a court should, likewise, uphold the

707. Id. at 237 n.4. In the bill report accompanying the EAJA upon re-enactment in 1985, the
House Judiciary Committee stated its "intent that if the local union is considered to be a separate
labor organization for purposes of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, it
should be considered to be a separate organization for purposes of the EAJA as well." H.R. Rep.
No. 120, 99th Cong., IstSess. 17 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 146. Accordingly,
the committee report stated, "the local's entitlement of fees should be determined without regard to
the assets and/or employees of the international union with which the local is affiliated." Id.
Moreover, when the re-enactment legislation was passed in the House, Representative Kastenmeier,
as chairman of the subcommittee and shepherd of the bill on the floor, noted the district court
decision in the Miller case and approved its agreement with the committee report position that a local
union is considered separately from its affiliate for purposes of EAJA eligibility. 131 Cong. Rec.
H4762 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (statements of Rep. Kastenmeier).
708. Miller, 107 F.R.D. at 236-37 (citing Leo Troy & Neil Sheflin, United States Union
Sourcebook (1985)).
709. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(a), 94 Stat. 2325, 2325 (1980). See also
Miller, 107 F.R.D. at 237 (holding exclusion of the vast majority of local unions from the EAJA
because of affiliation with national or international union "would virtually render [Congress's]
inclusion of the term 'labor' in section 202 surplusage").
710. See supra section lll.B.3.a.iii (discussing eligibility of corporations for an EAJA award).
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longstanding recognition that "a local union is a legal entity apart from its
international and that it is not a mere branch or arm of the latter."'. Because it is
the local union that is the representative of the bargaining unit, and because "the
local union has no guarantee that an International will finance its legal expenses or
that it can enjoy the use of the International's assets and employees,"7 2 the local
union is entitled in its own right to maintain litigation and to assert eligibility as a
party to recover those legal expenses it has actually incurred through an EAJA
award.
iii. Non-ProfitTax-Exempt Organizations
Finally, EAJA Paragraph (d)(2)(B) applies a special eligibility rule to nonprofit organizations that are exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code.7 13 Such an entity is excepted from the $7 million net worth
ceiling in the EAJA. 71 4 In general, Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status is afforded
only to non-profit organizations that serve certain charitable purposes and that are
not involved in legislative lobbying or political activity. Section 501 (c)(3) provides
a tax-exemption to the following types of organizations: '
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition ... , or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation [with certain exceptions], and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distribution of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.715

711. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 121 N.L.R.B. 143. 146-49 (1958). See also Carbon
Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 100 S. Ct. 410 (1979) (holding international union
and regional subdivision could not be held liable for illegal "wildcat" strikes by local unions and
were not obliged to use all reasonable means to prevent and end unauthorized strikes).
712. Miller, 107 F.R.D. at 237. If litigation maintained in the name of the local union is in fact
financed by the national or international union, then the local union would be ineligible for an EAJA
fee award because it has failed the requirement the party actually have incurred legal expenses. See
generally infra section III.C (discussing the requirement a party have incurred fees to receive an
EAJA award). This should answer the concern that an ineligible national or international union may
evade the eligibility requirements of the EAJA by maintaining and financing litigation through the
front of an eligible local union.
713. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
714. Equal Access to Justice Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
715. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
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Although the statute does not explain the purpose behind this special rule for
Section 501(c)(3) organizations, the reason is evident. Although such an
organization may have a net worth exceeding $7 million, those funds are held
solely to pursue a charitable purpose and not to sustain a commercial or profitable
venture. Notwithstanding that such an organization may be able to divert sufficient
resources to maintain litigation with the federal government, Congress determined
that the public interest is better served by allowing that organization to be
reimbursed under the EAJA so that its funds may be devoted to its charitable
purpose rather than expended on legal expenses necessitated by unjustifiable
government action. Nevertheless, Congress was apparently unwilling to extend this
generosity so far as to include those charitable ventures that have grown to such
substantial size as to employ more than 500 employees. Accordingly, Section
7t 6
501(c)(3) organizations remain subject to the EAJA's employment size ceiling.
Because EAJA Paragraph (d)(2)(B) excepts from the net worth ceiling only
those organizations "described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code,"71'7 non-profit organizations with interests falling outside of those listed in
Section 501(c)(3), although exempt from taxation under other provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, do not qualify for the EAJA net worth exception. Thus, for
example, a social welfare organization that engages in legislative lobbying, and thus
is excluded from Section 501 (c)(3), remains subject to the EAJA net worth ceiling,
notwithstanding that the social welfare organization may be exempt from taxation
under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.718
4. Other Entities
By its express terms, EAJA Subsection (d) authorizes an award of attorney's
fees only to "a prevailing party, 7 19 thus barring awards to non-parties, such as
those who appear as amicus curiae in litigation. Moreover, the definition of "party"
in Paragraph (d)(2)(B) is exclusive, thus precluding a fee award to any entity that
falls outside of the broad parameters of the definition.
a. Ainicus Curiae
In Lundin v. Mechan, 720 the District of Columbia Circuit observed that "[t]he
natural reading of the [EAJA] is that only 'parties,' as the term is used in its
technical legal sense, may recover fees under the statute. '72' However, the

716. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
717. Id.
718. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (1988) (providing tax-exemption to, inter alia, "[clivic leagues
or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social
welfare").
719. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
720. 980 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
721. Id.at 1461.
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Lundin court also noted that "the specific statutory section defining 'party' makes
no mention of any such limitation and at least one court has come to a contrary
conclusion."7 22 The "natural reading" of the statute must prevail, especially
under the rule of strict construction to be given to waiver of sovereign immunity. 23 Had Congress intended to allow attorney's fees to those who were not
joined or intervened as parties to the action and thus not subject to the judgment,
it would have said so. Nor is an understanding of the term "party" as extending
only to those joined in the litigation appropriately dismissed as a construction of
the word in a "technical legal sense."
There are important and substantial differences between a true party and
non-party amici. Only a party to a lawsuit may raise issues, press claims, and
direct the litigation. 72' However valuable the arguments of an amicus curiae may
be to the successful outcome of a civil action by or against the United States, the
amicus remains a "volunteer" who cannot be said to have incurred legal expenses
as a result of the government's conduct giving rise to the lawsuit. 725 Neither the
language nor the purpose of the EAJA justify expanding the waiver of sovereign
immunity to include fee awards to amici.
However, neither Lundin nor the district court case it cited, Coleman v.
Block,7 26 actually involved a request for EAJA fees by an amicus curiae to
recover fees incurred in preparing supportive briefing in that case. Rather, in
each case, an actual party to the instant case (that is, a true party subject to the
jurisdiction of the court), sought to recover, as part of its fee award, the legal
expenses that the party had incurred in appearing as an amicus curiae in a
separate but related case. In Coleman, the district court allowed a fee award
under another part of the EAJA727 for the party's legal expenses in writing an
amicus brief and appearing at oral argument in an appellate case, the outcome
of which was "crucial" to the party prevailing in the case pending before the
district court.728 In Lundin, the parties also had participated as intervenors or
amici in other related cases, but the District of Columbia Circuit concluded it

722. Id. (citing Coleman v. Block, 589 F. Supp. 1411 (D.N.D. 1984)).
723. See Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 112 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991)
(reaffirming, in construing another part of the EAJA, that a waiver of sovereign immunity "must be
strictly construed in favor of the United States").
724. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 801 F.2d 1571, 1581 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1986) (stating amicus may not frame the issues for appeal).
725. See A. Hirsh, Inc. v. United States, 948 F.2d 1240, 1250-51 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding an
amicus curiae who filed a brief in support of party opposing an appeal from Rule 11 sanction was
a "volunteer" and had not incurred any legal expenses by reason of the appeal).
726. 589 F. Supp. 1411 (D.N.D. 1984).
727. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988) (providing for an award of fees
to a "prevailing party" against the United States on the same terms a private party would be liable
for fees under the common law or a statute).
728. Coleman, 589 F. Supp. at 1419.
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could not award attorney's fees under the EAJA for this work because it was
performed under the jurisdiction of another court.729
Although ultimately it may reflect a properly stringent interpretation of a
waiver of sovereign immunity, the Lundin court's negative conclusion could be
criticized as overly technical or even mistaken in its identification of the issue.
The parties in Lundin, as well as those in Coleman, were not seeking an award
of attorney's fees for work performed in another case as such. Rather, they were
seeking an award of attorney's fees for expenses incurred by reason of and as
part of the instant litigation, arguing that the prosecution of that lawsuit required
or was enhanced by the filing of supportive briefing in related cases. Thus,
although the expenses involved were based upon the time spent preparing
documents filed in the related case, the parties in Lundin and Coleman contended
that the need to incur those expenses flowed from the party's participation in the
instant case before the court and the legal work was performed in the name of
the party joined to the present case.730 Nevertheless, in the absence of any
supporting language in the statute, and given the nature of the statute as a waiver
of sovereign immunity, the better course may be to construe the statute narrowly
and therefore demand a rather tight nexus between the work performed and the
73
litigation in which the fee award is sought. 1
b. Entities Not Designatedin Definition of "Party"
EAJA Paragraph (d)(2)(B) 732 provides an all-inclusive definition of the term
"party," signaled by the use of the verb "means" to indicate that the description
is intended to be complete.733 Thus, courts have been reluctant to authorize an
EAJA fee award in favor of a litigant who does not comfortably fit within the
specific statutory definition of "party."
For example, in In re Davis, 34 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit rejected a claim by the trustee of a bankruptcy estate for an
award under EAJA Subsection (d). 735 First, the court rejected the suggestion that
the trustee could be considered an eligible "individual" under the EAJA
definition by being regarded as the representative of an individual debtor. The
court carefully distinguished a trustee of a bankruptcy estate from the representa-

729. Lundin v. Mecham, 980 F.2d 1450, 1461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
730. This argument is more compelling in Coleman than in Lundin because the amicus work in
the Coleman case was performed with respect to an appeal pending in another case that would result
in a controlling appellate precedent. See Coleman, 589 F. Supp. at 1419 (stating the appellate
decision in the related case was "crucial" to the plaintiff prevailing in the instant case).
731. See infra section V, forthcoming (discussing the measurement of the fee award and legal
expenses for which recovery may be sought).
732. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988).
733. Child, supra note 140, at 357 (stating a drafter uses the verb "means" to stipulate a full and
complete definition of a term).
734. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990).
735. Id. at 1142-45.
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tive of the estate of a deceased person.736 Whereas an estate of a deceased
person "represent[s] the posthumous interest of an individual, 737 a bankruptcy
estate is "a completely different creature. ' 738 The trustee "does not represent the
interests of debtor alone; rather, he owes a complex set of obligations and
case of a
fiduciary duties to the court, the debtor, the shareholders 73(in
9 the
bankrupt corporation), and, most importantly, the creditors."
Second, the Davis court ruled the bankruptcy estate could not be shoehomed into the category of an eligible "organization." The Eleventh Circuit
found that "the conception of an 'organization' as a 'group of people that has a
more or less constant membership, a body of officers, [and] a purpose' 740 best
"captures Congress's intent in drafting the EAJA, and comports more closely
with a narrow construction of the EAJA's waiver of sovereign immunity. '' 74
Although the bankruptcy trustee "represents, in part, a group of creditors who
share the common interest and purpose of recovering the maximum return on the
debts owed to them," even this "abstract common purpose" often will mask what
in reality is "a set of violently competing individual interests." 742 Moreover, the
court observed that this purported organization "is of a transient and limited
nature." 743 Given the unusual nature of this entity, the court concluded that it did
not fit comfortably within the definition of "party" and thus was not eligible for
an award under the EAJA.
The list of entities falling under the definition of "party" in EAJA Paragraph
(d)(2)(B) will cover most parties to litigation, extending from individuals to
business corporations and affiliational associations. However, when we are
confronted by an unusual entity seeking a fee award, such as the bankruptcy
estate that serves as little more than "a locus of property or monetary value
against which the creditors have claims," 74 it is best to leave the designation of
new entities to Congress and read the EAJA definition of eligible "party" strictly
745
and narrowly.

736. Id. at 1143 n.15.
737. Id. (citing Hoffman v. Heckler, 656 F. Supp. 1136, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1987), which awarded
EAJA fees to the representative of a decedent's estate).
738. Id.
739. Id.
740. Id. at 1144 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1590 (1976) (emphasis
added)).
741.
Id.
742. Id.
743. Id.
744. Id. at 1145 n.18.
745. The addition of "unit of local government" to the definition of "party" in 1985 suggests
Congress intends to maintain strict control of the particular entities to which it will extend the
benefits of the EAJA. See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988).
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5. Fee Awards in Cases with Both Eligible and Ineligible Parties
By reason of the net worth and employment size limitations, "the United
States may be liable for attorneys' fees to some plaintiffs who qualify under
EAJA, but, in the same litigation, may not be liable to other plaintiffs who do
not or would not, if they applied, qualify under the EAJA. '746 In such cases, the
court must be assured that a fee award to an eligible party is based upon the
legal expenses actually incurred by that individual party.747 When, as is
common, attorneys for multiple parties in litigation with the government work
together as a team by assigning one attorney or firm the role of lead counsel or
by dividing litigation tasks,748 the court must be careful to ensure the award of
EAJA fees does not allow either the ineligible or the eligible party749to take "a free
ride through the judicial process, at the government's expense.
However, as explained below, the "free ride" concern is largely overstated
and is directly addressed by the statute's direction that an eligible party may
recover only attorney's fees for which it has accepted an obligation and thus has
actually incurred.750 When an attorney charges the client a fee for service, a
party who is eligible for an award has no economic reason to accept an
inequitable assessment of legal expenses or to allow an ineligible party to
indirectly benefit from an EAJA fee award through artful reallocation to eligible
parties of legal expenses.
a. Eligible and Ineligible PartiesSeparately Represented by
Different Counsel
When eligible and ineligible parties are separately represented by different
counsel, an eligible party may obtain a fee award only for the litigation expenses
actually incurred through that party's counsel, notwithstanding that counsel for
an ineligible party may have undertaken litigation tasks that also benefited the
eligible party. 5 In deciding which legal expenses are truly attributable to the

746. American Ass'n of Retired Persons v. EEOC, 873 F.2d 402, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
747. See generally infra section Il.C (discussing the requirement a party have incurred fees to
receive an EAJA award).
748. See generally Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of .awyers on Teams, 72 Minn. L.
Rev. 697 (1988) (discussing lawyers as team workers in litigation).
749. American Ass'n of Retired Persons, 873 F.2d at 406-07 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Guste v.
Lee, 853 F.2d 1219, 1225 (5th Cir. 1988)).
750. See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (stating court may
award fees "incurred by that party" in a civil action with the government). See generally infra
section I.C (discussing the requirement a party have incurred legal expenses to be eligible for an
EAJA fee award).
751. See American Ass'n ofRetired Persons, 873 F.2d at 404-07 (holding fee award to eligible
plaintiff was limited to legal work performed by the eligible plaintiff's separate counsel, and did not
include an award for legal work performed by the law firm for an ineligible plaintiff, notwithstanding
that this law firm served as lead counsel and performed litigation tasks for the benefit of all
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eligible party, the court should begin by determining who is counsel of record
for the eligible party.752 However, because "parties can manipulate who is
counsel of record" for a particular party, the court should also "consider
appearances and representations made by the various attorneys on behalf of their
respective clients. 75 a A showing that the counsel of record for an eligible party
has actively participated in the litigation-and demonstrated an independent
solicitude for the interests of that particular party-is concrete evidence that he
or she, while cooperating with counsel for an ineligible party, has retained the
responsibility to speak for the client. 71 Moreover, when an eligible party is
being represented by a legitimate legal services organization (an entity that
represents only indigent clients), the concern about manipulation of counsel of
record disappears and "the possibility of one client using another to obtain fees
otherwise unavailable" under the EAJA fades away.755
In any event, the statute directly addresses this concern and ensures that a
fee award will not enrich an ineligible party by authorizing awards of fees only
to the extent a particular party has incurred legal fees.756 Thus, the fact that the
attorney is precluded from recovering on behalf of an eligible party any legal
expenses that instead were paid by an ineligible party should make manipulation
of counsel of record designations generally unavailing. If an ineligible party
arranges for its retained attorney to be named as counsel of record for an eligible
party, but the ineligible party nevertheless continues to be responsible for
payment of that attorney's bill, then the eligible party simply has not incurred
legal expenses to justify an award of fees.757 By contrast, if an eligible party is
truly responsible for its own legal expenses, the fact that the legal services

plaintiffs).
752. Id. at 406. In American Ass'n of Retired Persons, the D.C. Circuit characterized these
factors for consideration as a means of determining which parties, eligible or ineligible, are real
parties in interest to the litigation. Id. at 405-06 (citing Unification Church v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). As discussed in detail infra section III.C.2,
this is not the best way to state the issue because any party with standing to seek relief on the merits
from the court is a true real party in interest to the litigation. The question is better understood as
asking which of the parties to the lawsuit has actually incurred an obligation for legal expenses. See
infra section IlI.C.3 (discussing requirement a party have incurred an obligation for legal expenses
to be eligible for an EAJA Subsection (d) award).
753. American Ass'n of Retired Persons, 873 F.2d at 406.
754. See id.
755. See id.; Unification Church, 762 F.2d at 1083.
756. See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988) (stating the court may
award legal fees "incurred by that party" in the civil action involving the government).
757. To prevent parties from concealing the actual attorney's fee arrangements among the
various attorneys and the eligible and ineligible parties, the court may require each party to reveal
the nature of its agreement to be responsible for legal expenses of its counsel as contracted at the
time the party entered into litigation. As part of the attorney's documentation of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation, the attorney should state by affidavit whether the party being represented
was responsible for those fees or the nature of the arrangement for compensation in the absence of
any fee-shifting award.
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performed by its attorney culminated in successful litigation that also benefits the
ineligible party should not prevent the eligible party from being made whole
through reimbursement by a fee award."'5 In sum, if a court remains focused on

the question of who is ultimately responsible for paying the legal expenses in the
absence of a fee award, as evidenced by antecedent fee arrangements and
patterns of payments,759 most of the concerns about manipulation or "free riding"
of ineligible parties on the statutory eligibility of other eligible parties simply
fade away."
Moreover, even if the general possibility of an attorney's fee award at the
conclusion of litigation might motivate certain actions by counsel,16 ' that prospect

758. Under such circumstances, the ineligible party may truly be a "free rider," but it has ridden
on the efforts and expenses of the eligible party, not the government. The government is liable under
the EAJA only to reimburse the eligible party for its legal expenses incurred by reason of the
government's unreasonable conduct. That payment makes the eligible party whole; it does not enrich
the ineligible party. We might postulate a circumstance in which the eligible and ineligible parties
anticipate the virtual certainty of an EAJA award in advance of the litigation and arrange the
distribution of legal tasks so that most legal expenses are incurred by the eligible party. If such a
situation arose, a court might be justified in denying a fee award because "special circumstances
make an award unjust." See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988). But
see supra note 674 (discussing possible limitation of the "special circumstance" rule to substantive
issues). However, this scenario is extreme, as parties eyeing litigation with the federal government
could seldom anticipate both that they would prevail on the merits and that the court would conclude
that the government was not only wrong but unreasonable in its position. If an eligible and ineligible
party entered into such an arrangement, and the government's position was found substantially
justified so as to avoid a fee award, then the eligible party would be left to bear the heavier legal
expenses caused by the disproportionate allocation of litigation tasks between them. If the parties
attempted yet another level of manipulation by agreeing in advance that the ineligible party would
reimburse the eligible party in the event the scheme failed through denial of a fee award, then once
again the existence of such an alternative agreement would vitiate everything that went before,
because it would mean the eligible party was not really at any risk of incurring an obligation for fees
and thus would not be able to request a fee award. In the end, assuming the attorneys have
contracted on a fee for service basis, simple economics provides the disincentive for manipulative
behavior designed to allow an ineligible party to shift its legal expenses to the government through
the front of an eligible party.
759. When the attorneys for the various parties have arranged for payment on a basis other than
fee for service, such as by a contingency fee or a fee to be paid out of the benefits obtained in class
action litigation, there may be a greater risk of manipulation and a correspondingly greater basis for
judicial scrutiny of fee applications. If the hours recorded by counsel for eligible parties appear
disproportionately high compared to that of counsel for ineligible parties, or if the court finds the
attorneys have evasively assigned certain lead attorneys as counsel of record for an eligible rather
than an ineligible party, the court may determine to disallow certain hours or to reallocate legal
expenses among the parties on a proportionate or other appropriate basis, as discussed below with
respect to the situation of common counsel for both eligible and ineligible parties. See infra section
Ill.B.5.b.
760. See generally infra section III.C (discussing the requirement a party incur an obligation for
legal expenses to be eligible for an EAJA award).
761. But see Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Evplaining Constitutional Tort
Litigation: The Influence of the Attontey Fees Statute and the Goveirnnent as Defendant, 73 Cornell
L. Rev. 719, 755-59 (1988) (concluding, based upon an empirical study of the Civil Rights Attorneys
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is made even more remote in the context of the EAJA. Parties postulating ex
ante whether they may collect an EAJA fee "must not only ... assess the
strength of their claims against the United States, but [must] also gauge whether
courts on review will find that the government's position had been substantially
'
unjustified. 762
Given the unpredictability of an EAJA award,763 the litigation
choices made by various counsel are likely to be driven by more immediate
economic and practical considerations such as the respective resources of the
parties and ability of their counsel and by determination of the best strategy to
achieve success on the merits.
What about the reverse scenario, that of an eligible party obtaining legal
representation as a free rider on an ineligible party? In Louisianaex rel. Guste
v. Lee,6' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered a
case in which both a state government (which is not an eligible party under the
EAJA) and private environmental groups (who were eligible) sought an award
of attorney's fees against the federal government.7 65 The court declared that "[i]f
the party ineligible for fees is fully willing and able to prosecute the action
against the United States, the parties eligible for EAJA fees should not be able
to take a free ride through the judicial process at the government's expense. 766

Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the prospect of obtaining a fee
award "play[s] a lesser role in civil rights litigation than one might expect").
762. Krent, supra note 11, at 466.
763. Id. at 461 n.15 ("Litigants are unlikely to predict with accuracy whether courts will find
the government position to be substantially justified."). Even if accurate prediction were possible,
the prospect of an EAJA award would remain remote. Professor Harold Krent's study found when
an EAJA application was filed after a party prevailed in civil litigation with the federal government,
an award was made in between 70% and 85% of the cases, depending on the type of case. Id. at
484. (Professors Susan Mezey and Susan Olson in a study limited to reported decisions found a high
rate of successful applications in individual benefits cases, but a majority of petitions for fees were
denied in cases concerning government regulation. Mezey & Olson, supra note 6, at 18.) In the
particular context of Social Security Act cases, where the "substantial evidence" standard of review
on the merits closely parallels the EAJA substantial justification standard, Krent's study suggests
many attorneys do not seek an EAJA award because they are content with the contingent fee paid
out of claimants' past-due benefits, although they would likely have been successful in obtaining an
award if an application had been filed. Id. at 497-99. However, in other contexts, many parties who
prevail in litigation with the federal government undoubtedly decide not to request an EAJA award
because they do not have a strong argument the government's position was not substantially justified.
Nevertheless, even assuming the 70% success rate could be applied generally to all civil cases in
which a party prevails against the government, an attorney making an ex ante prediction about fee
recovery must discount the possibility of an EAJA award on two levels. First, let us suppose the
attorney believes there is a 40% chance of prevailing on the merits of the case. Second, while the
actual likelihood of an EAJA award would vary according to the particular circumstances of the case,
let us assume there is a 70% chance of a successful EAJA application after success on the merits.
Combining these two probabilities results in an ex ante evaluation of the chance of ultimately
recovering litigation expenses under the EAJA at only 28%.
764. 853 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1988).
765. Id. at 1223-25.
766. Id. at 1225.
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The Fifth Circuit's fear that eligible parties might take a free ride on the
backs of ineligible parties-with the ultimate financial burden being shifted to
the government-is not adequately explained by the court. Initially, whatever
expenses are incurred by the ineligible party that "is fully willing and able to
prosecute the action against the United States" will not be recoverable because
the party is ineligible. The eligible parties will only be able to recover those
legal expenses they have individually incurred through their own counsel. If the
ineligible party is "fully willing and able to prosecute the action," then the
eligible parties will have little incentive to rack up significant legal expenses for
which they are separately responsible. Given the relatively high "substantial
justification" standard for an EAJA recovery, 767 parties entering into litigation
with the federal government will seldom be able to anticipate that they can
succeed in both prevailing on the merits and establishing that the government's
position is unreasonable.7 68 Thus, if eligible parties decide to expend significant
resources of their own to prosecute the action, notwithstanding the separate
presence of an ineligible party in the lawsuit, 769 this expenditure likely will
reflect the view of those eligible parties that their active participation is necessary
to a successful outcome or that the ineligible party is not adequately or
77
competently presenting the claim or defense against the federal government.

767. See infra section IV, forthcoming (discussing the "substantial justificAtion" or reasonableness standard for entitlement to afnEAJA Subsection (d) award).
768. See also supra note 763 (discussing ex ante prediction of the likelihood of obtaining an
EAJA award).
769. This assumes the expenses are legitimately attributable to and actually incurred by the
eligible parties, and not the result of artful reallocation of expenses among the parties with an EAJA
fee award in mind. In Louisiana ex rel. Guste, there was no prospect of reallocation of legal
expenses among the various parties because the ineligible party (the state government) could hardly
contrive to have its attorneys employed in the state attorney general's office named as counsel of
record for the private environmental organizations. Thus, no legal expenses that otherwise would
have been borne by the ineligible state government could have been surreptitiously transferred to the
eligible private parties.
770. To be sure, there is some danger that the attorney for an eligible party may act from aprofit
maximization incentive to charge more time to the litigation than may be appropriate or necessary,
not so much because of the remote possibility of an EAJA award as because an attorney on a fee-forservices contract may thereby enhance the fees charged to the client. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Lawyers'
Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 Law & Soc'y 569, 575-82
(1980-81) (arguing fee-for-service attorneys have aprofit maximization incentive to charge more time
to a matter than a fully informed client would desire). However, the attorney's economic interest
should be tempered by other factors, including professional standards and a sense of responsibility
to a client. Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The inpact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 Law &
Soc'y 251, 253 (1985). Moreover, in the particular context where the eligible party is one among
many parties, the party is likely to question excessive time spent by the attorney, given the party's
expectation that litigation tasks will be shared among the multiple parties and their counsel. In any
event, excessive or duplicative time charged by an eligible party's attorney should be addressed in
the determination of areasonable fee, rather than adetermination of threshold eligibility for an award.
See generally Sisk, supra note 7, at 750-51 (discussing disallowance of time that was excessive for
the particular task or proceeding or was duplicative of other attorney efforts). The same principle
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The Fifth Circuit in Louisiana ex rel. Guste perhaps cannot be faulted for
suggesting "that in special circumstances the participation of a party ineligible
77 1
for EAJA fees may make a fee award for other eligible parties unjust.
However, such special circumstances would be rare and should be found only
when eligible parties or their attorneys have abused the situation, such as by
needlessly joining an action brought by an ineligible party that is destined for
inevitable victory or by incurring excessive or duplicative legal expenses when
counsel for an ineligible party is fully and ably prosecuting the matter. In
ordinary circumstances, excessive or duplicative legal expenses would be
excluded as part of the process of measuring a reasonable fee award.772
b. Eligible and Ineligible PartiesJointly Represented by Common
Counsel
When "there is one counsel representing several plaintiffs of disparate size
or wealth, especially where the size or wealth of one or more of those plaintiffs
would likely disqualify it from recovering fees under the EAJA," concern about
evasion of the party eligibility requirements is at its greatest. 773 Under such
circumstances, the single counsel could attribute all or nearly all of the legal
work performed to the eligible party, while minimizing the amount of the total
legal expenses that have been incurred on behalf of the ineligible party.774 A

applies to intervenors in litigation, where "the usual course" is to acknowledge the eligibility of an
intervenor for a fee award but "to deal with the question of intervenors' fees in the computation
portion of the fee proceedings, by denying fees where intervenors' work was duplicative or
nonproductive." 1 Derfner & Wolf, supra note 76, 7.03[1], at 7-13 to -14.
771. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1988) (referring to EAJA
Subsection (d), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988), providing an exception to an EAJA award when
"special circumstances make an award unjust"). See also United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 808
F. Supp. 1030, 1036-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding "special circumstances" justified denial of an award
to a homeowners' association that intervened to oppose construction of postal facility where three
units of local government were already vigorously challenging the action), vacated on other grounds,
1 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1993). But see supra note 674 (discussing interpretation of "special
circumstances" rule to substantive issues).
772. See generally infra section V, forthcoming (discussing the measurement of a fee award
under EAJA Subsection (d)).
773. See American Ass'n of Retired Persons v. EEOC, 873 F.2d 402, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
774. Of course, to engage in this manipulation, the attorney would have to permanently forgo
the right to collect these attorney's fees from the large or wealthy ineligible party, even in the event
the request for an EAJA fee award is denied. As discussed in detail infra section III.C.3, an EAJA
award may only be made to a party that has incurred an obligation for a fee award. Equal Access
to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (stating an award may be made for legal expenses
"incurred by that party" in the civil action). If an attorney representing both an eligible party and
an ineligible party would look, in the absence of a fee award, to the ineligible party for payment of
all fees, then the eligible party simply has not incurred any obligation for legal expenses that can
properly be reimbursed under the EAJA. Nevertheless, given the rather high net worth and
employment size limitations, an attorney could attribute substantial legal expenses to an eligible party
without great risk that the fee would be uncollectible from that eligible party in the event an

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

simple answer to the problem might be to deny an EAJA award for any part of
the legal expenses that are not uniquely attributable to the eligible party, based
on the assumption that the wealthy or large ineligible party would have been
willing to foot the entire legal bill to pursue the general matter raised in the
lawsuit, even in the absence of other litigants." 5 This solution, although harsh,
has been offered by at least one judge as arguably dictated by the strict
construction afforded to a waiver of sovereign immunity." 6
However, the opposing argument is more compelling. Just as the lawsuit
presumably could have been pursued individually by the ineligible party, the
litigation also could have been brought solely on behalf of the eligible party, who
then would have obtained a full recovery of the expenses. The fact that a
wealthy or large ineligible party has also joined the litigation should not preclude
eligible parties from recovering their legal expenses. To be sure, the contention
that a separate suit would truly have been initiated by the eligible party
(notwithstanding limited resources) might seem more plausible when the parties
have retained separate counsel than when a single attorney simultaneously
represents both the eligible and ineligible party. The very fact that the eligible
and ineligible party are joined together under one roof could suggest a
dependence of the eligible party's claim on the pursuit of the ineligible party's
claim. However, this need not necessarily be the case. Even a wealthy party
that is ineligible for an EAJA award may be unwilling to take responsibility for
paying all of an attorney's legal expenses if its individual stake in the litigation
does not justify that investment or if substantial benefits from a successful action
will accrue to others. The mere presence of an ineligible party, therefore, does
not necessarily mean the litigation would have been instituted without the
participation of the eligible parties.
Before a court presumes to look beyond the allocation of legal expenses
agreed to by the attorney and the jointly represented eligible and ineligible
clients, the court should be required to articulate some reason for ignoring any
contractual arrangement for fee payment agreed to in advance by a competent
and informed client. 7" If the eligible party truly agreed to accept exclusive

application for fees under the EAJA was denied. Still, under such circumstances, we might expect
the eligible party to object to being charged with a disproportionate share of the fees. The economic
interests of the eligible party likely would make it an unwilling partner to such an arrangement.
775. See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383, 394 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (arguing that "it seems
incongruous to hold that if the ineligible plaintiff alone [had prosecuted the claim], fees could not
be awarded under the EAJA, but because the ineligible plaintiff was joined by less wealthy friends,
fees may be awarded").
776. Id. (arguing attribution of one plaintiffs ineligibility to all other plaintiffs was required
since "[tihe EAJA, as a waiver of sovereign immunity, must be strictly construed and not enlarged
beyond what a fair reading of the language requires").
777. Once again, as discussed in detail infra section lll.C.3.b, if the attorney has billed only the
ineligible client for his or her fees, thus looking exclusively to that party for payment, then the
eligible party has simply not incurred any legal expenses for which an award may be sought under
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financial responsibility for a particular share of the legal charges (meaning that
no recourse would ever be made to the ineligible party to pay that share, either
directly or as a guarantor), that fact alone should be given significant weight.77
The eligible party has no economic incentive to accept what it views as an
inequitable burden for legal fees, and no reason to agree to serve as a-pawn for
an ineligible party's scheme to shift legal expenses. Thus, we may reasonably
assume that the allocation agreed to in advance reflects the considered judgment
of each client as to what is appropriately its responsibility. 79 Such a fee
arrangement would be worthy of consideration only if it had been established
before the institution of litigation. By contrast, a post hoc allocation of legal
expenses between eligible and ineligible parties by the attorney when preparing
the fee application would be subject to greater scrutiny. Thus, the foregoing
discussion assumes the antecedent existence of a fee-for-service contract, which
contemplates a particular allocation of legal expenses or services among multiple
clients.
However, if the court concludes the attorney took advantage of the eligible
client and charged an unfair share of legal expenses to that party, either for the
benefit of the ineligible client or with an eye to the possibility of an EAJA
award, the court should refuse to follow that allocation of fees in making an
EAJA award. The attorney then should also be precluded from using that
inequitable allocation of the fee burden to collect the difference between any
EAJA award and the billed fees from the wronged client. Similarly, if the
attorney for both eligible and ineligible parties has arranged for payment on a
basis other than fee-for-service, such as by a contingency fee or a fee paid from
the benefits obtained in class action litigation, no pre-existing allocation of
expenses or services among the multiple clients is likely to have been created.
If a contingency fee or class action fee arrangement provides for an allocation
of the burden of legal expenses, such as by reducing each party's share of the
ultimate benefits according to a particular formula, the court should evaluate the
reasonableness of this allocation in the same way that it would otherwise
supervise the assessment of a fee on a contingency or class action basis.
Under circumstances where a pre-existing allocation of legal expenses is not
worthy of deference, the district court must be given broad discretion to make
a case-by-case assessment.7 80 When the facts surrounding the representation of

the EAJA.
778. See 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,903 (1981) (describing position of the Federal Trade
Commission that, when eligible and ineligible parties are represented by the same counsel, "the
eligible party should be entitled to an award for the amount it agreed to pay before the proceeding
began").
779. The court should reject any claim by an attorney that he jointly represented an ineligible
client for a fee and an eligible client pro bono. Although a true pro bono representation can provide
the basis for a recovery of an EAJA award, see infra section Ill.C.3.a, we would regard with fatal
suspicion the assertion that an attorney collecting fees from a large or wealthy client was
simultaneously affording pro bono representation to an individual or entity with limited resources.
780. See Louisiana ex reL. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219, 1225 (5th Cir. 1988).
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an eligible and ineligible party by a common attorney or law firm suggest that
the ineligible party initiated the joint retention, orchestrated the pursuit of the
matter, or controlled the litigation, a district court might be justified in
questioning whether the eligible party is a front for the ineligible party. The
district court should exercise its informed discretion, based upon its familiarity
with the case and the parties from its adjudication of the merits and its review
of the submissions by the parties with respect to any fee application, to
determine the most equitable allocation of the sole counsel's hours of legal
service among the jointly represented eligible and ineligible parties. 8
Some courts have ruled that eligible parties should be assigned the same
proportionate share of the legal expenses as the ineligible parties.782 However,
783
the district court should not be constrained by any strict mathematical formula;
the fact that an ineligible party has joined together with a larger group of eligible
parties should not necessarily lead to an ever-smaller reduction in the amount of
the EAJA fee recoverable. The court may find that a different share of the legal
expenses should be attributed to either the eligible or the ineligible party based
upon the entirety of the circumstances, including the role each party'played in
the initiation of the matter and direction of the litigation, an evaluation of
whether "the eligible and ineligible parties had overlapping but not coextensive
interests, 784 the benefit to be received by the ineligible party in comparison to
the eligible parties, the share of other litigation costs incurred that may have been
borne by the ineligible party, and other equitable considerations.
Again, however, the court should justify any departure from a fee-for-service
arrangement agreed to by the parties before refusing to accept (for EAJA award
purposes) the amount of the legal expenses for which an individual eligible party
has incurred a legal obligation of payment. As discussed immediately below,
courts have too often strained to develop special rules to respond to the fear that

781. It is important to understand the purpose of this allocation of legal services among the
parties, eligible and ineligible. The allocation does not necessarily determine the fee the attorney may
recover from an individual client, in the absence of or in addition to an EAJA fee award, although
this allocation does involve some of the same factors that may be relevant in determining a
reasonable fee and the basis for assessing that fee against the benefits obtained in a class action
context. The primary purpose of this particular allocation of legal services is to determine which
blocks of attorney time devoted to the litigation should be attributed to an eligible party and which
blocks to an ineligible party, with the result establishing the hours of attorney time for which
recovery of fees may be sought against the government tinder an EAJA application. If the total
contingency fee or class action fee would be higher than the EAJA award calculated according to the
legal services attributable to eligible parties, then the attorney may be allowed to recover that
difference in direct or indirect payments from the clients, subject to ethical limitations and the
supervisory power of the court to determine the reasonableness of the fee.
782. See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383, 393-94 (2d Cir.
1985) (awarding EAJA fees "based on the ratio of eligible plaintiffs to total plaintiffs, here eleven
to twelve"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986).
783. Louisianaex rel. Guste, 853 F.2d at 1225 (stating the district court is not constrained to
apply the "strict proportional nle used by the Sierra Club Court").
784. Id.
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parties may evade the eligibility requirements, while neglecting to first consider
the simple answer provided in the statute that only those legal expenses actually
incurred by an eligible party may be recovered in any EAJA award.
C. The Requirement that the Party Have "Incurred" Fees
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States
fees and other expenses.., incurredby that party in any civil action
... brought by or against the United States in any court having
jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust. (EAJA § 2412(d)(1)(A))785

1. Stating the Issue-Whether a Party is Eligiblefor Fees when Legal
Expenses Are Paid by a Third Party
In United States v. Paisley,786 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that prevailing parties in litigation with the federal government were not eligible for an award of fees under the EAJA because they had
not "incurred" any fees when their legal expenses would be covered by a third
party.787 Shortly before accepting appointments to positions with the federal
government, several former employees of the Boeing Company received a
severance payment from the company upon leaving their employment. 788 The
government brought an action against them seeking civil penalties, alleging that
these payments constituted illegal supplementation of a government employee's
salary by an outside source. 789 The Supreme Court ultimately held that receipt
of such payments by persons who were not yet government employees was not
a violation of the applicable statutes.79°
Under controlling Delaware corporation law, Boeing was obliged to
indemnify these employees for legal expenses incurred in successfully defending
a suit brought against them by reason of the fact that they were employees of the
corporation. 9 Under these circumstances, the Fourth Circuit held, the EAJA
was not available for an award of attorney's fees to the former Boeing employees. 792 The court reasoned that when a prevailing party has "an unconditional

785.
786.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
(1992).
792.

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
957 F.2d 1161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 73 (1992).
Id. at 1163-64.
Id. at 1163.
Id.
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 110 S.Ct. 997 (1990).
United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 73
Id.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

legal right to indemnification by a manifestly solvent third party," he has not
"incurred" fees within the meaning of the EAJA.7 93 The EAJA limits the award
to a prevailing party for those fees "incurred by the party" in the civil action. 9
Judge Hall dissented in the Paisley case, arguing that the majority's decision
allowed "the government to stand in the back of the line to pay attorney's fees,"
even though it was at fault in pursuing unjustified litigation.795 Even assuming
that Boeing was compelled by state law to indemnify the former employees,
Judge Hall saw the obligation as analogous to insurance. 79, In Judge Hall's view,
a fee award was appropriate pursuant to the common-law collateral source rule
"which does not permit the wrongdoer to profit from his victim's foresight to
' ' 97
secure an insurer.
Under the Fourth Circuit's Paisley theory, if someone else is paying the bill,
then the party has not "incurred" fees and thus may not obtain an award under
the EAJA. This is a ruling with implications reaching far beyond the state
corporation law obligation of one company to reimburse employees for litigation
expenses in successfully defending a suit arising out of the corporation
employment relationship. For example, indigent plaintiffs are frequently
represented by pro bono counsel or by public interest organizations that provide
legal services without charging a fee to the client. Similarly, government
employees may be represented at no personal expense in litigation by counsel
provided by public employee unions pursuant to their duty of fair representation,
Are EAJA fee awards unavailable to plaintiffs represented by counsel who
either expect no payment from the client or who are paid by an outside third
party? Can we give meaning and effect to the requirement that a party have
"incurred" fees to be eligible for an award, while also assuring the availability
of awards to public interest organizations and other entities that assist small
businesses and non-wealthy individuals in asserting legal rights against the
government? The discussion below addresses these questions, after first placing
the issue into proper legal context.
2. Mistakenly Avoiding the Issue by Applying a "Real Partyin Interest"
Analysis for Awarding EAJA Fees
In Grason Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,98 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit avoided this question, without
specifically addressing it, by framing the question of the EAJA award as being
available to whatever entity ultimately paid for the litigation. Applying what it
called "real party in interest" analysis, the court looked past the actual party in

793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.

Id. at 1164.
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
Paisley, 957 F.2d at 1171 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
951 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the litigation and considered whether an award of attorney's fees should be made
under the EAJA to the entity that financed the litigation.'" In Grason Electric
Co., a multiemployer trade association financed the defense of six employers
against whom the National Labor Relations Board had brought an unfair labor
practice action. 8° The Ninth Circuit held that, for purposes of the EAJA fee
award, "the real party in interest is the party who would pay the fees in the
absence of an attorney['s] fees award. ' '° Because the litigation expenses were
paid through an assessment by the trade association of each of its members, the
court held the real parties in interest appeared to be each of the 48 members of
the association. 2 The court remanded the matter to the agency, contemplating
be paid to each member according to its assessed share
that the fee award would
803
of the litigation costs.
This "real party in interest" approach, while perhaps ensuring that the award
goes to the entity that is truly out-of-pocket, nevertheless, cannot be sustained.
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, as under fee-shifting statutes in general,
the fee award belongs to the party in the litigation, not to some other entity that
may have financed the litigation or may have some claim upon the award.8°
Indeed, EAJA Subsection (d) states plainly that the award is to be made to the
"prevailing party"SO-not to some other entity that may have financed the
litigation.
This is not to say that the party named in the lawsuit is invariably the true
litigant to whom an award is due. However, the question then would be: Who
is the proper party to the suit itself, that is, to the case on the merits? Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, every action "shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. '' "° In other words, "the rule insists that the
named plaintiff possess, under the governing substantive law, the right sought to

799. Id. at 1105-06. Grason Elec. Co. involved an application for fees under that separate part
of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988), providing for an award of fees to
a prevailing party in an adversary adjudication at the administrative level. Grason Elec. Co., 951
F.2d at 1101. However, this part of the EAJA contains the same language providing for an award
to a prevailing party of fees "incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding." Equal
Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988).
800. Grason Elec. Co., 951 F.2d at 1101-02.
801. Id. at 1105.
802. Id. at 1106.
803. Id.
804. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-32, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 1538-39 (1986) (holding a
fee-shifting statute bestows eligibility for fee awards on the party, not on the attorney, and the party
may waive eligibility for fees as part of a settlement of the case, notwithstanding the objections of
the attorney); Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding.under
the EAJA, "any fee award is made to the 'prevailing party,"' and thus an attorney who arranged for
payment contingent on availability of a fee award "could not directly claim or be entitled to the
award," the award "had to be requested on behalf of the party").
805. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
806. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
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be enforced." ' 7 Thus, if the named plaintiff has no true interest in the case, but
rather is serving as the front for another entity that is not merely financing the
litigation but also seeks to obtain the benefits of that litigation on the merits, the
court may insist that the hidden entity be brought into the light as the real party
in interest, both for purposes of the merits and any fee award. 0 8
When there is the prospect of an EAJA award, the "real party in interest"
analysis should be applied forcefully by the courts to prevent evasion of the
eligibility requirements of the statute.o If the true force behind the litigation is
an organization or individual that would be ineligible for an EAJA award
because of wealth or number of employees, the "real party in interest" rule
should be applied to prevent the interposition of a nominal front party in whose
name the lawsuit is filed merely to ensure later availability of a fee award. For
example, in Wall Industries, Inc.. v. United States,a10 a corporation reached a
settlement contract with its accounting firm, under which the accounting firm
required the corporation to initiate a tax refund suit, selected the attorneys,
determined the litigation strategy and the legal issues to be presented, and
collected the full benefit of the tax refund. 8" Moreover, the accounting firm took
full responsibility for payment of all legal fees. 2 The corporation was nothing
more than a "stand-in" for the accounting firm. Under these unique circumstances, the accounting firm was indeed the real party in interest in every respect." 3
Because the accounting firm was ineligible for EAJA fees,8"4 the "real party in
interest" approach was properly applied in this case to bar an award.8"'

807. Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 6.3, at 319-20 (2d ed. 1993) (quoting Ellis
Canning Co. v. International Harvester Co., 255 P.2d 658, 659 (Kan. 1953)).
808. See generally Fleming James, Jr. etal., Civil Procedure §§ 10.3-.6, at 503-15 (4th ed. 1992)
(discussing real party in interest rule).
809. By analogy, the Supreme Court has applied something similar to a "real party in interest"
analysis to protect the integrity of federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction from collusive efforts
to create diversity through the presentation of a claim by a nominal party with state citizenship
diverse from that of the defendant. See Cashman v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 118 U.S. 58,
61, 6 S.Ct. 926, 928 (1886) (holding where non-diverse party solicited diverse plaintiff to file
lawsuit, engaged the attorney and paid all expenses, and secured an agreement from the alien to allow
the county to manage and conduct the suit and to decide whether to compromise or settle the suit,
the dispute was "really and substantially" between the non-diverse party and the defendant and thus
was not properly within the jurisdiction of the federal court). See also Ferrara v. Philadelphia Lab.,
Inc., 272 F. Stipp. 1000, 1012-14 (D. Vt. 1967), affd, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968).
810. 15 Cl. Ct. 796 (1988), affd imeie.,
883 F.2d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
811. Id. at 799 & nn.4-8.
812. Id. at 799.
813. See id. at 803-06.
814. Id. at 806.
815. By contrast, the Claims Court distinguished Wall Indus., Inc., and found that a subsidiary
corporation was independent of its parent corporation and qualified as a real party in interest in
Design & Prod., Inc. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 207 (1990). Although the fee applicant was a
wholly-owned subsidiary and the corporations shared presidents, certain vice presidents, and a
director, "no evidence [was] presented to suggest that [the parent corporation] will be the 'sole
beneficiary of this attorney's fees application' or that [the parent corporation] was 'actively involved

1994]

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICEACT

However, the "real party in interest" rule can seldom be so easily invoked,
especially if the aim is essentially to oust the named parties from the lawsuit
(and thus from an ability to apply for an EAJA fee) and substitute another entity
as the sole litigant. Consider the example of an ineligible trade association that
supports and finances litigation by one of its members, who is eligible, to
challenge governmental action that impacts upon the industry as a whole. If the
association could properly have been made the named party, and if the
association actually controls the lawsuit and makes the litigation decisions, then
it should be recognized as the real party in interest both for purposes of the suit
on the merits and for any later application for attorney's fees. 8,6 But, in the
absence of such control of the litigation, which may often be hard to prove, the
mere fact of financial support does not change the lineup of the parties. 8"7 Since
an individual member of the trade association would also be entitled to pursue
a challenge to government regulation in its own right, the fact that the trade
association provides financial support does not make the individual member any
less a real party in interest, provided the named plaintiff remains the "master of
the litigation" and has not surrendered the authority to direct the lawsuit to the
trade organization. Thus, as long as the named parties are legitimate, the fact
that one of the parties or even a non-party entity is financing the litigation does
not mean the court can reach beyond the named litigants and treat that single
party or the outsider as the only real party in interest for the purpose of making
a fee award." 9

in the underlying litigation."' Id. at 212 (quoting Wall Indus., Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 796,
804 (1988), affd ,ner., 883 F.2d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Instead, the evidence established that the
subsidiary corporation acted independently in bringing the civil action, that the parent corporation
never took an active role in nor financed the litigation, that the corporate offices were at different
locations, and that the subsidiary corporation performed its own administrative, accounting, and
insurance functions. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded "the totality of the facts" demonstrated
that the subsidiary corporation was the real party in interest eligible to seek an EAJA award. Id.
816. Cf.Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 84 (D. Conn. 1958) (holding when a
diverse plaintiff is not only induced to bring suit and reimbursed for his expenses by another, but also
"has surrendered or never had control of the suit, such control reposing in another who cannot sue
because of non-diversity," then a finding of collusion to improperly create diversity of citizenship
federal jurisdiction is warranted and the lawsuit should be dismissed from federal court), rev'd on
other grounds, 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959).
817. United States Phillips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 730-31 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(stating the fact a third-party provides financial support of a party's litigation as an indemnitor of
litigation expenses does not confer party status), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993). See Wheeler
v. City of Denver, 229 U.S. 342, 350-52, 33 S.Ct. 842, 845 (1913) (holding although water
company, which was not diverse from defendant, solicited diverse parties to bring the suit and agreed
to indemnify them against their costs and attorney's fees, the water company did not control the
conduct of the litigation, and, accordingly, the action was not brought collusively by nominal parties
to improperly create federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction).
818. Cf.Maithies,23 F.R.D. at 84 (stating "control is the decisive factor" and when the nominal
diverse plaintiff is not in fact "the master of the litigation" because control resides in another who
cannot sue because of non-diversity, then diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is not proper).
819. When an association prosecutes an action in its own name, with proper associational
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
made this very error in an understandable (but ultimately unnecessary) effort to
ensure that an EAJA award was not made when an action against the government
was financed by a large ineligible organization. In Unification Church v.
Immigration & NaturalizationService,"20 three aliens and the Unification Church
brought an action to challenge the denial by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service of applications by the three individuals to remain in the United States
and to continue to work for the church.82"' When the plaintiffs achieved success
and sought fees under the EAJA, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
church, and not the three individuals, was the only real party in interest for
purposes of the fee request. 822 The church had chosen the attorney and had
arranged for payment of all legal expenses.823 However, the individual plaintiffs
cannot be so easily dismissed from the equation. As the court acknowledged, the
individual plaintiffs, who had been in danger of being deported from the country,
had rights at stake in the case on the merits. 824 Thus, beyond any question, they
were real parties in interest to the action. The fact that, as the court stated, the
three individuals had "nothing at stake in the award of fees"825 is certainly
relevant to their eligibility for fees (as outlined at length below),8 26 but it did not
deprive them of their status as real parties in interest in the case.
The nature of the real party in interest does not shift from the merits
proceeding to the fee adjudication. The Equal Access to Justice Act is clear on
this point. The party who prevails, that is, the party who secures relief on the
merits, is the same party to whom the fee award is to be made. The statute
provides that the court "shall award to a prevailing party ... fees and other
expenses ... incurred by that party" in the civil action. 827 The three individual
plaintiffs in the Unification Church case were prevailing parties and thus real
parties in interest to that case. As discussed below, 82 8 they were indeed ineligible
for an EAJA award, but the reason for that conclusion is that they had "incurred"'

standing, it certainly may seek recovery of fees it has incurred (that is, for which the association,
rather than its members, is responsible). However, under such circumstances, a separate eligibility
question arises, which was discussed previously, of whether an association's size and wealth
determination for purposes of an EAJA award should be based upon its separate number of
employees and net worth or upon an aggregation of the size and wealth of its constituent members.
See supra section I1l.B (discussing eligibility limitations of net worth and employment size).
820. 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
821. Id. at 1079.
822. Id. at 1081.
823. Id. at 1082.
824. Id.
825. Id.
826. See infra section III.C.3 (discussing requirement that a party have "incurred" an obligation
to pay fees to be eligible for an EAJA Subsection (d) award).
827. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
828. See infra section lll.C.3.b (discussing eligibility for an EAJA Subsection (d) award in the
context of an outside financier of litigation).
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no fees, not that they somehow had lost their status as parties to the lawsuit
when it moved into the fee-shifting phase. 829
Similarly, in the Grason Electric Co. case, the government had brought the
unfair labor practice case against the six named defendant employers. 30 Those
six employers-and not the trade association-were the real parties in interest.
The trade association was in no wise a real party in interest to the action on the
merits. It had not been accused of any unfair labor practice. The association's
interest, and that of the other non-party association members, was merely
empathetic or ideological. The fact that the trade association or its members may
have paid the legal expenses of the six employers did not make the association
or its members real parties in interest to the lawsuit. Since neither the
association nor its other members were prevailing parties in the proceeding, they
were not eligible for an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA. The Ninth
Circuit erred in suggesting otherwise.
3. A Party Must Have "Incurred" an Obligation to Pay Fees, Either
Directly or Through a Nonrecourse Debt
The question whether a fee award may be made under the Equal Access to
Justice Act to a party who has not directly "incurred" fees may not be avoided
by shifting the focus from one prevailing party toward another party or entity
who did make a payment for those legal expenses.8 3' Thus, the question

829. Because the District of Columbia Circuit reaches the same result as I suggest below and
travels much the same road in getting there, our differences could be dismissed as academic. I reach
the conclusion that a party is eligible for an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA only if the
party has "incurred" an obligation to pay fees. See infra section III.C.3 (discussing requirement that
a party have "incurred" an obligation to pay fees to be eligible for an EAJA Subsection (d) award).
Through the "real party in interest" analysis, the Unification Church court reached the same result
by what may appear to be nearly an identical analysis:
We hold ... that, where the fee arrangement among the plaintiffs is such that only some
of them will be liable for attorney's fees, the court shall consider only the qualifications
vei non under the Equal Access to Justice Act of those parties that will be themselves
liable for fees if court-awarded fees are denied.
Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
However, that our disagreement is not merely semantical becomes apparent when we realize that
the "real party in interest" analysis lends itself not only to limiting the entities eligible to apply for
fees but also to expanding the universe of eligible applicants. The Ninth Circuit, in Grason Elec. Co.
v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1100, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1991), relied upon the "real party in interest" approach
formulated in the Unification Church decision to look beyond the named parties to the case, identify
other entities who funded the litigation, characterize those outside non-parties as the real parties in
interest for purposes of the fee award, and suggest the EAJA award should be made to those who
had paid the legal expenses. Id. at 1106. In sum, the "real party in interest" analysis may be used
to limit or expand eligibility, depending upon the circumstances. By contrast, I view the EAJA as
expressly limiting the fee award to those who were proper and prevailing parties to the action on the
merits and who have also "incurred" an obligation to pay attorney's fees.
830. Grason Elec. Co., 951 F.2d at 1101.
831. See SEC v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1412-13 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that asking
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remains: May a prevailing party whose legal expenses are ultimately covered by
another entity ever recover an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA? As
discussed below,83 2 the answer depends upon whether the party has incurred an
obligation to pay the fees, even if the obligation will not result in personal
liability, pursuant to an established custom or practice that comports with the
purpose of the EAJA.
As always, one must begin with the language of the statute. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has noted: "In its requirement
that the fees have been 'incurred' by the party, § 2412(d) differs from ... other
8 33
fee-shifting statutes that authorize the award of 'a reasonable attorney's fee."'
The plain import of this language cannot be avoided. Before a party may claim
an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA, that party must, in some sense, have
"incurred" an obligation to pay those fees.
Obviously, a party that has retained an attorney and contracted to pay fees
to that attorney has accepted an obligation. In the most direct sense of the word,
such a party has "incurred" fees and thus is eligible to seek to shift that
obligation to the government through an award under the EAJA. That is the
easy case. But must the obligation be so direct? The nature of the obligation
to pay attorney's fees and how it may be incurred is not described in the statute.
Can it ever be said that a party represented by a public interest organization has
incurred an obligation to pay fees? What if the party's legal expenses are
covered by a form of insurance or a prepaid legal plan? What if a friend or
relative confers a gift which is used to pay the fees? What if representation is
provided by a third party by reason of a statutory obligation, such as an
indemnification statute or a union's duty to provide fair representation to an
employee in the bargaining unit?
In discussing the measure for awards under fee-shifting statutes in general,
Professor Charles Silver observes that a fee agreement between a client and an
attorney could be framed to create a nonrecourse debt. 834 Although it may be
true, for example, that "legal aid organizations typically refrain from charging
their clients," ' 5 this does not necessarily mean that those clients have no right
to recover attorney's fees or that no obligation has been incurred by the client.

whether third party who paid legal expenses is the real party in interest for an EAJA award is
"addressing the wrong issue," and that the proper question is whether the party who prevailed
"incurred" legal expenses).
832. See infra section III.C.3 (discussing requirement a party have "incurred" an obligation to
pay fees to be eligible for an EAJA Subsection (d) award).
833. TGS Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 983 F.2d 229, 230 (Fed. Cir. 1993). However, in the TGS
Int'l case, the Federal Circuit confused the eligibility requirement that aclaimant for an EAJA award
have "incurred" fees with the appropriate measure of the fee award, mistakenly holding an EAJA fee
should be measured by a contingency fee agreement rather than by the time expended by the
attorney.
834. Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 Tex.
L. Rev. 865, 881-86 (1992).
835. Id. at 882.
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Professor Silver argues fee agreements with an attorney should be considered in
the same terms that apply to other debt instruments:
When thinking about debt instruments generally, it is typical to
distinguish the debt an instrument creates from the extent of a debtor's
personal liability on that debt and to recognize that a debt exists
whether or not personal liability obtains. When one analyzes fee
agreements in these terms, it becomes clear that fee agreements create
legal obligations that can properly serve as the basis for fee awards,
even in cases where plaintiffs receive legal aid.83s
Thus, for example, a legal services organization could contract with an indigent
client to create a nonrecourse debt, by which the organization essentially loans
the value of legal services to the client but limits its right to collect upon that
loan to any funds obtained by a fee award made to the client.837 Thus, while
legal aid organizations "forsake the option of holding clients personally liable for
fees, they acquire the power to seek compensation by enforcing their clients'
rights to demand fee awards. 8 38
Would the creation by contract of such a nonrecourse debt, under which the
party to the case would have no personal liability, qualify as the "incurring" of
fees within the meaning of the EAJA? Both because the debt created, notwithstanding its nonrecourse nature, is a true obligation, and because this approach
seems to comport with the underlying purpose of the EAJA, the courts should
accept this approach as establishing the eligibility of such parties for fee awards.
Moreover, the kinds of arrangements excluded by this analysis would seem to
correspond to those for which the EAJA was not intended to provide recovery.
Illustration of this approach in the context of recurring situations is presented
below.
a. Pro Bono Legal Services and LitigationInsurance
In the case of pro bono legal representation, a contractual arrangement by
which a client accepts an obligation to pay attorney's fees and then conveys to
the attorney the right to collect any fee award in full satisfaction of that
obligation is an enforceable and legitimate debt instrument. As Professor Silver
observes, lawyers who enter into such contracts expect to be paid and have
agreed to perform legal services with the hope (conditioned on success in the

836. Id. at 883.
837. Id. at 883-84. See also Stephen Yelenosky & Charles Silver, A Model RetainerAgreement
for Legal Services Programs:MandatoryAttorney Fee Provisions,28 Clearinghouse Rev. 114, 11618, 125-27, 131-32 (1994) (proposing a model retainer agreement for legal services programs that
includes an attorney's fee provision creating a nonrecourse debt, which by excusing the client from
personal liability remains consistent with federal law barring legal services programs from charging
fees).
838. Silver, supra note 834, at 883-84.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

litigation and any other requirements for obtaining an award under a fee-shifting
statute) that a fee award will provide the compensation. 3 9 "By agreeing to work
for fee awards, [these attorneys] simply freed their clients from personal liability
for fees. They did not take the further step of agreeing to serve their clients
without charge, however, nor did they enter agreements that eliminated all means
of collecting fees." ' In sum, such parties have incurred a true obligation to pay
the legal expenses through assignment of any fee award, and they might not have
received legal services without having agreed to incur such a nonrecourse debt."'
The same analysis should apply to a litigant whose legal expenses are
covered by insurance or a prepaid legal plan. If a party in litigation with the
government is provided legal representation through a form of insurance, the
insurance company typically will have reserved a contractual right to obtain any
fee award to which the party would be entitled. When an insurance company
pays a claim, it often uses a "loan receipt" device that "makes the payment to
the insured technically a loan, to be repaid only out of proceeds of the claim
against the third party, which claim is pledged to the insurer as security for the
'loan. ' -84 2 Thus, just as in the case of the legal aid organization or pro bono
attorney retention contract, the insurer and the insured have agreed through the
insurance contract to create a nonrecourse debt that may be satisfied only through
an award made to the insured against the opponent in litigation.
In the GrasonElectric Co. case discussed above, the Ninth Circuit described
the trade association's financing of its members' defense against a government
charge as involving a "kind of litigation insurance policy. ' 3 Thus, depending
upon the particular contractual arrangement between the association and its
members, the association could be said to have loaned the funds for the legal
representation to the charged employers, creating an obligation to be repaid by
any attorney's fee award to which those employers might be entitled. Although
the Ninth Circuit mistakenly applied a "real party in interest" analysis, it reached

839. Id. at 884-85.
840. Id. See also Phillips v. General Seres. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577. 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding a party had "incurred" fees for purposes of an EAJA award when the fee arrangement with
her attorney provided for payment contingent on receipt of a statutory fee award, and stating
"[i]nherent in the agreement is an intention on the part of [the party] to be obligated to her counsel
for fees properly obtainable under the statute").
841. To be sure, a large amount of pro bono work is performed by attorneys to uphold the
calling of the profession and without any expectation of compensation, even through a fee-shifting
award. However, individual attorneys performing substantial amounts of pro bono work and public
interest and legal services organizations providing representation to the disadvantaged do depend
upon the prospect of attorney's fee awards being obtained in some of the spectnm of cases they take
in order "to expand their capacity to serve victims for whom the private market fails to provide."
See Silver, supra note 834, at 882.
842. James et al., supra note 808, § 10.4, at 507.
843. Grason Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the right result-assuming the association's financing was pursuant to a true
insurance arrangement that created a contractual subrogation right. s4
Ensuring eligibility for fee awards to parties who are represented by legal
aid organizations promotes the purpose of the EAJA "to encourage relatively
impecunious private parties to challenge unreasonable or oppressive governmental behavior by relieving such parties of the fear of incurring large litigation

844. In Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the Federal Circuit
essentially accepted the theory that a party who has contracted to create a nonrecourse obligation to
convey a right to a statutory fee award has "incurred" fees to be eligible for a fee award. Id. at 158283. However, while the court was willing to accept this approach in the context of an attorney-client
contract limiting the client's obligation to pay fees and instead obliging him or her to pay any fees
awarded under the EAJA, the court suggested in dicta in a footnote that a fee award would be
inappropriate "[i]f the party seeking legal fees is obligated to pay them to a third party which is not
the professional providing the legal service." Id. at 1583 n.5. The court did not explain why the
creation of a nonrecourse obligation was adequately characterized as the incurring of fees in one
instance but not in others. As one of the authorities for this dicta, the court cited SEC v. Comserv
Corp., 908 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that a party has not incurred fees when
legal expenses are provided for in an insurance policy carried by the party's employer. Phillips, 924
F.2d at 1583 n.5. The Comnserv Corp. case, however, is attenuated authority for this proposition,
given the unusual facts of the case and the important fact it did not involve payment of litigation
expenses through insurance coverage purchased by the otherwise eligible party seeking an EAJA
award. In Coinserv Corp., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an action against
a corporate officer alleging various securities law violations and seeking an injunction against further
illegal conduct. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d at 1409. Pursuant to a severance contract, the corporation
had agreed to pay the officer's legal expenses incurred in connection with the SEC investigation and
litigation. Id. at 1413. Moreover, as the court observed, the corporation would likely have been
obliged to indemnify the officer in any event under state corporation law. Id. Thus, either by
contract or statutory duty, the corporation was obligated to pay the party's legal fees. Insurance
entered into the picture only because the corporation had purchased an insurance policy that
reimbursed it for its costs in indemnifying a director or officer. Id. The officer himself had not
purchased any insurance nor did it appear he had agreed to convey any right to a statutory fee award
to anyone, either the corporation or the corporation's insurer. Id. at 1414 n.8. The record did not
reveal whether the officer, if the recipient of an EAJA award, was obliged to reimburse the
corporation for any portion of his legal expenses.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Comnseri, Corp. suggests a party is not eligible for fees whenever
those expenses are paid by another source, with the sole exception being those parties represented
by pro bono counsel. Id. at 1414-15. However, the Comserv Corp. case did not involve a party,
otherwise eligible for an EAJA award, who was represented in the litigation against the government
only by means of insurance coverage he had purchased. The Eighth Circuit, correctly in my view,
understood the requirement that an obligation to pay fees have been incurred as meaning "that EAJA
awards should be available where the burdens of attorneys' fees would have deterred the litigation
challenging the government's action, but not where no such deterrence exists." Id. at 1415-16. As
discussed immediately below, I think providing for EAJA awards when a party is able to obtain
coverage only through insurance protection falls within this limitation. Moreover, looking at the
actual facts of the Conserv Corp. case, I believe the Eighth Circuit was correct in denying eligibility,
given the party's legal expenses were paid through prior arrangement by an outside financier, as I
also discuss further below. See infra section llI.C.3.b (discussing eligibility for an EAJA Subsection
(d) award in the context of an outside financier of the litigation).
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expenses. ' 'us In Bluin v. Stenson, 6 the Supreme Court stated that "'[itis in the
interest of the public that [non-profit public interest] law firms be awarded
reasonable attorneys' fees to be computed in the traditional manner when its
counsel perform legal services otherwise entitling them to the award of attorneys'
fees. ' 'U7 As Professor Silver notes, "fee awards enable legal aid agencies to
expand their capacities to serve victims for whom the private market fails to
provide."84 8 In Cornella v. Schweiker, 49 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit approved an EAJA award to pro bono counsel, stating that
"[ilf attorneys' fees to pro bono organizations are not allowed .... it would
more than likely discourage involvement by these organizations in [cases against
the government], effectively reducing access to the judiciary .. .. ",,5oThe courts
have routinely authorized awards under the EAJA to legal services organizations
and attorneys providing legal representation pro bono. 5 '
Admittedly with some less force, the same reasoning should allow the
recovery of attorney's fees when a party is afforded representation through a
genuine insurance arrangement, including a policy issued by an insurance
company or an association that has established protection against certain legal
expenses for its members pursuant to a written agreement. If an insurance
company or an insuring association is denied the opportunity to recover those
expenses through a fee award, the ability to provide such insurance and the cost
charged for such coverage will be increased. The intent of Congress in enacting
the EAJA was "to diminish the deterrent effect of the expense involved in
seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable government action. ''852
The availability and affordability of insurance coverage would be enhanced by
the prospect of reducing insurance cost through the collection of fee awards,
thereby granting small businesses and individuals of little wealth a greater
opportunity to procure protection from the burdens of litigation with the
government. Of course, the ability of the insurer to recover a fee award would
still depend upon the eligibility of the insured, since fee awards are made only
to parties. But this also comports with the purpose of the statute. The EAJA is
concerned with increasing access to legal representation-either by legal aid

845. Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing legislative history), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
846. 465 U.S. 886, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
847. Id. at 895. 104 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 919444, at 5048-49 (C.D. Cal. 1974)).
848. Silver, supra note 834, at 882.
849. 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).
850. Id. at 986-87.
851. Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1991); American
Ass'n of Retired Persons v. EEOC, 873 F.2d 402, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Watford v. Heckler, 765
F.2d 1562, 1567 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985); Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 985-87 (8th Cir. 1984).
852. Cornella, 728 F.2d at 981 (quoting Foley Constr. Co. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 716 F.2d 1202, 1203 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984)).
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organizations or the availability of insurance-like arrangements-by small entities
and relatively impecunious individuals.
b. The Outside Financier
When the costs of legal services for multiple parties joined together in the
same lawsuit are incurred by a single party, the purposes of the EAJA are not
implicated (beyond of course that single party, if eligible). In such a circumstance, the presence of the single party who pays all attorney's fees for all parties
indicates that only the participation of that particular party was necessary to
sustain the litigation. Thus, only that party should be eligible for a fee, and if
it is ineligible for reasons of size or wealth, this merely confirms that the
prospect of an EAJA award was unnecessary to ensure that the government
action would be challenged in litigation."'
For example, in the Unification Church case,"s 4 the church arranged to pay
for legal services for the individual plaintiffs in that litigation against the
government. This was not because it was providing pro bono representation or
through some form of insurance for its members against the costs of litigation.
Rather, the church itself was a participant in the litigation, had its own interests
in the outcome of the litigation, and undoubtedly arranged for representation of
the individuals to ensure a unified position among the plaintiffs on the issues
involved in the action."' 5 The church itself was not eligible for a fee award
because of the number of its employees.8 56 Thus, the District of Columbia
Circuit was correct in saying that an award of attorney's fees under those
circumstances
would open the door for the wholesale subversion of Congress's intent
to prevent large entities from receiving fees under subsection (d). In a
wide variety of circumstances, organizations obviously not qualified for
an award under subsection (d) would be able to persuade individuals to
be among the parties, and the organization would then receive free legal
services if its side were to prevail.857
Use of the "real party in interest" approach, however, was misplaced and was not
necessary to prevent such an abuse of the statute. If only one of several parties
is the sole financier of litigation, then the other named parties have simply not

853. See also supra section III.B.5 (discussing EAJA awards in cases with both eligible and
ineligible parties).
854. Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
855. See id. at 1082-83 (stating, when the church agreed to pay the fees for the individual
plaintiffs, the allowance of a fee award to the individual plaintiffs would effectively allow the church
to receive free legal services notwithstanding its ineligibility for an EAJA award because of the
number of its employees).
856. Id. at 1091-92.
857. Id. at 1082.
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"incurred" any fees so as to be eligible for a fee award."' 8 Of the four parties
to the UnificationChurch lawsuit (the three individuals and the church), only the
church had actually "incurred" any obligation to pay attorney's fees.8 59 Thus,
three of the parties were ineligible for an award because they had not incurred
fees; the church, although having incurred fees, was ineligible because of the
number of its employees.
The same analysis would apply when the legal expenses of a party in
litigation with the government are covered by an outside entity, either through
an arrangement directly with the party's attorney or by a promise at the inception
of the litigation to reimburse the party fully for all legal expenses in the future.
In either situation, the party has not truly incurred any obligation to pay
attorney's fees. Under such circumstances, the purposes of the EAJA are not
implicated because legal services would have been afforded even in the absence
of the fee-shifting statute. Moreover, when an outside entity advances the costs
of litigation, the danger is heightened that the named party to the lawsuit may be
serving as a front for another entity that would be ineligible for an EAJA award
because of size or wealth.
To be sure, such an outside entity might attempt to create the appearance that
the named party has incurred an obligation, perhaps by styling the fee payment as
a nonrecourse debt payable only by a fee award, as discussed above. However,
when such an arrangement is adopted on an ad hoc, case-specific basis-in contrast
with the established practices of a legal aid organization, an attorney who provides
representation pro bono or contingent on fee awards, or a genuine insurer-the
burden should be on the applicant to establish that the arrangement is legitimate and
was a true condition upon the payment of the party's legal expenses. In sum, the
obligation of the party to the litigation to pay attorney's fees must be real, even if
it is nonrecourse in nature, such that it may be said that the conveyance of the right
to collect attorney's fees to the financier of the litigation was a true condition
precedent to the availability of legal services.
A gratuitous payment, however, such as one by a friend or relative, received
by a party and then applied to a fee obligation would not prevent the party from
being eligible for a fee award under the EAJA. A gift, even one made with the
purpose of assisting the party with litigation expenses, would simply mean the party
faced with a debt had found a collateral source by which to pay it. The crucial
inquiry would be whether the gift was made without strings attached, such that the
party would be free to choose whether to apply it to legal expenses, and whether the
payment was directly correlated to the litigation expenses, in the sense that it

858. See also supra section lI1.B.5 (discussing EAJA awards in cases with both eligible and
ineligible parties).
859. Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (stating that when the plaintiff's attorney was "retained" by the individual plaintiffs, his
"arrangement" for payment was solely with the church, and if a fee award were denied, "the Church
will pay the fees").
860. Id. at 1083-92.
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constituted part of a prior arrangement to reimburse the party for litigation
expenses. In other words, the question would be whether it amounted to a true gift
as opposed to a specific arrangement by an outside party to finance the litigation.
In the former instance, it is meaningful to say the party has incurred fees; in the
latter, the party has never truly incurred an obligation but instead retained counsel
with the prior understanding that another would pay the bill.
c. Statutory Indemnification
When a third party entity funds the litigation pursuant to a statutory obligation,
the party who enjoys the benefits conferred by the statute has not "incurred" fees
so as to be eligible for an award under the EAJA. For example, when there exists
an unconditional right to full indemnification of legal expenses by another entity,
then the party has not incurred any obligation and a fee award would not promote
the purpose of the EAJA. As discussed at the outset of this section,86' the Fourth
Circuit reached precisely this result and for this reason in United States v.
Paisley.s62 The court concluded the employer was obliged under state corporation
law to indemnify former employees for the costs of defending themselves against
litigation arising from the fact of their former employment:
[To hold that a party with an unconditional right to indemnification
of its attorney's fees by a manifestly solvent third party might nevertheless
qualify for an EAJA award] would not in fact serve a principal purpose of
the EAJA: to avoid the deterring effect which liability for attorney['s]
fees might have on parties' willingness and ability to litigate meritorious
civil claims or defenses against the Government. The EAJA provides for
fee-shifting to avoid this result. Consequently, in any situation in which
the eligibility of a particular prevailing party for an EAJA award is in
issue, it is appropriate to inquire whether that party would, as a practical
matter, have been deterred from litigating had it been known that a feeshifting award was not available upon a successful conclusion. If that
question is asked here, it is obvious that [the individual parties] ...would
not have been deterred had the EAJA not then existed. This is the critical
concern underlying the EAJA precondition that a fee claimant shall have
"incurred" the expense. 63
While the Fourth Circuit's analysis is correct in the abstract, it is not clear that
it was correctly applied in the Paisleycase. In his dissent, Judge Hall observed that
the indemnification obligation in that case had been conditional; under the
corporation statute, "victory was a prerequisite to even the possibility of indemnifi-

861.
862.
863.

See supra section 11I.C.I.
957 F.2d 1161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 73 (1992).
Id. at 1164 (citation omitted).
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cation." 8' As the litigation began, therefore, the employees had no assurance of
reimbursement and had to accept the risk of being held fully obliged to pay their
own legal expenses. Thus, argued Judge Hall, the former employees "most
definitely 'incurred' fees for which they were and are personally liable. That they
have another potential source from which to obtain reimbursement ought not be a
defense for the government."'8 65 Under these circumstances, where the payment
was uncertain and came only after the parties had incurred an obligation, the
payment is analogous to a gift providing a collateral source for payment.
Accordingly, an EAJA award may have been appropriate.
d. Statutory Duty of Fair Representation by Labor Organizations
A similar statutorily-imposed obligation may arise in the form of the duty of
"fair representation" imposed upon a labor organization for the benefit of all
employees represented by the union. 8 6 As the exclusive labor representative of all
employees in a bargaining unit,s61the union has a duty "to serve the interests of all
members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion
with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." 68 When a
union provides legal representation to an employee pursuant to this statutorily
inferred obligation, the employee cannot be said to have incurred a fee obligation. 69

864. Id. at 1171 (Hall, J., dissenting).
865. Id.
866. In the private sector, there is no express statutory duty of "fair representation." Chauffeurs,
Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 n.3, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1344 n.3 (1990).
The duty was "judicially developed as a necessary corollary to the status of exclusive representative"
by the union of an employee bargaining unit as provided for in labor statutes. 2 The Developing
Labor Law 1409 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has confirmed
the duty is "grounded in federal statutes." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S. Ct. 908, 910
(1967). It is, therefore, plainly a duty imposed by law, not an obligation accepted by agreement.
However, in the federal sector, with respect to unions representing federal employees, the duty of
fair representation has been codified in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988). The statute provides that the labor organization recognized as the
exclusive representative of a unit of employees "is responsible for representing the interests of all
employees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor organization
membership." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1) (1988).
867. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) (private sector labor law); Federal
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1) (1988) (federal government
employee labor law).
868.
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177, 87 S.Ct. at 910. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 563, 110 S.Ct. at 1344.
See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d 1402, 1406
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (approvingly quoting the language from Vaca set out in the text in discussing duty
of fair representation for labor organization representing federal employees). See generally Robert
A. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law (1976) (discussing duty of fair representation).
869. But see American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Bd., 944 F.2d 922,
933 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating for purposes of provision of Civil Service Reform Act allowing award
of "reasonable attorney fees incurredby an employee or applicant for employment" when prevailing
in an employment matter, 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g) (1988) (emphasis added), a fee has been "incurred"
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Because the duty to provide representation is imposed by law, the union may not
exact, as a condition to representation, any promise from the employee to convey
the right to a fee award. No obligation, direct or nonrecourse, exists on the
employee's part for the legal expenses, No plausible understanding of the term
"incurred" could extend to this scenario.
One court has noted that the "lesson" to be drawn from cases considering the
requirement that attorney's fees have been incurred "is that EAJA awards should
be available where the burden of attorneys' fees would have deterred the litigation
challenging the government's actions, but not where no such deterrence exists. 870
When an employee is guaranteed representation in matters related to the collective
bargaining process by reason of the union's statutory duty as exclusive representative, he or she would not "require[] the assistance of a federal fee-shifting statute
to overcome the deterrent of attorneys' fees.", 7 ' Thus, if an EAJA award were
sought by the employee, or on the employee's behalf, the application should be
denied on the grounds that no fee obligation was incurred by the employee.
While this is an obstacle to recovery of EAJA fees by unions in theory, it may
not be a great concern in practice. When a union is called by statutory duty to
represent the interests of an employee in litigation, the union is able to do so in its
own name and as a party to the litigation. Indeed, because the union's duty of fair
representation "is coterminous with the union's power as exclusive representative,'8 72 the duty will be implicated only in a context "when a union uses a power
that it alone can wield," as, for example, when the collective bargaining agreement
provides for a grievance procedure in which the union participates as sole
representative of all employees. 3 As a formal party to the proceeding, the union
would be able directly to seek a fee award in its own right.
Most fair representation cases involve the union's duty to process an
employee's grievance with an employer. 74 Collective bargaining agreements

where an attorney-client relationship exists and counsel has rendered legal services on behalf of the
employee, thus allowing a fee award to union-paid counsel). See also Goodrich v. Department of
Navy, 733 F.2d 1578, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189, 105 S.Ct. 958 (1985).
870. SEC v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1415-16 (8th Cir. 1990).
871. See id. at 1415 (holding employee whose legal fees were paid by his employer by
contractual or statutory obligation had not incurred fees and thus was not eligible for an EAJA
award).
872. American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 812 F.2d 1326, 1326
(10th Cir. 1987). See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564, 96 S.Ct. 1048,
1056 (1976) (stating in private sector labor law, the duty of fair representation imposed upon the
union is also "a responsibility equal in scope to its authority"). See National Treasury Employees
Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 800 F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
873. American Fed. of Gov't Employees, 812 F.2d at 1328.
874. The Developing L.abor Law, stqpra note 866, at 1868. See, for example, Chauffeurs,
Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990) in which the union
declined to refer to the grievance committee a challenge by employees to the employer's lay-off and
recall policies. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903 (1967), an employee alleged he was
wrongfully discharged in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and the union had
arbitrarily and without cause refused to take his grievance with the employer to arbitration. See also
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between labor organizations and employers typically establish a grievance
procedure, providing for presentation of the grievance to the employer and binding
arbitration in the absence of a satisfactory resolution between the union and
employer.875 As the statutory agent of the employees, the union generally has the
exclusive authority to administer the grievance and arbitration procedures created
under the collective bargaining agreement.8 76 Thus, "[wlages, hours, working
conditions, seniority, and job security... became the business of [labor unions],
as did the contractual procedures for the processing and settling of grievances,
including those with respect to discharge."' " If the grievance and arbitration
process were to break down, any litigation that might ensue could be pursued by
and in the name of the union as part of its continuing duty of fair representation.
The union may file suit to compel arbitration of a grievance pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement 78 or to enforce an arbitration award. 9 Of course, these
lawsuits do not ordinarily implicate the EAJA because the federal government is
not the opposing party.
For the federal government to become a party to litigation involving an
employee grievance, the matter would either have to be charged as an unfair labor
practice before the National Labor Relations Board or involve federal government
employees. In the context of private sector employees, it is generally not an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to follow the grievance procedure in a
collective bargaining agreement or to refuse to comply with an arbitration award.88°
Accordingly, a grievance matter involving a private sector employee would rarely
come before the National Labor Relations Board or implicate the EAJA. However,
a federal agency's refusal to abide by a grievance procedure or to comply with an
arbitration award with respect to federal employees may result in an unfair labor
practice charge before the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which in turn may
result in litigation if a party seeks judicial review.88 '

American Fed. of Gov't Employees, 812 F.2d at 1327-28 (holding federal employees union had no
obligation under the statutory duty of fair representation to provide attorneys to represent employees
with respect to a statutory disciplinary action that was not a grievance or other procedure growing
out of a collective bargaining agreement); NationalTreasury Employees Union, 800 F.2d at 1167-72
(same).
875.
Terry, 494 U.S. at 564, 110 S. Ct. at 1344.
876. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190-95, 87 S. Ct. at 916-19. The same applies in the context of public
employee unions representing federal government employees. *Underthe Civil Service Reform Act,
when a federal government employee is subjected to a disciplinary action and chooses to make a
grievance, the union will present the grievance on behalf of the employee. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(b)(3)(A)
(1988). If the matter is not resolved to the union's satisfaction, the union has the exclusive power
to invoke binding arbitration with the agency. Id. See also Cornelius v. Nutt. 472 U.S. 648, 660
n.15, 105 S.Ct. 2882, 2889 n.15 (1985).
877. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563, 96 S. Ct. 1048, 1056 (1976).
878. E.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 923 (1957).
879. E.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364 (1987).
880. Benjamin Aron, Unfair Labor Practicesand the Right to Strike in the Public Sector: Has
the National Labor RelationsAct Been a GoodModel?, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1097, 1107-08 n.86 (1986).
881.
E.g., Department of Health & Human Servs. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 976 F.2d
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Again, and most importantly, the union would be a formal party to litigation
proceedings arising out of an employee grievance matter. Because the union's duty
of fair representation is tied to its role as exclusive representative of the employees,
the duty will arise only in a context where the union would be the named party
enforcing the claimed right. As a party, the union would be the entity that has
"incurred" fees, even if the employee on whose behalf a grievance claim or unfair
labor practice charge was pursued by the union has not personally incurred fees.
As such, the union would be eligible in its own right to a fee award under the
EAJA, assuming it met the other eligibility requirements.882
Finally, a labor union often provides legal representation for its members as a
service afforded to its members beyond what it is required to do as a matter of
statutory obligation.883 A union may provide legal services to its members in a pro
bono capacity, acting "as a legal aid organization. '84 Additionally, a union may
give its members the opportunity to participate in a prepaid legal plan.885 In either
instance, the employee should be eligible for attorney's fees for the same reasons
discussed above applying to legal services organizations and litigation insurance
plans. In sum, in most instances in which a union would participate in litigation on
behalf of an employee, an EAJA award would be available either directly to the
union as a prevailing party or to the employee having incurred a nonrecourse
obligation for attorney's fees as a customer of legal aid services or litigation
insurance.
4. The ProSe Litigant andthe Requirementof IncurringFees
In Kay v. Ehrler,886 the Supreme Court unanimously held that a lawyer who
represented himself pro se in a civil rights action was not eligible for an award of
attorney's fees. The Court held that granting a fee award to a pro se litigant, even
one who was himself a lawyer, would "create a disincentive to employ counsel

1409, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding judicial review of Federal Labor Relations Authority decision
on charge federal agency's refusal to comply with an arbitration award constituted an unfair labor
practice); Department of Air Force v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 775 F.2d 727, 732 (6th Cir.
1985) (same); United States Marshall's Serv. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 778 F.2d 1432, 1436
(9th Cir. 1985) (same).
882. See supra section lII.B.3.d (discussing the eligibility of "organizations," including unions,
for an EAJA Subsection (d) award).
883. See, for example, American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 812
F.2d 1326, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 1987), in which federal employees union provided attorney
representation to members, but not non-member unit employees, in statutory disciplinary actions not
part of the duty of fair representation because they do not involve a grievance or other procedure
growing out of a collective bargaining agreement. See also National Treasury Employees Union v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 800 F.2d 1165, 1167-72 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
884. E.g., Devine v. National Treasury Employees Union, 805 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 67 (1987).
885. E.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Department of Treasury, 656 F.2d 848 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
886. 499 U.S. 432, 111 S. Ct. 1435 (1991).
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whenever [a pro se litigant] considered himself competent to litigate on his own
behalf. The statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious
claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in every
such case."88'7
The Supreme Court's disapproval of an award of attorney's fees to a pro se
litigant in this civil rights case undoubtedly applies generally to bar recovery of
attorney's fees by pro se litigants under other fee-shifting statutes as well, including
the Equal Access to Justice Act.
The Kay decision has been criticized as wrongly assuming that it is foolish or
inappropriate for a person, especially a lawyer, to undertake his or her own
representation, notwithstanding that a fee award would not be forthcoming unless
the pro se had demonstrated sufficient legal ability to prevail in the litigation.,
The decision also has been criticized for failing to appreciate that a pro se litigant
has incurred "a measurable loss-the value of the time involved in the representation-that is caused by a defendant's wrongful conduct."8 8 9 Nevertheless, whatever
the wisdom of the decision, the Supreme Court's declared policy of encouraging
retention of counsel to prosecute claims would apply with full force to preclude an
award of attorney's fees to pro se litigants under the EAJA. 8g9
Moreover, the reservation of fee awards to cases involving retained counsel is
supported by the actual language of the the EAJA. By stating that an award shall
be made for fees "incurred by the party,"89' the EAJA plainly contemplated
compensation only for legal expenses for which the party bears an obligation.
Although a pro se litigant has experienced a loss in terms of the'value of the time
devoted to the lawsuit, it cannot be said that he or she has incurred any obligation,
whether direct or nonrecourse in nature, to reimburse another party for legal
expenses. The courts of appeals have uniformly held that attorney's fees are not
available for pro se litigants under the EAJA.8 92
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